The Paradox of Good Intentions

The Biography of Private Giving in Post-Tsunami Sri Lanka

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Content

Part 1 – Frame

Part 2 – Publications

Part 3 – Annex

List of Tables

List of Maps

List of Figures

List of Pictures

List of Abbreviation

ADB	Asian Development Bank
BaWü	Baden Württemberg
BWTRC	Baden Württemberg Tsunami Relief Cooperation
BWF	Baden-Württemberg Foundation
CC Act	Coastal Conservation Act
CEB	Ministry of Power and Energy, Electricity Board
CNO	Centre for National Operations
DS	Divisional Secretariat
GN	Grama Niladhari
GoSL	Government of Sri Lanka
MEBW	Ministry of the Environment Baden-Württemberg
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
NWSDB	National Water Supply and Drainage Board
PS	Pradeshiya Sabha
RADA	Reconstruction and Development Agency
RDA	Road Development Authority
Rs	Sri Lanka Rupee
TAFLOL	Task Force for Logistics and Law and Order
TAFREN	Task Force to Rebuild the Nation
TAFRER	Task Force for Rescue and Relief
TAFOR	Task Force for Relief
TEC	Tsunami Evaluation Coalition
THRU	Tsunami Housing Reconstruction Unit
UDA	Urban Development Authority

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March 2014 Hard, Austria

„If I knew for a certainty that a man was coming to my house with the conscious design of doing me good, I should run for my life ...“

Henry David Thoreau (2000) Walden And Other Writings, 85

Summary

The 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami exemplifies impressively the power media has today in creating a global humanitarian momentum in which people develop an ethical virtue of care for distant strangers. Through real-time pictorial reporting in the aftermath of the tsunami, "the misery of those far away has been brought home to the people of the rich countries" (Lumsdaine, 1993: 186), brutally illustrating the globalized world its universal vulnerability towards nature (Beck 2005; Clark 2005).

As the disaster was not only a global crisis but also a national issue for many western countries (over 5'000 tourists were among the tsunami victims), the visualization of suffering with a strong national reference induced feelings of sameness, of being together at the mercy of a larger force. This led to a feeling of collective helplessness among various individuals, local and international, affected by the tsunami wave but also those who experienced the disaster via media in the distance. Feelings of togetherness and being collaborators in overcoming the shock and devastation resulted in a wave of solidarity or as Korf (2005) designates the "tsunami after the tsunami", mainly expressed in innumerable private and public donations, multilateral/bilateral aid agreements as well as promises (Brunkhorst 1997; Hondrich and Koch-Arzberger 1992; Linklater 2007; Radtke 2007; Rippe 1998). A massive contingent of aid workers, volunteers, individuals, humanitarian and development agencies and money flooded Sri Lanka converting the humanitarian moment of compassion and

generosity into a field of "competitive humanitarianism" (Stirrat 2006; cf. Bastian 2005/2009). At this point not only international and national institutionalized aid agencies competed with each other but also nations, states, countries, cities, companies, private donators and individuals. These various actors launched what Emma Mawdsley (2012a) accurately refers to as "donor potlatch" (260) in which actors with good intentions to alleviate the suffering of the disaster affected, began to overbid each other's aid promises and public performances of generosity.

The consequence of this donor potlatch was the elevation of post-tsunami rehabilitation to the best-funded international emergency mission in history (Telford 2006). Further it brought up new forms of donators and aid supporters that not only anonymously give money to aid agencies but transferred their benevolence, their genuine ethical and emotional engagement wishing to do good into beneficence, taking the crucial step towards action (Silk 2000). This changing sense of responsibility resulted in a high quantity of private non-anonymous donators getting personally involved in project planning and implementation. Their motives are twofold. On the one hand, based on personal or professional relations to the disaster affected country and individuals, they want to give something back, they feel an obligation to reciprocate. On the other hand they want to counter-steer negative reports and evaluations in humanitarianism and therefore strive to get involved in order to control, guide and re-position the sector towards their core principles – humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence. However the demand of non-anonymous donators for an active participation in decision-making and implementation changes the way in which aid is done and works.

Even though donators publicly present their donations as 'altruistic' gifts emphasizing to focus only on the demands and needs of the sufferers, their claim for an active involvement and the position as controller uncovers paternalistic motives. On the way to deliver their 'gift' donators not only claim for more transparency, accountability and efficiency of aid but also demanding to put into effect personal visions, ideals and their understanding of improvement and development. Attaching clearly defined conditions and finalities to the donation and personally getting involved in the local domain of aid not only changes the relation between giver and receiver but the accountability towards the gift. Or, as Stirrat and Henkel (1997) put it with regard to charity in development aid more broadly, "[w]hat starts off as a counterpoint to the logic of the real world (gifts versus markets) ends up as part of that real world. The pure gifts become, in the end, the currency of systems of patronage" (74).

The cumulative PhD project exemplifies in five published, double blinded peer reviewed articles (itemized in Part 2), what I will describe as the paradox of good intentions: the conversion of the 'pure' and well intended gifts into a culturally charged political commodity. As the author was involved as aid practitioner in post-tsunami rehabilitation, a former aid project, a tsunami-housing relocation project for 90 affected families located in Southern Sri Lanka, Galle District, was transferred into an academic research field making the thesis an "insider ethnography" (Mosse 2006: 936). The fundamental knowledge on the resettlement scheme, that was initiated by three German private donators, its actors, networks and alliances, project visions and political linkages was gained during 30 months of professional involvement. Hence lot of the empirical data was 'produced' as work material such as internal project documents, field notes, memos, monthly project reports, and Email communication documenting various processes, decisions and discussions on the donator-driven housing project. In order to holistically trace the biography of this particular private non-anonymous gift additional fieldwork periods were conducted and semi-structured interviews conducted in Sri Lanka but also Germany. The overall aim of the thesis is to explore the hidden workings and mechanisms behind good intentions. Hereby the question is not whether or not the transferred gift of development fails or per se is a mistake. The objective is to understand the logic behind the gift asking: what does lead to certain practices of private non-anonymous donators aiming to achieve their visions and ideals of a successful rehabilitation and more general how does aid work? (Detailed account of each article see chapter 5). In order to uncover the paradox of good intentions, the thesis analyses the phenomena of private non-anonymous humanitarian giving, distinguishing two phases of the private non-anonymous gift (detailed in chapter 2). Firstly, building on Marcel Mauss' (1990) theory of the gift, the analysis focuses on the humanitarian moment of the 'pure' gift arguing that the active donators' participation does influence and change practices, politics and power networks in the humanitarian aid chain and at different localities thereby reinforcing the prevailing modes of social hierarchy, the commodification of good intentions and power relations (Article 1, Article 2, Article 3). Secondly, the research focus shifts to analyse the transformation of the 'pure' gift in long-term visions of development. Here Foucault's concept of governmentality helps to uncover the power donators' exert on the receivers of their gift aiming to shape their "…possible field of action…" (Foucault, 1982:221). It is claimed that the donators' initially 'pure' and good intentions transfer into a will to improve, aiming to produce 'good beneficiaries' and to implant their visions, logic and socially informed knowledge into their lives (Article 4, Article 5).

Based on the analysis the PhD in overall concludes that a major problem of the humanitarian sector today is: the aspersion of the Maussian gift. Even though the thesis highlights this aspersion for the very specific case of non-anonymous giving, it is agued that the majority of actors and brokers working within the global gift economy act similar to non-anonymous donators. On the one hand the sector present their gifts of aid as 'pure' and altruistic, a gift free from any obligations and reciprocity. On the other hand these performances and demonstrations are purposeful and intentional. The logics of compassion, purity and disinterestedness are critical at the beginning of doing aid in order to set up transnational gift exchanges and further to convince a broad public to materially and financially support predefined vision of development and 'betterment' for those suffering. The problem here is, that development agencies hide the true workings of exchange and the business of doing aid behind a benevolent and altruistic self, covering hegemonic objectives, self-interests and struggles for power within a highly competitive market. Using Mauss' Theory of the gift it became clear that the notion of gift is important to cover these true workings. Combining Mauss' theory with Foucaults' concept of governmentality in the analysis it is highlighted that the language of the gift slips into a language of governing, of educating those who do not know, who need guidance in order to achieve betterment for their lives. However analysing the governmentality of private non-anonymous gift it becomes evident that it is not those who want to govern guide the long-term mentality of the governed but the governed themselves modify it based on their everyday reality.

The recommendation for the humanitarian sector would be that it develops an attitude of mutual learning or in Giri and Van Ufford terms "acknowledged dependence" (273). In this understanding, actors within the development gift economy at both ends and along the aid chain "…acknowledge the significance of the four agents of development – state, market, voluntary organisations/social movements, and the self – but not to grant absolute primacy to any" (ibidi 273). In doing so it becomes important to understand the socio-political complexity of doing aid and the logic of the gift economy in each specific location and most important to acknowledge it openly. Aid practitioners arriving in countries in the aftermath of disasters need to reflect on involved interests and learn about what Korf characterizes as "the political economy of 'the situation'" (2010: iv). Therefore researchers and practitioners have to become partners in order to "… grasp the social and political processes through which aid policy is made and transformed in practice, … [researchers]…have to negotiate space for their involvement to be more ethnographic and resist institutional pressure to conform to dominant policy-driven or economics-based knowledge systems" (Mosse

2007:941). The overall aim has to be to frame existing problems of rehabilitation and relief not only in a language of development technologies but to uncover the political ecology of established gift relations and adjust its practices accordingly.

Prologue: Experiencing a disaster

‘Pia, something happened in Sri Lanka, thousands of people are dead!’

M. Hollenbach, 26th December 2004

This was the morning call from my father on the 26th of December 2004, 9:12 am (CET). I had been staying at my parent’s house, packing my boxes to move to Sri Lanka to fulfil a 2 year working contract with the University of Heidelberg. The 26th of December 2004 changed all plans I had for my last days in Germany before my departure on the 1st of January 2005. Immediately after my father had heard the news on the radio my family and I switched on the TV to find out what had actually happened in Sri Lanka. My first thought was ‘war’, but soon BBC showed me another reality. Pictures from Thailand, Sri Lanka and Southern India were streamed right into our living room. A red banner informed us: ‘Earthquake with 9 on the Richter scale in Indonesia set off one of the biggest recorded Tsunamis… thousands of people dead’. Later a real time-streamer showed constantly the death count of all affected countries – Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India, Thailand, Maldives.

I was in shock and hours later, I still sat in front of the TV watching the pictures of destruction and crying people running around in despair. I listened to interviews with tourists – people from Germany, England or Australia. I also started to try to get in contact with my future

office colleagues and with my Sri Lankan friends, which was impossible at that time. For the next two days I was unable to reach anyone. During the following hours and days my family received many phone calls from family and friends all expressing their sympathy, shock and worry. Not only because I was about to leave to Sri Lanka but due to the real time screening of the disaster we felt as if we were a part of it too.

Many of those who called expressed their deep sympathy with the tsunami-affected people in the region and asked how they could help. As some had been visiting Thailand or Sri Lanka as tourists, they were thinking of going there to help. Others immediately offered money to take to Sri

Kalmunai, Sri Lanka 01/2005
Source: Steve Creech

Lanka and give it to people in need. Also the managing director of my future workplace called to let me know that the Institute would set up a donations account since many people wanted to help by donating something. When I left Germany for Sri Lanka on the 2nd of January 2005, I had collected almost 4'000 Euros from generous givers who wanted me 'to do something good'. I was impressed by their generosity and kindness but also overwhelmed and scared whether I would be able to meet their expectations.

I was quite naïve when flying in to Sri Lanka. I had called the airline and they informed me they would not take any civilians to the island besides emergency experts, relief goods or technical equipment for the next two weeks until the situation were stable and secure. After long discussions the airline accepted my argument that I had to take over my duties in the local branch office of the University of Heidelberg's of South Asia Institute and that I had a responsibility to be there with my office colleagues and staff. As I had never experienced an international emergency situation before, I was not aware of what it triggers off in the arena of international emergency aid.

The flight provided a first insight into what I would have to expect when arriving in Sri Lanka. The airplane carried a huge Water Treatment Plant, four Red Cross emergency experts, one doctor and me. As all passengers were experienced with disaster and emergency situations they started to talk about their former experiences in Bosnia, Afghanistan and Africa and everyone agreed that this disaster was different from all their former experiences. It was not only the magnitude and outreach of the wave, but also the immense generosity and solidarity expressed by many people around the world. My flight companions were all critical about private people or city councils starting fundraising campaigns and 'doing good'. They were convinced that relief work is the job of experts. Uncoordinated private initiatives would create chaos and produce counter effects. Knowing about the money I was carrying in my suitcase affiliated to expectations of generous private people, I became more and more silent. As I listened to the emergency experts my anxiety increased with regards to whether I would myself be able 'to do good'.

Arriving at the Bandaranaiake Airport I was physically confronted with the reality of tsunami relief and I was completely overwhelmed. Since the 26th of December 2004 I had sat, more or less continuously, in front of the TV watching real time pictures of the Tsunami disaster but now I was facing its immediate consequences: There were still tourists waiting at the airport to leave the island, the airstrip was full of containers, the army repacking relief goods on to trucks,

and helicopters were coming and going. I was touched by the reality of the international emergency and humanitarian aid machinery unaware that soon I would become part of it for the next three years. I was picked up from my office colleague who directly drove me to the office. All office members and their immediate families were fine, as well as my close friend the former SAI Head of Office and his partner. What a relief! As I held an official passport and was linked to the German Embassy, they were aware of my arrival within just three hours. I received a phone call from the German Embassy asking me to join the Embassy as soon as possible in order to support the German relief coordination, identification of tourists, travel back documents, etc. Two hours later I entered the German Embassy. Here, during the next six weeks I would start learning to understand the outcomes and consequences of an internationally mediated disaster relief taking place in a tourist destination. The numbers of German aid organizations arriving in Sri Lanka grew every day; professional agencies and private initiatives along with families who had experienced the tsunami disaster asked the Embassy to assist them in the implementation of their aid projects. However the attempt and effort of the Embassy to coordinate and map German Aid in order to make it more efficient while minimizing regional and thematic overlaps failed. Aid organizations were not willing to share detailed information either about their work, regional proliferation or on budget volumes, aims and local partners. I realized at an early stage, that humanitarian aid is a highly competitive business. To make matters worse the majority of organisations struggled, to find projects, and paradoxically later in identifying affected people.

In March 2005, having got in contact with many relief organisations that had entered Sri Lanka to provide emergency aid and in need of personnel, I was offered a contract by a German Emergency Relief Agency as an external consultant. My task was to coordinate and organize their immediate relief work in Sri Lanka and to identify local partner organisations to conduct emergency projects with. In October 2005 my contract and responsibilities were extended and I became responsible in co-managing a resettlement project in Southern Sri Lanka, in the Galle District, which was initiated by three private donators and of which the aid agency became a contracting partner. Here the task was to implement the visions and ideas of the donator group. One of my responsibilities in this private, donor-driven housing scheme project was to guide communication with the actively involved donators and to ‘coordinate’, ‘manage’ and ‘regulate’ their demands, wishes and expectations. In this context ‘doing good’ had less to do with the real demands, needs and the living environment of aid recipients but rather a custom-tailored process.

Days, weeks, months and years later I still remain impressed by the generosity and solidarity that people showed in the aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. However, the experiences I had with private giving, charity, solidarity as well as international humanitarian aid, relief and reconstruction work with its involved politics as well as struggle over power, increased the desire to better understand what I call the paradox of good intentions. On the one hand private donators as well as aid agencies want to alleviate the suffering of poor and affected people in need. It starts with an altruistic moment, with the intention of a 'pure' gift but does end in a competitive business of showing visible impacts and difference when entering the domain of organized giving. It is obvious that actors are trapped in power and patronage systems, and are guided through personal politics and self-interests. Being personally involved I have experienced how difficult it is to escape the complex system of aid, since at the end it is a business sector, which needs to show success, effectiveness and good performance. Moreover it secures the survival of many international experts and during this particular period of time, mine included.

With the help of an academic research project, I attempt to better understand and reconcile my practical experiences with the reality of how humanitarian aid, its actors and the narratives of 'purity', generosity and doing good is still presented in public. In other words: I hope it helps to overcome the personal trauma of my personal Tsunami. The aspiration is that analytical and theoretical concepts enable me to detach and distance myself from the project as well as institutionalized humanitarianism. At the same time I have been able to reflect, clarify and realize why certain activities, agreements, decisions, visions and demands of various counterparts and involved actors, including myself, were made and implemented. I am however aware that my personal history and involvement can never be fully detached from my academic work and results showing that research in social science can never be conducted 'outside' ourselves or outside our biography.

Hambantota, Sri Lanka 02/2005
Source: P. Hollenbach

Part 1
Frame

Over the last centuries organized and institutionalized giving to suffering strangers has not only changed in its modalities and practices but also in scale and dissemination.

1. Disasters, Solidarity and Gift-Giving in humanitarian aid

The 1755 Lisbon earthquake known as the first mediatised natural disaster marks a first turning point in demonstrations of transnational solidarity and organized humanitarian response (Dynes 2000; Hannigan 2012; Murteira 2004; Pantti 2012). The visualization of suffering beyond Portugal's borders diminished the distance between those suffering the aftershocks of the natural disasters and those experiencing it through graphic descriptions and dramatic accounts in news papers and narrative reports. After seeing the magnitude of destruction, many European countries, states and individuals sent money, food, building supplies and labour to Portugal intending to alleviate the suffering of the affected people. Since then global media coverage has expanded tremendously and today's improved technology broadcasts in real time, one side of the world into the lived reality of the other side, evoking an ethical virtue of care for distant strangers. As Corbridge (1993) notes: "…our lives are radically entwined with the lives of different strangers [and today] … there is no logical reason to suppose that moral boundaries should coincide with the boundaries of our everyday community…" (463; bracket added; cf Boltanski 1999; Brock 2005; Chatterjee 2004; Hannigan 2012; Howitt 2002; Ignatieff 1998; Korf 2007; Linklater 2007; Proctor 1998; Robertson 2008; Sack 1997; Silk 2004).

A second point of inflexion in international organized giving identifies Henry Dunant's initiative in 1862 inspiring the creation of the International Committee of the Red Cross. Since then, and particularly since ending the Second World War in 1945, the world has seen the emergence of numerous international/ national multilateral/bilateral, state-led increase of non-governmental and private humanitarian and development aid agencies and a growing importance of the same. The attempt is to alleviate the suffering of individuals, states and countries in a situation of emergency and distress caused by an abnormal event such as natural or man-made disasters, thereby recognizing institutionalized rules and regulations. Financial support for humanitarian activities is generated through public and private money with an increased importance of private donations, representing today almost two thirds of the sectors revenue (Fearon 2008; Randel and German 2002). While the majority of these generous private givers prefer in staying anonymous and not becoming personally involved in the relief work, aid organisations act as "…brokers that translate this caring-about into a caring-for the distant sufferer" (Korf 2007: 376; cf. Barnett 2005; Calhoun 2008/2010; Donini 2006; Kent 2004; Wilson and Brown 2009).

However the growth of globally acting humanitarian agencies have not only positive effects in terms of the dissemination and accessibility to aid. Negative outcomes are "…competitive dynamics for status, power, and authority" (Barnett and Weiss 2008: 29) as well as the critique on the legitimacy, accountability, transparency and effectiveness of the sector. It is argued that humanitarian organisations that distinguish their work from human rights and development activities by "focusing on the immediate ethical imperative of reducing suffering – and especially saving lives - …that underwrites the ideal of humanitarian neutrality…" (Calhoun 2008: 90) get caught in the mundane world of development practices - patronage, favouritism and politics. Good intentions to alleviate suffering get contested through conditions, restrictions, interests, rules and pre-defined finalities resulting in questionable social practices of 'doing aid' (Barnett and Weiss 2008; Bornstein and Redfield 2010; Mosse 2005; Mosse and Lewis 2006; Smith 2005; Sogge 2002; Van Ufford and Giri 2003; Weiss 2013). The scores of public critique on current organised giving and humanitarianism resulted in the emergence of a new actor, presenting themselves and their visions in a high moral tone as the antipode of the humanitarian sector, private non-anonymous donators[1].

1 The term donator is used in this thesis to distinguish private persons giving donations to aid and development organizations from donor-indicating official development institutions like government, semi-official foundations or international/national/local aid organizations. The phenomena of private (national/international) donator-driven aid projects emerged in a multitude of tsunami projects in Sri Lanka in which, private donators acted as ‚experts' and as part of the project planning team, becoming

A growing literature in geography, indicating a "moral turn" (Smith 1997) in the discipline, discusses the relationship between space and obligations, and the geographies of responsibility towards suffering distant strangers (Barnett 2005; Barnett and Land 2007; Brock 2005; Howitt 2002; Korf 2007; Massey 2004; Proctor 1998; Sack 1997; Silk 2004). However less attention in academic writing is given to ethnographically informed research on the phenomena of non-anonymous giving analysing how and why altruistic acts of generosity are presented in 'pure' gifts, become entangled in the political economy of aid and reciprocal obligations. The aim of the cumulative PhD project is to exemplify in five published, double blinded peer reviewed articles (itemized in Part 2), what I will describe as the paradox of good intentions: the conversion of the 'pure' and well intended gifts into a culturally charged political commodity. Using the example of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami the thesis traces the biography of a private non-anonymous gift trying to explore the hidden workings and mechanisms behind good intentions. The question is not *whether or not* the transferred gift of development fails or per se is a mistake. The thesis tries to understand the *logic behind* the gift, asking: *what does* lead to certain practices of donators aiming to achieve their visions and ideals of successful rehabilitation and more general *how does* aid work? (Detailed account of each article see chapter 5).

The first part of the PhD thesis – the present frame document – introduces the overall research context and how the articles stand in relation to each other. The first chapter discusses the phenomena of private non-anonymous donators and gives a summary of resultant research objectives and research questions. Chapter two presents the applied conceptual approaches followed by an introduction into the empirical case (chapter 3) that enabled the ethnographic research project. Chapter four reflects on critical encounters during the research work focusing on the researchers personal involvement in the field first as practitioner and later as researcher. Chapter five presents a summary of each article highlighting their interplay as well as relation and completes the frame document with a synthesis.

1.1 Non-anonymous private donators in humanitarian aid

The 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami exemplifies impressively the power media has today in creating a global humanitarian momentum in which people develop an

an active part in the rehabilitation process. This led not only to new relationships and networks within the aid chain, but also to new practices of how aid was delivered (cf. Henkel/Stirrat 1997; Korf et al. 2009; Stirrat 2006).

ethical virtue of care for distant strangers. Through real-time pictorial reporting in the aftermath of the tsunami, "the misery of those far away has been brought home to the people of the rich countries" (Lumsdaine, 1993: 186) brutally illustrating the globalized world, its universal vulnerability towards nature (Beck 2005; Clark 2005). Furthermore the disaster was not only a global crisis but also a national issue for many western countries, since over 5'000 tourists were among the tsunami victims[2]. This made disaster reporting "…exceptional because the Western audience was not only in the position of a witness and a helper but also of a sufferer…" (Pantti et al. 2012: 127). In comparison, natural disasters like the earthquake in Kashmir 2005 with over 80'000 people dead and millions displaced, the cyclone in Burma and the Sichuan earthquake in China in 2008 or the devastating earthquake in Haiti 2010 with a similar impact on economic, social and human losses were not covered by media in such an intensive way but critically positioned within local political circumstances making the disaster less newsworthy, less media visible, less cosmopolitan and less emotionally demanding. The consequences are less private while public donations influenced the intensity and capacity of humanitarian aid responses (Boltanski 1999; Hyndman 2011; Ignatieff 1998; Natsios 1997; Pantti 2012)

Therefore media coverage and the visualization of suffering with a strong national reference induced feelings of sameness, of being together at the mercy of a larger force. The collective helplessness as well as being collaborators in overcoming the shock and devastation resulted in a solidarity of compassion highlighting that "… solidarity is not thought of as recognition of a core self… rather, it is thought of as the ability to see more and more traditional differences as unimportant when *compared with similarities with respect to pain and humiliation*" (Rorty 1989: 192; emphasis added; cf Brunkhorst 1997; Hondrich and Koch-Arzberger 1992; Linklater 2007; Radtke 2007; Rippe 1998;). However the tsunami highlights other factors in eliciting the solidarity of compassion particularly processes summarized under the notion of 'globalization' such as increased mobility of people, expansion of personal and professional networks of influence and change the spatial organization of human life, the sense of mutual reasonability and the scope of care for and about distant strangers. The "vanishing distance" (Korf 2007: 366) between individuals extends both moral boundaries and ethical obligations turning solidarity, according to the theory of the gift, into a mutual compliance of reciprocity (Chatterjee 2004; Komter 2005; Adloff/Mau 2006; Schieder 2008; detailed discussion on the theory of the gift in humanitarian aid follows in

2 The majority of the 275'000 Tsunami victims originate not only from Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India or Thailand but also western countries in terms of causalities: Germany 539, Sweden 543, Finland 178 and Britain 149 (Source: Pantti et al 2012: 127 and Telford et al 2006)

chapter 2). Innumerable private and public donations, multilateral/bilateral aid agreements and promises however created what Korf (2005) designates as the "tsunami after the tsunami". A massive contingent of aid workers, volunteers, individuals, humanitarian and development agencies and money flooded Sri Lanka converting the humanitarian moment of compassion and generosity into a field of "competitive humanitarianism" (Stirrat 2006; cf. Bastian 2005/2009). Though not only international and national institutionalized aid agencies competed with each other but also nations, states, countries, cities, companies, private donators and individuals. These various actors launched out what Emma Mawdsley (2012a) accurately related to as "donor potlatch" (260), overbidding each other's aid promises and public performances of generosity.

A great number of people expressed their solidarity in form of money donations to humanitarian and development aid agencies elevating it to the best-funded international emergency mission in history (Telford 2006). However based on former social ties, personal or business relations to affected countries a multitude of private money contributors transferred their benevolence, their genuine ethical and emotional engagement wishing to do good into beneficence, taking the crucial step of actively doing good (Silk 2000). This changing sense of responsibility resulted in a high quantity of private non-anonymous donators. On the one hand the motivation for non-anonymous donations results from an obligation to reciprocate. Donators intend to counter-steer negative reports and evaluations in humanitarianism. Since the 1994 Ruwandan genocide and the questionable involvement of the humanitarian sector, its image presenting "…a symbol of what is good about the world, as the world's superego, as suggestive of the possibility of a more human world" (Barnett and Weiss 2008: 6) suffers from public critique and debates. Common perception is that concepts like the 'responsibility to protect', which followed as consequence to better control and legitimize the humanitarian sector has a too strong influence on contemporary humanitarian principles and worse "…it is mobilized by the powerful nations only when it suits them to depose an 'undesirable' regime" (Mawsdley 2012b: 90). The consequence is an increasing involvement of a variety of non-anonymous donators publicly presenting themselves as the antipode to the 'dirty business' of current humanitarianism that needs to be controlled, guided and re-positioned towards their core principles – humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence. Prominent examples are celebrities such as the well-known actor Sean Penn launching the 'Haitian Relief Organization[3] in the aftermath of the Haitian earthquake in 2010 or Brad Pitt establishing the 'Make it right foundation' in the aftermath of the 2005 hurricane

3 for more information see http://jphro.org/ and http://makeitright.org

Katrina, both getting actively involved in the relief work, self-organized but also in cooperation with institutionalized relief organizations changing and influencing the way of doing aid. Through an active participation in decision-making and implementation non-anonymous donators on the one hand want to control the money flow and increase the transparency, accountability and efficiency of aid work, on the other hand they aim to put into effect personal visions, ideals and their understanding of improvement and development.

Even though donators publicly present their donations as 'altruistic' gifts emphasizing the focus only on the demands and needs of the sufferers, their claim for an active involvement and the position as controller uncovers paternalistic motives. Stirrat and Henkel (1997) argue in their article, "The Development Gift" that anonymous donations slowly transform "…into an interested, accountable, a non-free transaction … a shift toward more and more obvious forms of patronage and control" (76-77) when entering the institutionalized and organized system of giving. Here donors and receivers do not directly interact but different types of aid brokers (Bierschenk, Chauveau and Olivier de Sardan 2002; Mosse and Lewis 2006; Sørenson 2008) mediate among different actors in the domain of humanitarian giving increasingly commodifying the pure act of generosity. Non-anonymous donators alter this transformation process. Attaching clearly defined conditions and finalities to the donation and personally getting involved in the local domain of aid not only changes the relation between giver and receiver but also the accountability towards the gift. A detailed discussion on the theory of the gift, its incorporation in development studies and its broadening towards the humanitarian non-anonymous gift will follow in chapter two. Before this the following chapter introduces the main research foci, subsequently presenting associated research questions.

1.2 Research focus and research question

Previous empirical research on the tsunami, such as the one completed by the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC), have shown the ambivalent impact of competitive humanitarianism, its limited outreach, the multiple dilemmas and ambiguities embedded in the recovery process, as well as the frustration of aid beneficiaries about paternalistic aid practices (Bastian 2005; Bennett et al. 2006; Brun and Lund 2008; Brun 2009; Cosgrave 2006; de Mel and Ruwanpura 2006; de Silva and Yamao 2007; Fernando and Hilhorst 2006; Haug and Weerackody 2007; Hyndman 2007; Keys et al. 2006; Korf 2005/2007; McGilvray and Gamburd, 2010; Ruwanpura 2008a, 2008b, 2009; Sarvananthan and Sanjeewanie 2008; Telford et al. 2006; Telford and Cosgrave 2007; Stirrat 2006). As Korf (2005) writes: "For many Sri Lankans, especially the poor and vulnerable, the tsunami has often taken all they have – their assets, their loved ones. What has happened to many of them after the tsunami is that they have lost their dignity because they are treated as 'pure' victims, reduced to recipients of foreign gifts and the state's paternalistic benevolence" (i). Further topics such as the politics of memorialisation and purification (Simpson and de Alwis 2008; Hasbullah and Korf 2009), the gendered world of post-tsunami spatial politics (De Mel 2007; Hyndman 2008; Rees 2005; Ruwanpura 2008; Thurnheer 2009) or the politics of housing and new challenges for rehabilitation (Barenstein 2013; Birkmann 2007; Brun and Lund 2008/2009; Boano 2009; Domroes 2006; Hettige 2007; Lyons 2009; Ruwanpura 2009; Samarasinghe 2006) have been addressed. All these writings underline the fact that it is impossible to understand post-tsunami reconstruction without recognising the wider political, cultural, social and cultural terrain of war, ethno-nationalism and uneven development in Sri Lanka.

Less attention in current academic writings is given to the newly emerged phenomena of non-anonymous private giving in humanitarian aid (Chouliaraki 2013; Fernando and Hilhorst 2006; Korf 2010) analysing its consequences and impact on everyday practices of aid. Since I have been deeply involved myself in tsunami rehabilitation and in particular in the new form of private non-anonymous giving via professional aid agencies, therefore my PhD thesis is informed by ethnographic research material. This enables me to demonstrate how the everyday practices, discourses and dilemmas faced by aid workers and implementing agencies help to counterbalance inflated expectations, expose uncritical admiration, and put unrealistic critiques into perspective. Even if my personal involvement and experience as an "aid broker" (Bierschenk et al. 2002; Mosse and Lewis 2006) has prepared me well as a participant ethnographer in the sense of Mosse's (2004, 2005) work to produce such ethnography of humanitarian

aid (Gould and Marcussen 2004; Korf 2006; Long 2001) in a reflexive ethnographic style (Davies 2008; Eyben 2011; Foley 2002; Guillemin and Gillam 2004; Rose 1997; Salzmann 2002), I have struggled during the deployment of my research project with changing positions from 'aid broker' (insider) to an ethnographic researcher (outsider) (Ergun and Erdemir 2010; Gould and Marcussen 2004) and as Coffey (1999) refers to it, my own 'ethnographic self'. This ongoing struggle and arising questions of ethics in conducting such research will be discussed and contemplated in chapter four.

During my professional involvement in post-tsunami rehabilitation I was puzzled by the continuous disjuncture between donator narratives and the public presentation and performance of private non-anonymous gifts. The everyday practices of implementation and how donators controlled and influenced processes using their personal and professional power positions and networks in order to achieve their vision and expectations of a successful project (in their understanding) constantly contradicted the narrated 'purity' of the project. My intention is not to condemn or to blame any of the actors involved in the project used as empirical example, but rather to understand and diagnose the rationale and logic behind, as the product of a particular vision, a particular socialized knowledge, a particular setting and the involvement of politics and power. By providing insights into the project, I hope to provide elements for a better understanding of the dynamics of post-tsunami aid.

In order to uncover the paradox of good intentions, the thesis analyses the phenomena of private non-anonymous humanitarian giving distinguishing two phases of the private non-anonymous gift (detailed in chapter 2). First, building on Marcel Mauss' (1990) theory of the gift, the analysis focuses on the *humanitarian moment* of transnational solidarity expressed in form of 'pure' gifts. The thesis argues that the active donators' participation does influence and change practices, politics and power networks in the humanitarian aid chain and at different localities thereby reinforcing the prevailing modes of social hierarchy and the commodification of good intentions (Article 1, Article 2). Furthermore the research work asserts that rituals and ceremonies around the gift visualize and perpetuate power relations and asymmetries expressed in gentle form of violence (Article 3, Article 4, Article 1). Second, the research focus shifts to analyse the transformation of the 'pure' gift in *long-term visions of development*. Here Foucaults' concept of governmentality helps to uncover the power donators exert on the receivers of their gift aiming to shape their "…possible field of action…" (Foucault, 1982:221). It is claimed that donators' initially 'pure' and good intentions transfer into a will to improve aiming to produce 'good beneficiaries'

corresponding to their understanding of sustainable 'development' and autonomous village organization (Article 5). Further the concept helps to highlight how donators' visions, logic and socially informed knowledge influence the objectives of the aid project but also the actual practices and technologies of doing aid (Article 4, Article 5).

Each article refers to one main focus of private non-anonymous giving, asking the following research questions (see next page):

Article	Research Focus		Research Question	Research Findings
1	Humanitarian moment of gift giving	Multi-local dynamics of giving	How do donators' public narratives of purity and ethical practices of aid delivery in their home location influence the everyday practices and technologies of giving and the project implementation in Sri Lanka?	• development gifts presented as pure and altruistic become embroiled in the workings of gift exchange • gifts work through the logic of patron-age, favouritism, and politics • to understand the geography of a gift one needs to understand the socio-politics of both locations – givers and receivers
2		Commo-dification of good intentions	What are the intricate chains of relation, obli-gation, and expectation pertinent in the co-evolving, but often con-tradictory, gift rationales that permeate and influence the practices, performances, and discourses of tsunami aid?	• Good intentions become contaminated through local politics of patronage and the workings of an institutionalized gift economy • Gifts establish socio-political relations with giver and receiver setting specific reciprocal expectations
3		Ritual legiti-mization of the gifts' symbolic violence	How does the application of rituals and ceremonies around the humanitarian gift intend to 'incorporate' extraneously set aid objectives into the habitus and social reality of local communities? Further, how do such rituals underline and reinforce asymmetric relations between donators and recipients, and how are these subtly and symbolically visualized?	• Gifts presented as charitable act carry a symbolic violence within deepening existing social and power divides • Private non-anonymous development gifts are more concerned strengthening the social capital of the giver then the betterment of the receiver • Generosity carries a double truth: it reveals social asymmetry, hierarchy and the manifestation of power

Article	Research Focus		Research Question	Research Findings
4	Long-term development of the gift	Rationale of governing others' mentality	How are donators' visions, ideals and understanding of ‚building back better' transferred into everyday practices of concrete village reconstruction? And through which technologies and practices do donators intend to shape, form and guide the conduct of housing recipients in order to fit their particular and pre-assembled visions?	• Private non-anonymous donator-driven aid projects guide and govern the beneficiaries based on their socialized knowledge and logic of development/betterment • Donator-driven aid do change and influence the 'conduct of conduct' of beneficiaries but newly interpreted by themselves • The attempt of private donators to produce governable subjects is a source of power replicating existing asymmetries and deficiencies in international development aid
5		Governmen-tality of good intentions	How and at which juncture of project implementation does the initial compassionate impetus of donators slip into a will to improve resulting in an inadvertent obtrusion of moral imperatives of donators upon the lives of aid recipients? How does this highlight existing power relations but also systems of patronage and clientelism?	• The logic of compassion is critical for generating solidarity and financial support in order to establish aid projects • Discursive tropes of compassion slip during project implementation into a will to improve • The interpellation of religious and moral mores are compassionate gesticulations, but when taken to the scale of willing communities to improve they expose and underbelly where the political economy matters

Table 1: Overall research question

2. Conceptual Approach

My purpose here is to distinguish two phases of private non-anonymous giving by focusing on different objectives of the gift. To analyse the phenomena of private non-anonymous giving in the context of mediated international organized aid Mauss' (1924) theory of the gift is able to capture many aspects of private non-anonymous giving such as the paradoxical combination of interestedness and disinterestedness, the three-fold sequence of obligation (to give, to accept, and render) or the deep interconnection between the gift and donators socio-political and economic identity. Yet the gift theory is able "to demonstrate the ways in which the symbolic properties of foreign aid work to assert benevolence and generosity, while obscuring more exploitative, hierarchical and self-interested relations" (Mawdsley 2012a: 268). However it is less useful to analyse the process and *how* the transferring of this imbedded identity is to its receivers. In order to resolve this gap but to reach for a fuller understanding of the phenomena the thesis, in addition, applies Foucaults' (1977) concept of governmentality examining adopted development techniques and practices but also to highlight the derivation of the gifts' identity and governmentatlity.

2.1 Gifts in humanitarian aid

2.1.1 Basic essentials of the Maussian gift

Building on Marcel Mauss' (1990) theory of the gift, the analysis first focuses on the *humanitarian moment* of transnational solidarity expressed in form of 'pure' gifts to humanitarian aid organizations. To better understand the consequences of such expressions of solidarity, it is helpful to embed the concept of solidarity into the theory of the gift carving out the paradox of good intentions and hidden ambivalences of the 'humanitarian gift' (cf. Stirrat and Henkel 1997). But what do the two concepts - solidarity and gift giving - have in common and how can solidarity be analysed through the theory of the gift? Seemingly both concepts have nothing in common as they differ in their etymological and scientific histories: "Whereas solidarity is an abstract concept … gift giving is often associated with concrete and material objects exchanged on certain occasions between people having a certain type of relationship" (Komter, 2005: 1). However looking at solidarity and gift giving in their entirety, it becomes clear, that both do relate in their most fundamental manifestations and functions: solidarity and gift giving are both motivated by the nature of human relationships creating and maintaining social ties. Or as Mary Douglas (1990: XV) puts it "the theory of the

gift is a theory of human solidarity" (Komter 2005; Korf 2007; Mauss 1990; Rippe 1998; Ratke 2007; Smith 2005; Stirrat/Henkel 1997).

In his work *"Essai sur le don"* Marcel Mauss (1924) (English version 1990 'The Gift') came to the conclusion, that gift giving in archaic communities should be seen as a system of exchange, which involves "the three-fold sequence of obligations (to give, to accept, and render)" (Silber, 1998: 138) emphasising the direct relation between donor and giver. Mauss argued, that the exchange of gifts connects individuals to a larger society and can be seen as a "total social phenomena" (1990: 11) in which economic and social motives are inseparable. He identified that gifts carry a wide range of meanings – religious, economic, political and social and that the process of giving follows its own logic related to an initiated cycle of reciprocity establishing social relations and consolidating hierarchy. Based on his observations he further contends that even if a gift is given without the thought of a return-gift, the act of giving implies an implicit expectation of reciprocity. Derrida (1992) underlines Mauss' argument noting that there is no such thing as a 'free gift'. In his view gift giving does negate its own principle due to the fact that "as soon as a gift is giving knowingly as a gift, the subject of generosity is always anticipating a return, already taking credit of some sort, if only for being generous" (in Barnett and Land 2007: 1072). Even self-congratulation or the hope that good action will bring good (not necessarily directly from the recipient of the gift), in which the biblical image 'as you sow, so shall you reap' fits so well, invalidates the gift as 'pure' (Derrida 1992; Laidlaw 2000).

Sahlins (1972) identified in Mauss' essay three forms of gift giving differing in their reciprocity: balanced, generalized and negative. The classification is founded on the giver and receiver's capacity to give back. Balanced reciprocity indicates giving among social equals, meaning, the given gift can be given back in same value. Negative reciprocity on the contrary reveals, that the universal obligation of reciprocity does no longer hold as the social divide is too large and the recipient is left with a huge moral and social debt and dependency based on the incapability to reciprocate. Sahlins sees in negative reciprocity a tool to affirm social hierarchy and power over time. Vandevelde (2000) yet suggests that recipients always have the capacity to give back, even if it is only by showing gratefulness. He notes: "very often situations in which one can only respond to a gift by being grateful, are considered as humiliating. They oblige us to admit our inferiority" (Vandevelde, 2000: 19).

2.1.2 Maussian gift and humanitarian aid

Richard Tittmus (1971) inaugurated with his book '*The gift relationship: from human blood to social policy'* a publicly influential line of thinking, reiterated more recently by Godbout and Caillè (2001) and Gouldner (2005), contending that Mauss' approach is no longer applicable evaluating the system of modern giving. Agreeing with Marcel Mauss on the fact, that voluntary giving is "not only morally superior, and eventually even practically more efficient than the market in the provision of public goods and services … and constitutive of a higher level of social solidarity" (Silber 1998: 138), he refuses the most fundamental features of Mauss' gift theory. For Tittmus the modern form of giving (or in his words modern 'altruistic' giving) in contemporary societies is based on anonymity and made to strangers, therefore not entailing expectations of a return gift from the recipient to the donor. In his understanding modern generosity is an act of "altruism as behaviour intended to benefit another, even when doing so may risk or entail some sacrifice to the welfare of the actor" (cited in Adloff/Sigmund, 2005: 217; cf. Gouldner 2005). Giving is thereby found on the norm of beneficence that requires supporting and giving others the help and aid they need regardless of former interpersonal relations or expected gratitude. Modern 'altruistic' giving represents the 'pure' gift that is "…spontaneous, uncoerced, and for those reasons often received with surprise…The gift is unexpected by the recipient, completely voluntary and unnecessary by the giver" (Smith 2005: 3) and it does deny reciprocity. In the opinion of Jacques Derrida (1992) Marcel Mauss in his essay does never address this form of the gift.

A growing number of literature in the context of internationally organized development aid bring back Mauss' concept into the analysis disclosing that Tittmus' view is not only a very partial rendering of the concept of today's solidarity but also of the actual workings of international organized giving and further remains only as a partial applicability of the conception of the gift process (Eyben 2006; Hattori 20031/2003; Karagiannis 2005; Kapoor 2008; Korf 2007; Mawdsley 2012a/b; Silber 1998; Stirrat and Henkel 2006). Most of these studies argue that the "biography of the development gift"[4] (Stirrat and Henkel 1997) starts off as a 'pure' gift guided by an ethical and disinterested act of generosity and not based on personal relations of donors and givers. However its processing and mediation through different types of aid brokers (Bierschenk et al 2002; Mosse and Lewis 2006; Sørenson 2008) entering "at various nodes in the aid chain ….both internal to the humanitarian agencies (as consultants, experts, project

4 The thesis will use the notion development gift and humanitarian gift interchangeably

managers and volunteers, for example) and external to it (as local bureaucrats …, local politicians…, or as other agents of a local or national elite…)" (Korf et al 2010: 62) does pollute the gift's purity.

Motives of self-interest and reciprocity have become prominent features in 'development gifts'. From a Maussian point of view, such gifts are ultimately self-serving and accompanied by a huge range of "…internal and external rewards (such as self-esteem or pleasure; social prestige among both peers and inferiors or even upward social mobility; business connections; public relations improvement, etc)" (Silber 1998: 140). Even so one could doubt an existing reciprocity between givers and receivers of development gifts, the analysis of development practices uncover a purposeful mediation of reciprocity in the complex and highly regulated aid chain. Furthermore, various actors within the aid chain present and ritualize the gift at different localities using it as a commodity, a social investment; altruism serves self-interest supporting the struggle over power, profit and recognition within the highly competitive international aid sector or actors' socio-political environment. In other words, "a gift is worth nothing if it does not reflect an authentic appreciation of our personal qualities…it proves to establish a good reputation and to serve our long-term interests. It supplies us with honour and gratitude" (Vandevelde, 2000: 2-3). Humanitarian gifts therefore are intentional, personal and even political comprising self-interests while creating or re-enforcing social relationships hereby denying pure altruism (Adloff/Sigmund 2005; Bourdieu 1998; Chouliaraki 2012; Derrida 1992; Gouldner 2005; Hattori 2001/2003; Korf 2007; Korf et al. 2010; Silber 1998, 2001; Simmel 2005).

However the rhetoric within the aid chain continues to relate the development gift to 'altruism'; to the humanitarian momentum that opened the charitable space of doing good legitimizing the practices of brokerage and mediation as disinterested. This illustrates what Bourdieu defines as the open secret of giving: "no one is really unaware of the logic of the exchange, but no one fails to comply with the rule of the game which is to act as if one did not know the rule … Everyone knows – and does not want to know – that everyone knows – and does not want to know – the true nature of the exchange" (1997: 231-232). Givers and receivers participate in the "collective self-deception" (ibid: 231) euphemizing the power and symbolic violence that is hidden in the process of gift giving. This line of interpretation of the gift suggests that Mauss' findings on the gift in archaic communities are applicable to the problems of humanitarian gifts. He already stated that "gifts are presented in rituals looking to be spontaneous, voluntary and altruistic, but in general the gestures accompanying the act of giving are fiction, formalism and social lies covering the truth of the gift: compulsion and

interests" (Mauss in Moebius and Papilloud 2006: 63). That is what makes humanitarian gifts so vulnerable for the receiver: it serves the donator and is based on the arbitrariness and power of their generosity and interests. As Korf argues: "the core problem with geographies of generosity is…that they invigorate compassion and emotions as the core virtues that should ground ethical action. However, compassion is not per se something that is positive for the one who is the addressee of this compassion" (2007: 370).

Based on Mauss' theory of the gift it was possible to show in the analysis that similar to gifts in archaic communities, non-anonymous humanitarian gifts still present the three-fold sequence of obligations; remain a blend of political, aesthetic and moral dimensions, and further are accompanied by ritual activities, ceremonies and public presentations of generosity subtly defining, confirming, or modifying prestige and status distinctions (Article 1, Article 2, Article 3). Focusing on Mauss' aspect of a deep connection between the gift and the donors' identity, the empirical case contained evidence illustrating the impact of donators' personal structures, their personal source of identity and socio-political preferences (including a particular opinion on 'good' life and politics). Yet the research interest here does not lie on the fact of this existence but more on the processes of and the *how* of transferring the imbedded donators' identity to the recipients. As Mauss does not provide analytic tools for this research objective, the next chapter will introduce Foucaults' (1977) concept of governmentality outlining its application on the non-anonymous humanitarian gift.

2.2 Governmentality – from 'pure' giving to the will to improve

Even though the system of organized and non-anonymous giving upholds the narrative of the 'pure' gift, closer analysis uncovered that development gifts contain personal and political structures and sources of givers' identity. In addition development gifts inhabit particularly the agenda to improve and develop others lives exposing the paternalistic dimension of the gift. Even though givers of development gifts focus on the well being of recipients, they assume that the receiver exhibits a specific lack, a problem, which therefore needs to be regulated and corrected in tailor-made projects. The intention is benevolent, but "…the claim to expertise in optimizing lives of others is a claim to power" (Li 2007: 5) based on the assumption that human conduct can be regulated, controlled, shaped and turned towards specific ends. In this way gifts transferred in aid projects become an instrument of power and a technology "…to guide and shape (rather than force,

control, or dominate) the actions of others" (Cruikshank 1999: 4; cf Bourdieu 1997; Dean 1999; Foucault 1991; Li 2007).

Even though development gifts are an exertion of power, it is not a power that wants to dominate others, rather a productive power, a subtle form of power influencing processes of individualization by structuring and shaping "the conduct of conduct" (Foucault 1982: 221) of those governed. Here I turn my thoughts to Foucault who defines in his concept of governmentalitiy the governing of people not as "…a way to force people to do what the governor wants; it is always a versatile equilibrium, with complementarity and conflicts between techniques which assure coercion and processes through which the self is constructed or modified by himself" (Foucault cited in Lemke 2000: 3-4). To govern in this sense is not to dominate but to act upon action in order to advance the capacity of action and to direct it (Li 2007; Rose 1999; Watts 2003). Thus Foucault was specifically interested in the 'art of government' trying to identify and understand the practices and techniques implemented as "…deliberate attempts to shape conduct in certain ways in relation to certain objectives" (Rose 1999: 4).

In order to understand the governmentality of the development gift it is important to analyse and to understand its specific political rationalities, its set of thinking and logic and involved calculations, strategies and tactics. Or referring back to Mauss, it is important to uncover the gifts' identity that is based on donators' personal socialized knowledge and lived experiences as it highly influences the how of governing. As Rose (1999) highlights: "Thoughts become governmental to the extent that it becomes technical…" (51). By identifying visions, ideals, rationales and objectives imbedded in the gift it is possible to translate them into development technologies aiming for programmed project objectives. In the development context experts involved in the aid chain are therefore trained and equipped with a variety of technologies that immediately link an identified problem to a solution. Or as Li (2007) writes, "Experts are trained to frame problems in technical terms…their claim to expertise depends on their capacity to diagnose problems in ways that match the kinds of solution that fall within their repertoire" (2007: 7). Technologies are linked to a certain degree of acquiescence and participation. Development technologies "…operate according to a political rationality for governing people in ways that promote their autonomy, self-sufficiency, and political engagement; in the classic phrase of early philanthropists, they are intended to 'help people to help themselves'…" (Cruikshank 1999: 4). Their aim is to persuade recipients to accept the development gift in order to participate in the creation of a miniaturization of their ideals and of their utopian vision (Cruikshank 1999; Li 2007; Scott 1998; Watts 2003).

My reading of Foucault's concept of governmentality enabled me to identify the governmentality of the humanitarian gift by illustrating that development technologies camouflage interests, power and politics and the twin possibility of domination and freedom. It further helped to understand the logic behind the social engineering of the lives of tsunami affected people thereby uncovering that "…it always ignores essential features of any real, functioning social order" (Scott 1998: 4-6) as it is solely based on donators socialized knowledge and the vision to shape their environment as they see fit (Article 4). This is the paradox of good intentions: in order to uphold the narratives of a pure ideal of the ethical imperative of saving lives and giving 'pure', 'free' and altruistic gifts, non-anonymous donators themselves become subject to the logic of mundane development practices they wanted to distinguish themselves from (Article 5).

The next chapter will now introduce the German non-anonymous gift for tsunami-affected people in Sri Lanka in more detail. On the one hand embedding it into the government structures of tsunami rehabilitation while on the other hand, highlighting its distinctive features in relation to donators' socio-political networks in Germany and Sri Lanka and at various junctures referencing to conceptual approaches and special characteristics of post-tsunami aid.

3. The empirical case: A 'German Gift' for tsunami-affected people in Sri Lanka

The 'wave of compassion' also overwhelmed the federal state of my origin in Germany – Baden Württemberg (BaWü). My personal experiences with spontaneous acts of generosity and solidarity presented in the prologue recurred similarly to a multitude of individuals having close relations – personal, professional, economic, or in general familiar with Sri Lanka. In addition the then German chancellor, Gerhard Schröder[5], was using his traditional New Year speech 2004/2005 appealing for more solidarity with the disaster affected communities in Asia and Africa. The Chancellor's appeal was particularly directed towards states, cities, communities, companies and individuals to take over partnerships with districts, town councils and communities in the tsunami affected regions, creating new forms of public and private giving. Within a short period of time a multitude of public and private initiatives were formed all with good intentions to help. Among these private initiatives was the 'Baden Württemberg Tsunami Relief Cooperation' (BWTRC) initiated in 2005 through three private donators (henceforth designated as "Donators A, B, C")[6], all with long standing close private and professional histories as well as networks in Sri Lanka. Their aim was to construct a new village for tsunami-affected people in Sri Lanka.

The following sections will introduce the genesis of this private donator initiative, its political interference and how it was integrated in the government structures

5 Abridgement official New Year Speech 2004/2005:

"Ich habe von der Dimension des Leidens gesprochen, der wir gerecht werden müssen und zwar jeder an seinem Platz. Die Staaten, die Regionen, die Wirtschaft und die ganze Weltgesellschaft. Ich möchte nachhaltige Hilfe für die Region. Ich will, dass wir uns lange verantwortlich fühlen. Alle wohlhabenden Länder sollten Partnerschaften für den Wiederaufbau bestimmter Regionen übernehmen. Ich stelle mir vor, dass sich die großen Industrieländer für jeweils ein Land verantwortlich fühlen. Auch Deutschland. Unsere Bundesländer für entsprechende Bezirke. Unsere Städte für Städte und unsere Dörfer für Dörfer. Unsere Wirtschaft könnte helfen. Hilfe würde so sichtbar und ganz konkret. Deutsche Schulen und ihre Kinder könnten Patenschaften für Schulen dort übernehmen. Unterstützt von ihren Eltern. Das würde zeigen, dass wir über das Spenden von Geld - das gewiss wichtig ist - weit hinaus wollen. Dass wir Verantwortung als etwas Dauerhaftes begreifen..." (Source: http://www.lc-bonn-venusberg.de/lcbnvb_d_eingang_20050102_bk_n-anspr.htm)

The Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation guided the process of the Partnership Initiative. The ‚Service Agency Communities in One World' (SKEW) of the Ministry was assigned with the task to coordinate and match partnerships. Communities, town councils, regions, schools, or companies were able to place a request for a partnership with SKEW and they provided the service to identify local aid projects in which the initiators were able to invest their money. However many private initiatives directly contacted aid agencies in order to directly communicate and negotiate possible aid projects and to have a bigger influence in the delivery process.

6 The acronym is used in order to secure the anonymity and privacy of the three key initiatores of the tsunami relocation project.

of tsunami rehabilitation in Sri Lanka. Further highlighted here is the manner in which the specific donator and project constellation annihilate the intention of a 'pure' gift and how initially hidden interests gradually came to the fore not only influencing practices but also the objectives of the project.

3.1 Eco-Village: genesis and background

Based on donator A's professional position as senior official in the Ministry of the Environment Baden-Württemberg (MEBW), the BWTRC became part of the ministries' bilateral relief efforts in Sri Lanka. The official link to the MEBW and the efforts donators made in fundraising and setting up a solid foundation for the relief project were awarded from the Tsunami Fund of the Baden-Württemberg Foundation (BWF) amounting to 750'000 Euro. The donation of the BWF however set clear conditions and a finality to the project: the construction of a 'Green Village', later introduced to the German public and Sri Lankan counterparts as 'Eco-Village'. The project had to fulfil the following criteria[7]: (1) focus on long-term investment into infrastructure by (2) building a new village model for eco-friendly living, (3) introduce new technologies originating from Baden-Württemberg, and (4) transfer knowledge to improve peoples capacities and abilities in eco-friendly behaviour. The Sri Lankan Ministry of Development and Water Supply became the bilateral partner ministry due to existing political linkages based on former bilateral cooperation between the two ministries, thereby ignoring the official government tsunami rehabilitation structures and rules (cf. chapter 3.1.1). The decision on the locality for the donator-driven housing relocation scheme was rather based on personal preferences as well as good personal and political relations to the Southern district of Galle than on the actual needs and demands for tsunami housing. Based on official statistics and in line with the official Tsunami Housing Policy (cf. chapter 3.1.2) Eastern Province claimed the highest support for housing reconstruction with over 24'000 fully and partly damaged houses followed by the Southern Province with only around 9'000 damaged houses[8]. One donator stated: "to be honest, the location for the project was decided on personal preferences. The South is a good location. Our partners told there is still a demand and it is also much more comfortable to access when we come to visit … We also considered the East. But it is really too complicated: access and difficult political situation… also we have no contacts there with local ministries" (45,082008, DC)[9].

7 Source: Internal Memo MEBW (13052005, MEBW)
8 Detailed statistical information on the number of Tsunami damaged houses by Province and District see Annex 1, Table 3
9 The interviews with German donators and other German interview partners were transcribed and translated from German to English by the PhD author

With growing funds (over 1,0 Mio Euro) broadening the project size and its objectives, as well as the involvement of official political authorities the idea to cooperate with a knowledgeable and experienced partner in the humanitarian business was generated. BWTRC found a suitable partner in AID[10], an experienced emergency aid organisation with its headquarters in the capital city of the state of Baden-Württemberg. The former director of AID suggested in an interview that she was reluctant to accept the partnership at one point, however it was not possible to decline, as "…there was so much politics involved that to withdraw from the project would have caused problems and a bad reputation for our agency" (44, 012009, HH). To counterbalance the donators' influence AID topped up the project budget with 1,2 Million Euros - half of the total budget - to keep a say in its planning and implementation and to legitimize the project under their organisational mandate. The paradox of this liaison: the gift became a subject to struggle over power, representation, legitimization and accountability of involved stakeholders.

How did I become part of this liaison? In the early tsunami relief phase incoming international NGOs faced a major problem in finding locally available personnel well connected in the highly competitive NGO sector in Sri Lanka. Based on professional and personal linkages with AID and due to the fact that I already lived and worked in Sri Lanka, I was offered a two years consultant contract as project manager in the newly set up Colombo office. Since my father, a member of BaWü parliament was known to the donators AID headquarters felt that it would be suitable if my duties would also include being in charge of the direct donators communication as well as for reporting in relation to the Eco Village. For this reason I was entrusted to assemble the vision, expectations, and requests of donators and to translate them into the reality of everyday project work as well as the lived reality of project beneficiaries. Until the end of 2007, I was involved in the Eco-Village project and experienced what I will describe as the paradox of good intentions: the disproportion between a high moral tone of private non-anonymous humanitarian gifts and everyday practices and the reality of delivering, but also the one sided selective perception of donators on paternalism, clientelism and self-interested exertion of influence.

To better place the Eco-Village tsunami relocation project within the Sri Lankan governmental tsunami structures, the next two sections will introduce the official institutional arrangements and the tsunami housing policy in particular. Further

10 AID is a fictitious name used throughout the thesis to secure anonymity of the implementing aid organisation

the manner in which the donators utilized their personal political linkages in Sri Lanka in handpicking official tsunami structures to accept or to neglect in order to gain advantages for 'their' housing project is also emphasized.

3.1.1 Official institutional arrangements and structures

Under the supervision of the then president Mrs Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga the GoSL established the Centre for National Operations (CNO) functioning as the core tsunami relief coordinating body in December 2004. End of January 2005 the CNO published a first official recovery plan notifying two objectives for relief and rehabilitation: 'rebuilding the nation' and 'building back better', linking immediate relief work to long-term development objectives (Senanayake 2008). To achieve these objectives the GoSL introduced three task forces coping with different key aspects of the relief work: Task Force for Rescue and Relief (TAFRER)[11], Task Force for Logistics and Law and Order (TAFLOL)[12], and Task Force to Rebuild the Nation (TAFREN)[13]. After disbanding CNO in February 2005, the government formed the Task Force for Relief (TAFOR), which took over the combined responsibilities of CNO, TAFRER and TAFLOL. TAFREN remained as the primary institution to coordinate, facilitate and assist all international/ national, multilateral/bilateral humanitarian and relief organizations formulating four thematic key areas for tsunami rehabilitation: 1) getting people back into homes; 2) restoring livelihoods, health, education; 3) providing protection for all; and 4) upgrading the national infrastructure. The relief and reconstruction process was highly centralized; all relevant instructions, orders, policy guidelines and circulars were filtered through TAFRENs' office. Even though TAFREN cooperated closely with relevant line ministries such as the Ministry of Urban Development and Housing, Urban Development Authority (UDA), National Water Supply and Drainage Board (NWSDB), Ministry of Power and Energy, Electricity Board (CEB), Ministry of Highways, Road Development Authority (RDA) and other relevant government institutions, the task force was questioned in terms of competency, capacity, self-interests and independency. The critique resulted from the fact that two TAFREN representatives were senior political advisors, two heads of national

11 TAFRER: Coordination and facilitating the implementation of all rescue, relief and rehabilitation activities through the relevant line ministries, District Secretaries, Divisional Secretaries and other relevant government authorities
12 TAFLOL: Coordination of relief logistics, and facilitate easy access to necessary relief supplies
13 TAFREN: Guide long-term recovery process implemented through livelihood schemes, education, health and infrastructure programmes. Coordination and implementation of policies related to tsunami issues.

banks and the other six were leaders of some of the largest corporations in the country, mainly from the tourism sector directly acting under the Presidential Secretariat. As Bastian writes: "The initial response of the Sri Lankan state towards tsunami rehabilitation was guided by the current orthodoxy of the state sector playing a minimal role of setting the overall framework, while handing over the implementation to private actors…the Sri Lankan government pretty much privatised the tsunami rehabilitation" (2009: 232; cf. Barenstein 2013; Bastian 2009; GoSL 2005; Haug and Weerakoon 2007; Hettige 2007; Kleinfeld 2007; TEC 2007).

Following the election of a new president, Mahinda Rajapaksa, in November 2005, TAFOR and TAFREN were combined in the Reconstruction and Development Agency (RADA) focusing on all recovery issues across all sectors and stakeholders in the tsunami affected regions. Since mid-2007 with the closure of RADA, all remaining responsibilities and duties related to tsunami rehabilitation and reconstruction were assigned to the Ministry for National Building and Development.

In an early phase of tsunami rehabilitation the complex and intransparent situation of official government structures and the continuously changing formation of institutions and responsibilities, led a multitude of international aid agencies to channel their tsunami budgets through local partner organisations. The principal purpose of these liaisons was avoiding time-consuming self-registration processes under the government's tsunami structure's aim for quick results in relief work. AID and the BWTRC initially followed this approach of not registering the Eco-Village as a tsunami project. They later realized, that if the Eco-Village was not registered as an official tsunami relocation project under TAFREN, later RADA, the project would not access special government services such as Tax exemption, free provision of access roads, electricity and water granted to official tsunami projects. Therefore donators used their political networks in Sri Lanka to facilitate a belated registration of Eco Village as a tsunami relocation project formulating an official Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Tsunami Housing Reconstruction Unit under the Donor Driven Tsunami Housing Policy.

3.1.2 The official Post-Tsunami Housing Policy

Based on first estimates in early 2005 under the supervision of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the GoSL calculated the destruction of houses at about 13 per cent of the overall housing stock within 500 meters of the coast (ADB

2005: 12). Hence post-disaster housing and relocation was identified as one of the most important core areas in the rehabilitation process. The Action Plan for Rebuilding the Nation launched in February 2005 singled out:

"*Rehabilitation and resettlement of the families needs to be done with utmost urgency… They need immediate assistance to get back to their normal livelihood*"

TAFREN 2005a: 7

Yet the government policy of a 'non-building back' coastal buffer zone announced almost immediately after the tsunami immensely influenced the process of post-disaster housing. In February 2005, building on the Coastal Conservation Act No 57 (CC Act), which was declared in 1981 targeting the management of densely populated areas adjacent to the coast, the GoSL imposed the 'Buffer Zone or Vulnerability Zone Regulation'. The government justified the 'Buffer Zone' "as a public safety measure against the potential devastation of another tsunami" (Boano 2009: 770) in which any construction or reconstruction of houses was prohibited up to 500m inland from the coast. This not only created "…uncertainty as to where residents within the zone would be relocated and what would happen to the land they had been occupying in the zone when the tsunami struck" (Boano 2009: 769) but also protest and critique.

The launch of advertisements initiated by the GoSL in cooperation with the Tourism Board and Ministry of Tourism offering 'special tourism zones' to the private sector incited a public protests against the Buffer Zone Regulation. Detractors accredited by the official government leaflet that the policy was created in order to move poor people and small enterprises away from the coast, thus creating space for big private businesses, or providing a complementary ticket for eviction, land grabs, unjustifiable land-acquisitions plans preventing homeless and marginalized residents to return to their home of origin (INFORM 2005; COHRE 2005, Leckie 2005; Oxfam 2005).



Figure 1: Government Leaflet – Rebuilding Tourist Industry.

Source: TAFREN 27th February 2005

In early 2006 the government gave in, gradually reducing the protection zone to 100 meter in the South and West[14], and 200 meter in the North and East[15] (Barenstein 2013; Boano 2009; Brun and Lund 2009; TAFREN 2005a/2005b). Even though the GoSL adjusted the non-building back zone over 70'000 households had to be relocated. The huge scale of housing reconstruction and relocation was coordinated and managed under two approaches relating to the different rights for assistance, funding regulations and involved stakeholders (see Annex 2):

a) Donor Driven Housing Program for households within the Buffer Zone:

The policy envisaged that "owners of land within the buffer zone were offered a new house in a relocated site without having to surrender their property to the government" (Barenstein 2013: 219). The slogan was: 'a house for a house'. Funding for these relocation projects was allocated by national or international donor agencies on land allocated by the state. After signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Tsunami Housing Reconstruction Unit (THRU) the housing project became officially registered as Tsunami Housing Scheme with the following shared responsibilities:

14 Districts: Kilinochchi, Mannar, Puttalam, Gampaha, Colombo, Kalutara, Galle, Matara and Hambantota.
15 Districts: Jaffna, Mullaitivu, Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Ampara.

	Responsibility
Donor	Funding and construction of houses
	Absorption of costs for basic infrastructure related to the house: electricity, running water, sanitation and drainage facilities
	Absorption of costs for overall infrastructure related to the settlement: roads, street lamps, community centre, etc.
Government	Provision of land and assignment of land rights to recipients
	Funding and allocation of infrastructure and services up to the relocation site: access road, electricity, national water system

Source: Ministry of Finance 2005a

b) Owner Driven Housing Program for households outside the Buffer Zone:

All affected households outside the Buffer Zone and able to demonstrate ownership of land were entitled to a state grant enabling to rebuild houses. Fully damaged houses (repair cost is more than 40% of replacement cost) were granted with 250'000 Rs (ca. 1'900 Euro) in four stages. Partially damaged houses (repair cost less than 40% of replacement cost) were granted 100'000 Rs (ca. 760 Euro) in two stages based on the physical progress of construction. In addition, households successfully utilizing the grant were eligible to apply for a loan of 500'000 Rs (ca. 3'800 Euro) repayable over 20 years with a grace period of 24 month for small business development. Even though the borrower had to show repayment capacity and offer security acceptable to the lending institution (Ministry of Finance), the owner driven approach "…gave beneficiaries a high degree of freedom and control over the reconstruction of their houses" (Barenstein 2013: 219).

In the month that followed, one of the biggest problems in the post-tsunami housing sector was the unavailability of suitable land for housing relocation programs under the Donor Driven Housing Program. The goal to identify land in close proximity and in suitable size (comprising sufficient parcels measuring

between six (ca. 150m²) and 15 perches (ca. 400m²)) was almost impossible due to the coastal geography, population density and infrastructural accessibility. In the North and East, additionally, ethnic disparities and distribution exacerbated land identification. As Boano identified for the two regions: "…the two distinct ethnic communities of Muslims and Tamils create a complex and mixed geography... A Muslim village is followed by Tamil village and vice versa. This alternate geography along the coastal belt, in addition to the area's structural land shortage and ethnic sensitivities, posed serious problems for the identification of land for resettlements" (2009: 774; cf. Brun and Lund 2009; Barenstein 2013; Hasbullah and Korf 2009; Hyndman 2007; IPS 2005/2006; Ruwanpura 2008; Sambandan 2005; Silva 2009).

These difficulties and a general opposition to relocation led the new government to again reduce the non-building back zone in April 2006 to a minimum distance of 35 meters and a maximum distance of 125 meters[16]. Hence the dual Tsunami Housing Policy was continued and even extended. Under the donor-driven policy also tenants, extended family members, and encroachers of government land within the Buffer Zone were eligible to receive a house. This reduction of the buffer zone and expansion of eligibility shifted the housing reconstruction situation, minimizing not only the land requirement for relocation sites but also the requirement for donor-driven housing. Although the number of in situ owner-driven housing increased, aid agencies continued to invest in donor-driven resettlement schemes; „the idea of housing projects appealed to NGOs as it enhanced their visibility and ability to demonstrate 'concrete' results, particularly to headquarters' staff who came to visit on monitoring missions" (Silva 2009: 68). Moreover, as housing schemes are cost intensive they helped to clear the organisations' tsunami budget in a short period of time, which allowed organisations to demonstrate and display efficiency and public visibility. As Stirrat (2006) notes: "competition was not just a matter of getting rid of money but getting rid of it in the 'right' way which would fit with Western donors' visions of what relief should be" (2006:13).

16 The distinction was justified based on location, physical environment of land and sea and the extent of tsunami damages.

3.2. Project location, village construction process and community management system

Location

Due to the fact of land shortage and availability of sizable sites, the three German donators again used their good personal and political contacts within the central government but also local government in Galle District to directly negotiate and identify suitable land for their project idea. Local bureaucrats helped to identify sites, which were deemed beautiful and suitable only later filing an application for transference of the land as a tsunami relocation site. One tsunami officer in Galle remembered: "First time the German delegation came in 2005... it was a special request from a ministry in Colombo to assist them finding a location for a special housing project ...we showed them several sites but nothing was good enough...we took quite an effort and time for them" (88, 10012009, ARI). In September 2005, a suitable relocation site was identified and through the use of donators' political networks it was later officially accepted as a tsunami relocation site.

The relocation site, an old rubber and tea estate (see pictures 1 and 3) , is located in Akmeemana Division, more specific in Meegoda – Pilana Grama Niladhari Administration Division (GN division)[17], comprising 11,134 hectares. The location is not in close proximity to the coastal line but situated 12 kilometres inland from Galle Four Gravets, one of the hardest and most severely hit division in Galle district. In total 23 (46%) of Galle Four Gravets' GN divisions were directly affected and 2'500 people relocated in 11 new relocation projects in neighbouring divisions, of which Eco-Village is one. The land shows a hilly topography and due to its former use as a rubber and tea estate, basic infrastructure like roads, water or electricity was not available.

17 Grama Niladhari Administration Division (GN): the smallest administrative level (village level) within the decentralized Sri Lankan administration, aiming "to ensure an administrative system at rural level on par with public policies" (http://www.pubad.gov.lk/web/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=82&Itemid=173&lang=en)

Map 1: Geographical location of Eco-Village
Source: W. Schlor 03/2014

Construction Process

The planning process, as with the identification of a proper location, was highly influenced through donators' interference. The following two statements illustrate what they wanted to achieve:

> "The village should be like a German village"
>
> (German Technical Engineer (GTE))

> "The public buildings should present Sri Lankan architectural tradition"
>
> (Donator B)

This seeming paradox – a village that should be like a German village while representing Sri Lankan architectural traditions through public buildings – shows the implicit tension in the spatial and technical design of what also had to become a sustainable, eco-friendly village. To some extent the project managers seemed to solve the paradox by hiring a German architect familiar with German standards as much as with the design requirements for local houses. After becoming an official tsunami project, the village plan was conceived in line with the official tsunami housing policy, combining landscape potential and the vision of a 'typical' German village. In line with the official tsunami housing policy the house size was about 650 square feet (about 60 m²) and each property size contained 15 perches (375 m²). As a result of partially steep topography it was technically manageable to locate 90 houses under these requirements.

Picture 1: Housing site, northern view (left)
Picture 2: Construction site, northern view (right)

Source: J. Bokel 09/2005 and 09/2006

In order to achieve fast results attending to the humanitarian needs of tsunami-affected people, donators set a tight time schedule aiming to finish the housing construction by end of 2006 with the view of resettling the first villagers by the first quarter of 2007. However the reality was other than the expectations. The official tsunami housing bureaucracy proved to be lengthy and slow. By the use of persistence and repeated interference using political networks, the village plan and construction site obtained approval. In mid 2006 AID contracted a local construction company turning the relocation site into a huge construction site (see pictures 2 and 4).

At this moment beneficiaries were not yet identified nor selected and the village as well as the housing design therefore was fully shaped based on the donators visions and aesthetics. The approval letter to RADA presents donators' vision of a well-designed house, combining high standards and local living culture, based on their understanding of local housing (see pictures 6 and 7, page 57).

Picture 3: Housing site, southern view (left)
Picture 4: Construction site, northern view (right)

Source: J. Bokel 09/2005 and 09/2006



Map 2: Layout Plan Eco-Village

Source: AID Architect, 01 2006

The letter stated: "The houses will have a chimney as the locals use firewood for their cooking and each door and window will have a ventilation element for air circulation (see picture 5). The toilet will be attached to the house and accessible through an open veranda in the back of the house. For the sewage disposal each family will get a three-chamber cesspit and will be responsible for the maintenance. Furthermore the house is planned in a way that the owners will be able to expand and extend the area with rooms if they deem necessary" (Letter 05042006, Internal Document).

Related to the vision of creating a 'German' village, the houses were settled around a public square located in the centre of the village comprising a community building (see map 2). To meet the requirements of a well functioning village, the community building included a community centre, nursery, library, doctors' room, dispensary, administration office and an open market hall. For economic development two buildings comprising space for commercial use and a separate bakery were constructed. Donators' attached great importance to sustainability and future village development. Again the approval letter gives evidence: "For further development we also kept some areas free if there is a need for an extension of the village. Therefore we planned more wide roads so that there will be no problems with future development. The main road will be 10 m (33 feet) wide with drain and pavement and the side road 7 m (23 feet)" (letter 05042006, Internal Document).

from top to bottom
Picture 5: House shell construction European architectural style
Picture 6: Public Square with Community Hall
Picture 7: Bakery in local architectural style

Source: J. Bokel 05/2008 (Picture 5)
P. Hollenbach, 07/2007 (Picture 6), 12/2009 (Picture 7)

As basic infrastructure was missing at the location, the resettlement scheme obtained a deep well with solar driven pumps and a water tower to provide each house with running water (see picture 8). In order to meet high ecological standards for the village, all public buildings and street lamps were equipped with solar lamps (see picture 9). The houses were built with ecological friendly construction material (sustainable grown wood, locally produced stones, etc) and a technology improving the houses internal natural airflow in order to reduce internal heat minimizing the usage of electrical ventilation. In addition each house received a rainwater collection system (see picture 10) providing water for the toilet and garden and a specially constructed cesspit naturally processing wastewater in a high proportion.

This side
Picture 8: Water tower
Picture 9: Solar lamps
Picture 10: Rainwater-collection system

Opposite site
Picture 11: View on Public Square

Source: P. Hollenbach 02/2010 (Picture 8 and 10)
J. Bokel 05/2005 (Picture 9 and 11)

Village Management System

The donators had a long-term development perspective and vision in regard to village management. They projected the village to be a model of self-governance and peaceful coexistence. One donator remarked: "Eco-Village should be a model to show that people participate in community politics and take decisions together for their lives… I am sure if they learn to participate in community politics, they will start formulating their political desires and make demands for their rights as a Sri Lankan citizen…" (42, 102009, Donator B). To achieve a "coexistent living pattern" (Village Constitution: 2) and to be more independent from formal local government structures, a self-governing system was introduced based on donators' knowledge and experience of community self-governance in BaWü. The core idea was an active, self-managing village community, which in turn would shape a new political identity and assertiveness towards becoming independent citizens empowered to challenge long-established politics in Sri Lanka. This ideal is reflected in the mission statement of the village constitution:

> *To establish a coexistent (sic) village whereby the community who have been displaced by the Tsunami disaster is capable of independently managing and developing the village to create and generate income to the betterment of themselves.*
>
> Village Constitution 2009: 2

Picture 12: Training on village self-management system
Source: P. Hollenbach, 08/2007

The new organization of the village management was openly posted and explained in order to admonish the new villagers to adapt the system (see picture 13). In a participatory process, facilitated by international and local experts, villagers elected a village committee and several sub-committees each responsible for a specific sector such as finances, community activities, eco-awareness, economic development (promoting self-employment through a micro-credit program) and technical maintenance. To attain necessary skills for successful management villagers and specially the committee members were given several trainings (see pictures 12 and 14).

In addition the project intended to alter the living style towards a more ecological and self-catering life style. For this reason beneficiaries received gardening tools and were trained in home gardening techniques learning how and which vegetable, fruits and herbs can be grown on the land aspiring towards self-catering home gardens. In addition under the supervision of a professional landscaper AID organized a reforestation program to vegetate public spaces and improve the overall ecological value of the village (see picture 16). To increase the economic skills women were trained in various skills such as sewing, cloth painting and trade. Setting up revolving micro-credit system villagers had the opportunity to transfer these skills in self-employment (see pictures 15 and 17).

Picture 13: Open notice in community hall
Source: P. Hollenbach, 12/2010

Picture 14: Villagers attending training session
Source: P. Hollenbach, 08/2007

The above presentations of the project should provide an indication of its special constellation and its exceptional position within the official tsunami rehabilitation process based on donators' active involvement, through their tight personal networks, with local politics. A closer analysis on these specifications and how donators' visions and requests influenced the practices and implementation will be provided in the articles itemised in Part 2. Before chapter five briefly introduces and outlines the articles highlighting their interplay and succession but also the presentation of objectives, I wish to use the following chapter (chapter 4) to reflect on my position within the empirical case study. In particular considering the influence my shifting positionality had on my research work and the outcome of the thesis. Further I introduce my methods and reflect on the (co-)production of knowledge, as the thesis is not my lonely effort but the result of working with field assistants. I close the section with personal reflections on data writing.

Picture 15: Self-employment: vegetable shop
Source: P. Hollenbach 02/2010

Picture 16: Home garden
Source: P. Hollenbach 03/2011

Picture 17: Self-employment: women's association producing self-created pillowcases, napkins and cloth

Source: P. Hollenbach 02/2010

4. Conducting Internal Ethnography in a former working field

The thesis opens with the prologue describing how I became involved in post-tsunami rehabilitation in Sri Lanka further highlighting the motivation to conduct academic research on the topic of private non-anonymous giving in humanitarian aid. The 'personal Tsunami story' shows that this research started off not as a 'pure' research project but as an outcome or side product of my biography. My former working field turned into my research field transforming the thesis in to an "insider ethnography" (Mosse 2006: 936). As Gould writes, "…what makes ethnography ethnographic is the privileging a certain kind of evidence: First-hand, rich and disaggregated, embedded in processes of contiguous social inter- and transaction over time" (2004: 269). Hence I am aware, that the research is "…multi-positioned and multi-sited…" and that a huge part of my dataset was conducted unconsciously as it was "…research not just in, but as part of …" my everyday consultant work and life (Mosse 2005: 11; cf. Aull Davies 2008; Ergun and Erdemir 2010; Hammersley and Atkinson 1983; Herod 1999; Katz 1994; Marcus 1995; Mosse 2006; Rose 1997; Sultana 2007). The fundamental knowledge on the resettlement scheme, its actors, networks and alliances, project visions and political linkages was gained during my 30 months of professional involvement. Hence lot of my data was 'produced' as work material such as internal project documents, field notes, memos, monthly project reports, and Email communication documenting various processes, decisions and discussions on the donator-driven housing project. Further private motives led to keep a diary about my working experiences helping me to reflect and digest my everyday struggles of 'doing humanitarian aid' in the post-tsunami context in Sri Lanka. After starting my research work and analysing the phenomena of private non-anonymous giving in humanitarian aid, all these documents became "…material of the ethnographic text" (Silverman 2008: 17).

Based on former relations in the field, access to the research field and its subjects did not present a problem. Nevertheless the analysing and writing process created uneasy feelings. I hence wanted to reflect on these emotional moments following Gillian Rose's (1997) suggestion on common strategies for reflexive research: "What we may be able to do is something rather more modest but, perhaps, rather more radical: to inscribe into our research practices some absences and fallibilities while recognizing that the significance of this does not rest entirely in our own hands" (319). I have to confess, that in my articles I am far from what Marcus (1998 cited Foley 2002: 473) has labelled a "confessional" form of reflexivity making self-critical assessments of own interpretations available to the reader. Nor was I explicit to convey that my empirical data and its interpretations

are not the "intellectual accomplishment of a lone researcher" (Unnithan-Kumar and de Neve 2006: 5), but took place within the context of various relationships and were co-constructed by various actors influenced by "…the places we occupy at that moment (physically and spatially as well as socially, politically, and institutionally)" (Sultana 2007: 382). Neither did I coherently acknowledge the partiality and embodied power relations influencing the data. Therefore the following chapters will rehabilitate these shortcomings.

4.1 Turning former working field into researcher field

Starting my PhD I did not struggle to enter the research field but to 'exit' it. The seeming contradiction results on my former position as unintentional insider participant observer. The intensive involvement in the aid project, the fear of spoiling personal relations, good rapport and friendships among future research subjects however made it difficult to achieve the common advice given in ethnographic textbooks: the researcher needs to require the ability to be inside the scene as well as remain a stranger to the scene. Or as Labaree (2002) notes: "…the situatedness of the insider…first requires the insider to step outside in order to gain a new understanding of the inside ('distancing')" (109). Turning the former working field into a research field implies the researcher does not enter in a place as an unknown stranger but needs to learn alienating from it (Chacko 2004; Coffey 1999; Aull Davies 2008; Devereux and Hoddinott 1993; Hammersley and Atkinson 1983; Labaree 2002; Nagar and Geiger 2007; Roberts and Sanders 2009; Tembo 2003).

Re-entering Sri Lanka as a researcher I felt insecure experiencing what Johnson et al (2006) delineate for the first arrival in the research field: "an anxiety-provoking endeavour involving feelings of self-doubt, fear and often helplessness" (112). My ontological insecurity was based on the fact that I re-entered Sri Lanka with a new identity. Conducting research involved taking a critical and analytical view on the behaviour, performance, decisions and practices of former colleagues, partners and institutions I formerly belonged to. While having these moments of insecurity and discomfort, 'the field' welcomed me warmly facilitating the access to information and necessary data collection in order to complete the existing dataset in relation to identified theoretical entry points elicited in the first phase of the research process.

4.2 Doing research: Fieldwork and dataset

The preliminary dataset as mentioned above consisted of former work documents, internal papers and personal diary entries up to the point of leaving the project, end of 2007. Afterwards I was still provided with internal documents such as monthly project reports, in-depth tri-monthly reports and the final project report by end of 2008. Also I gained access to minutes of donator meetings conducted in Germany between 2005 and 2008, an external evaluation report providing a neutral and professional view and perspective on the outcome of the project. Even though I was able to gain a lot of additional information and insights from these documents I was aware, that they "…are 'social facts', …produced, shared and used in socially organized ways…They construct particular kinds of representations using their own conventions" (Atkinson and Coffey 2008: 58). Not feeling sufficiently equipped with enough background information of when, where, how and who actually produced these documents, I did not systematically analyse but rather used them as additional secondary, (in)-formal information sources. This composition of dataset enabled me to focus the research mainly on the humanitarian moment arguing in my analysis and findings with the theory of the gift (Article 1, Article 2, and Article 3).

During two fieldwork missions in Sri Lanka, one in November 2009 for a period of 5 months and a second one in February 2011 for 2 months, I particularly focused to gain more insights into the long-term visions and donators' intentions in terms of the housing project. My fieldwork objective was to adjust the existing dataset towards the notion of governmentality. Based on the current project status and stage, I gained insights into the donators' centralized formulation process of the village constitution and later observed the implementation process, launching and introducing the new village constitution as well as village organization to the housing beneficiaries. In addition I conducted several interviews in Germany between 2009 and 2011 focusing on the same theoretical aspect of governmentality directing the interview questions to assess their socialized knowledge and personal understanding of development (Article 4, Article 5). Yet to complete and sharpen the dataset for the last article using the theory of the gift, the interviews in Germany also included aspects to ascertain information on the dynamics that the donators' tsunami initiative caused, in their local socio-political context back home in Baden Württemberg (Article 3).

The majority of interviews in Sri Lanka were qualitative oriented semi-structured or open interviews. Furthermore several informal conversations were afterwards transformed into written field notes. Interviews were conducted with the support

of a local research assistant as many were held in 'half English', 'half Sinhala' or fully in Sinhala. Parallel to the research assistant who took rough notes that were afterwards written up in the form of continuous texts, I took notes on the interview setting, of upcoming emotions and of reactions interviewees or surrounding observers had on the questions. Later the research assistant and I discussed our notes and impressions in order to minimize shortcomings but also to efficiently combine both notes. Interviews conducted in English were often self-organized and transcribed by me. Only few interviewees agreed being recorded on tape, which were later transcribed by the assistant or me, based on the language. Besides this free-flow informational exchanges with informants and random encounters provided another relevant information source to clarify given or countercheck information. As Holstein and Gubrium recognize, "…interviews are special forms of conversations…the narratives that are produced may be as truncated as forced-choice survey answers or as elaborated as oral life histories, but they are all a product of the talk…" (2008: 141). For subsequent analytical editing, all conversations were shortly afterwards transformed into written texts/ transcribes to avoid a loss of recollection and failures of interpretation.

To analyse the data I used a strategy with an open character relating the material not to prefixed categories but developing categories parallel to the establishment of the theoretical frame and developed research objectives. The first round of analysis started with existing data material compiled from former work material but also first interviews held in Germany. The second intensive round of analysis took place during and after my fieldwork in Sri Lanka. The analysis process started with intensive reading and examination of the material (documents, interviews, etc) in order to get to know the dataset. However, as Hammersley and Atkinson note, analysing data already began during fieldwork in Germany and Sri Lanka, as "field notes, journals, and diaries are, in one sense, the 'data' that are collected; in another sense, they are written up, in ways that constitute preliminary analyses and presentations" (1983: 208). Further when transcribing interviews I started not only to identify commonalities and patterns but also employed theoretical reflexivity challenging the conceptual frame that I had outlined based on parallel theoretical readings. The in-depth reading of empirical material led to the next step of setting up relevant analysing categories for the analysis. After the categorization the dataset became subject to renewed reading, now focusing to classify the material and allocate codes aiming to set up a synoptical table. This table then helped to deepen the theoretical interpretation or guided the re-assessment of theoretical considerations and/or to develop new

theoretical entry points. The intensive reading of the material further helped to extract relevant interview parts making a good case in emphasizing the arguments that were made (cf. Aull Davies 2008; Flick 2007; Schmidt 2007; Silverman 2008).

The following table provides an overview on research focus and its corresponding dataset. It shows that aspects of different research focuses are interlinked reverting to the same dataset. The order of publications however does identify the intensity of usage of the dataset. Detailed insights on the composition and numbers of interviews and empirical material are provided in Annex 3 and Annex 4.

Table 2: Research focus and corresponding dataset

	Research Focus	Dataset
Humanitarian moment of gift giving	Multi-local dynamics of giving	• 8 donator interviews • 41 interviews with government officials • 24 interviews with aid organisations • 3 public AID office statements • 1 interview with government official • Monthly project reports • 9 interviews with aid officials
	Commodification of good intentions	• Minutes of donator Meetings • Internal Documents Ministry of the Environment • Tri-monthly project reports • Personal Diary Entries
	Ritual legitimization of the gifts' symbolic violence	• Documentary film on opening ceremony
Long-term development of the gift	Rationale of governing others' mentality	• Donators communication, official communication documents Ministry of the Environment and AID • 125 interview with housing beneficiaries • Village Community documents
	Governmentality of good intentions	• 13 interviews with key informants

	Survey		Publication
	Period	Location	
	2010-2011 2009-2011 2009-2011 2008-2011 2009 2005-2007 2008-2010	Germany Sri Lanka Sri Lanka Germany Germany Germany	**1** 2, 3, 4
	2005-2008 2005-2008 2006-2008 2005-2007	Germany Germany Sri Lanka	**2** 1, 5
	2007	Sri Lanka	**3**
	2005-2008 2009-2011 2010-2011	 Sri Lanka Sri Lanka	**4** 5, 1, 3
	2009-2011	Sri Lanka	**5** 4

4.3 Reflections

After conducting interviews in Germany some of my former work colleagues raised several objections asking critical questions how I would analyse and interpret their answers and information, continuously reminding me of confidentiality. Several of these colleagues pointed out to set their answers in relation of the special characteristics of the housing project and the exceptional situation of post-tsunami rehabilitation work in general. It seemed that during the interviews my counterparts felt secure and confident talking to an old colleague knowing of the problems, dilemmas related to the project – perceiving me as 'insider'. However realizing the reality and purpose of the interview I was positioned as 'outsider'. Due to my shifting identity I became what Katz pictured as: "ethnographers are displaced persons…" (1994: 68). Turning a former working field into research field evokes a constant negotiation of locality and subjectivity within ourselves; we feel simultaneously a part of and apart from the field. It is the ambivalence and the discomfort, tension and instability of the subjective position that we feel and need to work with – it is the fear of not being a 'good' researcher and a betrayer of professionally established relations. This ambivalence of positionality is comparable with Tringh Minh-ha's description of post-colonial women:

"Not quite the same, not quite the other, she stands in that undetermined threshold place where she constantly drifts in and out. Undercutting the inside/outside opposition, her intervention is necessarily that of both not quite an insider and not quite an outsider. She is, in other words, this inappropriate 'other' or 'same' who moves about with always at least two gestures: that of affirming 'I am like you' while persisting her difference and that of reminding 'I am different' while unsettling every definition of otherness arrived at"

(1997: 418 cited in Sultana 2007: 377)

The next section reflects on the dilemma of being caught between two worlds and identities during fieldwork. As England reminds us: "the researcher cannot conveniently tuck away the personal behind the professional, because fieldwork is personal" (1994: 85). During the research project, mainly during personal encounters with the researched, I often found myself in emotional and ethical dilemmas. I asked myself 'who am I' and 'am I transparent enough to be considered an ethical and reflexive researcher'? I had the feeling of misuseing well-established relations and everyone's generosity and willingness to support my research that I afterwards would use to write my thesis taking it out of 'our' common history. I felt how Katz (1994) phrases: "…these field projects all have probably been more beneficial to me than to them" (72).

4.3.1 Reflections on own positionality

Ethnographic literature discusses the position of the researcher in relation to the researched in the binary divide of inside/outside emphasizing its complexity and continuous shifts (Kusow 2003; Ergun/Erdemir 2010, Aull Davies 2008; Herod 1999). Gould alludes: "Positionality refers to the need for finding a serviceable and responsible way of situating oneself in 'the field', and is a threshold in all ethnography…The specific ways in which positionality is problematic naturally depends on the nature of one's site and on the possible points of entry into the field" (2004: 271). In my case I did not face a problem with the nature of the research site, in contrast I felt very comfortable and confident to conduct research in my former work field. Also finding an entry point constituted no difficulty due to my 'field' history. However I often felt discomfort with the side I represented – 'Pia as researcher'! Intensifying interviews in time and number, gaining more insights into the lives and everyday reality of interview partners who were struggling under the politics and implementation practices of the project. This increased my wish to get back to my old identity as practitioner. Obvious shortcomings and false decisions made during project implementation and now causing hardship for beneficiaries picked on my personal work ethics. A feeling of guilt evoked the desire to correct, to find solutions and to fix them. Re-entering a former working field underlines the veracity of what Fine (1993) notes in his article 'Ten Lies of Ethnography: Moral Dilemmas of Field Research': "Qualitative researchers need to be warned about the difficulty, if not the *impossibility*, of *pretending objectivity*… Participant observation often becomes *participant intervention*: Finding a problem, we wish to fix it. Identifying with our informants in loco parentis we wish to take their side, to protect them from harm, and make everything right. This human reality suggests that qualitative evaluation research…is always 'contaminated'…by the emotions generated in the field" (Fine 1993: 286-287; emphasis added).

Even though I tried to distance, continuously reflect while re-negotiating and re-defining my new positionality, I had little influence on how my counterparts dealt with it. In addition to my difficulties drawing the boundary to my former identity, interview partners themselves contextualized and defined my new positionality. A shared history and common affinities in relations to the aid project helped "…to increase the perceived trustworthiness…while also ensuring openness on the part of the respondents, thereby facilitating rapport" (Ergun and Erdemir 2009:18). Yet several interview partners ignored the fact that I did not re-enter as AID project officer. They continuously reminded me of AIDs' responsibility and accountability towards the given promises and depicted shortcomings and failures. During interviews in Sri Lanka I often noticed that answers were given in a very

strategic and tactical way pursuing the aim to get my agreement and promise to help them achieve an improvement or change. Besides interview partners within the local authority in Sri Lanka clarified my relation to German donators and the implementing aid agency finding out ways to fresh financial support for the relocation village. I therefore was often requested to help facilitating negotiations with AID and donators to continue their participation in the village and to correct and improve apparent shortcomings. In contrast I realized with German interview partners that they were reserved in giving answers instead asking me back question on the research objective, way of data analysis and interpretation. I realized what Mosse noted, that "those reading about themselves may be intrigued, amused, or pleased; but turning relationships into data, and placing interpretations in public, can also disturb and break relationships of fieldwork. It may be 'anti-social'" (2006b: 937). Therefore strategic or tactical answers were given to either achieve a certain aim or interests or to hide a more complex reality. It becomes thereby obvious that "research in a particular location is thus often influenced and constrained by the politics of the place and the overall politics of development, which have to be acknowledged and respected in any research process" (Sultana 2007: 381).

Personally I felt in an in-between position causing a huge personal disunion. I became aware that "…the reliance of fieldwork on our personal relationships also places us at risk of vulnerability, exploitation and hurt. Like reciprocity, issues of power also have the potential to cut both ways" (Coffey 1999: 41). The dilemma was: on the one hand I felt an urgent need to follow the requests, on the other hand I feared to risk my good and trustful relation to AID, donators and other relevant actors in the field bringing up critique by questioning current project decisions. The fear was caused by the awareness, that "any perception of falling within one particular camp would compromise the trust needed to research the other" (Labaree 2002: 111; cf. Ergun and Erdemir 2010; Kusow 2003). Hence my involvement was rather reserved and unofficial. I helped formulating and writing letters to donators and AID, facilitated village meetings developing problem-solving strategies and used established contacts to local experts and officials providing professional advice based on the local situation. My efforts to call AIDs' attention to existing problems were not successful and former colleagues at the German Headquarter asked me to stop the interference. In an email AID invoked on former project reports of two hired local NGOs responsible for current village development that most of the problems I enumerate were solved. In addition a letter dated September 2012 asserts that AIDs humanitarian involvement already overextends the common project duration, indicating German law defining rules and regulations for humanitarian assistance. The letter argued that there was no

possibility to continue neither financial nor professional support. Even though my first reaction to the letter was anger, I also was appreciative of the proceeding and practice. The behaviour highlights Mosse' (2011) reasoning for aid organizations' resistance on internal project ethnographic research: "…one specific reason why ethnographic description is threatening. Its field of inquire – events, context, informal relations and divergent views – links it to narratives of programme failure" (Mosse 2011: 55). And the public's taken-for-granted assumption that aid organizations are doing good does not leave space for admitting shortcomings (Barnett and Weiss 2012). However a reality check shows that the most pressing problem 'sufficient and clean drinking water' is still not solved (November 2013).

4.2.2 (Co-)construction of knowledge

As mentioned earlier I conducted interviews in Sri Lanka with the help of two research assistants. On the one hand this was necessary based on my rudimentary Sinhalese language skills, on the other hand I was aware that working with a well informed and well-networked 'colleague' would facilitate getting access to relevant people, interview partners, documents, and information. For these reasons I decided to work with two former work colleagues: one AID colleague and one former university colleague. Both had long lasting and well-established networks within local authorities and the Sri Lankan aid sector. Further both were familiar with my working style and the private donator driven housing project. Related to their personal history and different work experience and networks I was able to draw on different skills and access possibilities to the field. The former AID colleague was now living in Galle district working as director of an international development organisation. She obtained excellent knowledge, good rapport and broad networks within the local development sector (tsunami and post-tsunami time) but also within the local authorities in Galle District. This enabled access to many interview partners and key informants. The university colleague on the other hand has great experience in working for several international researchers. She supported the process of developing, conducting and transcribing interviews and the translation of documents (Singhalese to English).

Briefly outlining the relation to my research assistants but also their affiliation to the field shows the importance to reflect upon knowledge (co-)construction and the genesis of our dataset. Working with research assistants means their history and positionality in the field is reflected in the data we collect. They become informants playing a key role in facilitating access and guiding the research process by their networks and personal understanding of the field. Assistants

are not ‘pure’ or ‘neutral’ companions. Even though their understanding and knowledge, insight and access to hidden transcripts and stories of the field do have the advantage of making fieldwork insightful and profound. Nevertheless the researcher has to bear in mind that those translations, information and data always contain a great deal of the assistants’ interpretations, reflections, subjectivity and positionality. As Aull Davies (2008) commemorates, “… ethnographers … must remain aware that translation … is far from a theoretically neutral activity and that… [translators/assistance] own perspective, both professional and personal, will influence their translations” (125, cf. Coffey 1990; de Neve 2006; England 1994; Temple 1997; Unnithan-Kumar and de Neve 2006). Through continuous discussion on translations, conducted interviews, interview situations/setting and transcripts I cross-checked the research assistants’ position, opinion, and interpretation on the context and interview partners aiming to get to know their judgment of correctness and how far their translations and transcripts were influenced by their knowledge. Even though I was able to minimize the scale of subjectivity I am aware that to a certain degree “field notes…are necessarily partial and reflect the ethnographers’ perceptions” (Aull Davies 2008: 256) and in my case that of two research assistants as well.

4.2.3 Writing of Text

The mentioned emotional and personal difficulties arising when re-entering the field, aggregated while writing. The first set of intensive writing and analysing leading to two articles (Article 2, Article 3) started way before re-entering the field again in late 2009. The first writing process enabled me not only to intensively ground my working experiences in theory but to physically and temporally draw a boundary to the field. However an emotional distancing remained undone. Analysing and writing the field is re-writing and re-defining memories accompanied by a constant struggle to locate and reduce these memories within theoretical boundaries. As Coffey (1999) observed, “…qualitative data analysis cannot only be thought of in terms of technique and strategy…it is a point of emotional involvement and personal investment… at this stage of our research … we manipulate, rethink and represent our endeavours, drawing upon our own ideas of what the data are saying” (Coffey 1999: 136-138).

While writing I consciously left out interview parts anticipating disappointment or conflicts with the researched if they identify themselves in the text. I was caught in the dilemma that Mosse (2011) pointed out for the production of ethnographic text: “…Ethnography is unfair or bad evaluation because it does not involve the

usual negotiation of an acceptable story that mediates interpretative differences. Ethnography draws attention to different points of view and does not involve, or require, a drive to consensus" (55). I would argue that even though I was aware that in order to conduct reflexive, accountable and ethical research it is necessary to share my work with involved actors, interview partners and the researched, my subconscious guided me differently avoiding additional personal dilemmas and conflicts I faced since the writing process began. Thus the ethnographic self is disturbing, selective and partial, subtly influencing decisions during the research process.

Yet another shortcoming appeared in the writing of texts – anonymity. As Shutt (2006) remarks based on personal experiences in writing internal-ethnography: it is "virtually impossible to both give thick contextual descriptions and anonymise communities and organisations in practice" (34). I experienced similar difficulties obviously not being reflexive and sensitive enough in relation to anonymity. As one anonymous article referee pointed out: "If you give the real name and location of the village, will it be easy for people to figure out the identities of the donors? Much of the tsunami aid information is still available on the internet..." (Anonymous Referee Comment, 13.04.2013). Until I received this comment I never was really concerned about writing details of the geographical location, not realizing the transparency I create. After double-checking on the Internet I realized that with the given information in already published articles I unconsciously annihilated the personal right of anonymity of my informants. I have to admit, that I failed to fully secure the anonymity of involved donators, organisations and institutions and was not able to achieve the agreement of confidentiality.

Nevertheless reflecting on these shortcomings and admitting occurring failures I believe is the strength of insider ethnographic data that is particularly dependant on the formation of tight and close relations and the development of an emotional relation to the field and its actors. As Coffey (1999) writes: "ethnographers are not outsiders looking in. They have to be reflective insiders, negotiating roles and subjectivities, looking out" (57). My empirical data illustrates first-hand and exclusive insights into complex socio-political realities, networks and processes within organized non-anonymous giving and the everyday reality of doing aid.

The following chapter will now give a brief introduction to each article highlighting its objective and theoretical starting point. It further completes the frame document attempting to consolidate the article findings in a comprehensive synthesis.

5. Composition of Articles and Synthesis

Five scientific articles, all subject to a double-blind peer-review process, form the main part of the PhD thesis. Till this day four articles have been published (Development in Practice, Disasters, Journal of Development Studies, Geoforum) and one accepted for publication (International Development Planning Review).
The aim of the articles is to comprehensively uncover different aspects and consequential effects of what I define as the paradox of good intentions: the practical conversion of 'pure' development gifts into culturally charged political commodities. The thesis hence does not intend to answer the question if aid works or not but to expose how it works (Mosse 2004, Korf 2010) through the everyday practice of doing aid. The ethnographic insights into the non-anonymous donator driven rehabilitation project provide evidence that even though actors rhetorically distance themselves from mundane practices of development aid (or humanitarian aid, as it were), they become part of exactly that system of organized gift giving that is guided and dominated by self-interest and power. The articles therefore write out the hidden mechanisms of the development gift and "how aid intermingles with multi-local gift economies and local political economies" (Korf 2010: vi) transforming good intentions into socio-political interests.

5.1 Articles

The first set of articles, comprising of one single authored and two co-authored articles, focuses on the *humanitarian moment* of transnational solidarity expressed in the form of 'pure' gifts. My analysis building on Marcel Mauss' theory of the gift (see chapter 2) shows that the donators' active participation influences and changes practices, politics and power networks in the humanitarian aid chain at different localities, creating dynamics that reinforce the prevailing modes of social hierarchy as well as serving donators' self-interest of social recognition and honour (Article 1). It further revealed how these influencing factors provoke a process of commodification whereby pure and good intentions get contaminated through the politics of patronage and international aid (Article 2). Furthermore the research asserts that rituals and ceremonies around the gift and the direct encounter between those who give and those who receive visualize the perpetuating socio-economic asymmetries and existing power relations executed through gentle forms of violence (Article 3).
The second set of articles, consisting of one single and one co-authored article,

shifts the focus towards analysing the transformation of the 'pure' gift into *long-term visions of development*. In relation to Foucault's concept of governmentality (see chapter 2) one article illustrates how donators' visions, logic and socially informed knowledge on the one hand influences the projects objective, and while on the other hand establishes the basis for actual practices and technologies of doing aid (Article 4). The last article in addition uncovers how donators' initial 'pure' and good intentions transfers into a will to improve the unpacking of private non-anonymous donators' powerful role, in giving meaning to sustainable development and village improvement in the context of post-tsunami housing in Sri Lanka (Article 5). For article three and five I joined Dr Kanchana Ruwanpura in bringing together our separate empirical case material on post tsunami donator driven housing project. The two cases complemented each other nicely as Dr Ruwanpura's case study highlights that donators with Sri Lankan origin coming from Colombo middle class inhabit the same habitus of giving and the intention to govern the lives of others towards their socio-economic standard as is the case of international donators. In bringing both cases together it becomes clear, that the consequences of development gifts and the paradox of good intentions is not a matter of culturally different understanding of giving but a problem of the structures and processes of the gift.

Before outlining the articles in more detail, the following list will provide an overview presenting my contribution to each co-authored article:

Table 3: Articles and PhD authors' contribution

	Article	Author(s)
Humanitarian moment of gift giving	Dynamics of multi-local gifts: practices of humanitarian giving in post tsunami Sri Lanka In Development in Practice, 2013, 23(3), 319-331	Hollenbach
	The gift of disaster: the commodification of good intentions in post-tsunami Sri Lanka In Disasters, 2010, 34(1), 60-77	Korf, Hollenbach Klem Hasbullah
	Symbolic Gestures: The Development Terrain of Post- Tsunami Villages in (Southern) Sri Lanka In Journal of Development Studies, 2011, 47(9), 1299-1314	Hollenbach Ruwanpura
Long-term development of the gift	Seeing like a donator: guiding communities into better lives in the aftermath of the Indian-Ocean tsunami In International Development Planning Review, accepted 2013	Hollenbach
	From compassion to the will to improve: Elision of scripts? Philanthropy in post-tsunami Sri Lanka In GEOFORUM, 2014, 51(1), 243-251	Ruwanpura Hollenbach

	Contribution	
	Writing	Percentage
	Article	100
	• Writing one empirical case out of three • Assisting in writing out theoretical entry points and conclusion	25
	• Developing and writing out theoretical concept and overall article guideline • Writing analysis and conclusion • Guiding joint writing process • Empirical cases	70
	Article	100
	• Developing and writing out theoretical concept • Writing out the conclusion • Working up one empirical case study out of two • Assisting the journal review process	40

Article 1

Hollenbach, P. (2013) *Dynamics of multi-local gifts: practices of humanitarian living in post tsunami Sri Lanka.* In Development in Practice, 23 (3), 319-331

This article takes up the issue of the paradoxical combination of interestedness and disinterestedness and the three-fold sequence of obligation (to give, to accept, and render) highlighting its effects and influences at different localities of the gift. The paradox of the transnational development gift thereby emerges from the gap that arises between the presented ideals of private non-anonymous altruistic gifts, within the donators' home arena, and the actual practices of delivering the gift in the receiving arena. Donators present their gift within their socio-political arena in Germany as "…freed from the 'total social phenomena' in which economic and social motives are inseparable" (Hollenbach 2013: 322; cf. Mauss) claiming not to ascribe any expectations or personal, economic, and political interests to the gift. These highly moral presentations create pressure that continuously urges donators' to uphold and present the narrated 'purity' towards different audiences in different localities. The paper however illustrates that as soon as the gift enters the process of brokered aid delivery the ideals, good intentions and purity became subordinate to self-interests and demands of reciprocity. In line with Bourdieu (1998) it is argued that "without doubt the social universe within which disinterestedness is the official norm are not necessarily governed throughout by disinterestedness: behind the appearance of piety, virtue, disinterestedness, there are subtle, camouflaged interests" (87). Good intentions to alleviate the suffering of tsunami affected people get pushed aside through donators' interest of not losing social, political and personal reputation in Germany but also to increase their social capital through official honour and acknowledgment. The changing interests resulting in pressure to show visible success were carried over into the implementation process in Sri Lanka. Brokers and mediators of the gift in Sri Lanka were obliged to generate fast success thereby applying development practices related to patronage, favouritism, power and politics. And even more, actors in the receiving arena were left with a debt not only to continue to uphold the discourse of the pure gift, but to demonstrate their thankfulness and gratitude. In order to accomplish visible and successful outputs everyone complied with the rules and logics of give and take but as the case study also illustrates, everyone utilised the gift to fulfil their own purposes. The paradox here becomes obvious: in order to produce success, to achieve set expectations and promises of a gift enclosed in a space of purity, anti-politics, and non-economics, one has to apply the mundane practices of tit for tat, of give and take that constitute the economy of aid.

Article 2

Korf, B.; Hasbullah, S.; Hollenbach, P.; Klem, B. (2010) *The gift of disaster: the commodification of good intentions in post-tsunami Sri Lanka.* In Disasters, 34(1), 60-77

This paper analyses the process of commodification of post-tsunami aid in Sri Lanka through three unrelated and geographically separated empirical case studies. The cases explore the intricate chain of relations, obligations, and expectations pertinent in the co-evolving, but often contradictory gift rationales that permeated the practices, performances, and discourses of tsunami aid. The paper uncovers that development gifts are not just material transfers of 'aid' but also embodiments of cultural symbolism, social power, and political affiliation. Furthermore each developed biography of the gift discloses that the process of contamination of good intentions is mainly driven by the three-fold obligation to give, to accept and to return that Mauss identified in relation to gift processes in archaic communities. Development gifts therefore have to be seen in a system of exchange, and discourses of purity and disinterestedness are rhetoric supporting measures to raise financial support and/or social capital for those who give. In addition the three empirical cases uncover that gifts reinforced and reshuffled loyalties, group boundaries, and socio-political networks on different scales influenced by a strong entanglement in local politics of patronage and international gift economy. The analysis points out that beyond dominant rationales of ethnic or political party patronage, gifts by disingenuous patrons not only became patrimonial, but that the patrimonial rationale emerged as much from above as from below. This dynamic became nearly inescapable and self-reinforcing highlighting that gifts bind people together in a system of exchange with clearly defined rules, regulations and mutual expectations.
Therefore, the idea and rhetoric of the 'pure' tsunami gift – to enclose aid in a space of 'anti'-politics – was surely naïve in a society shaped by patronage rationale but also an important part of the game of international aid. In consequence the antagonistic discourses and the seemingly inescapability of patrimonial rationales reinforced social asymmetries along political and ethnic lines but also contributed to social conflicts and political discontent on different levels of the society.

Article 3

Hollenbach, P. and Ruwanpura, K. (2011) *Symbolic Gestures: The Development Terrain of Post- Tsunami Villages in (Southern) Sri Lanka.* In Journal of Development Studies, 47 (9), 1299-1314

This article accesses for its analysis two examples of private non-anonymous post-tsunami housing projects, one locally the other internationally initiated. The paper highlights that "…there is no such thing as a 'free gift' …and giving binds people together, it creates individual and social ties; it is motivated by the nature of human relationships" (Hollenbach and Ruwanpura 2011: 12). Donators' non-anonymous involvement in project implementation processes establishes a clearly defined gift exchange and in Mauss' understanding creates the three-fold obligation to give, to accept and to reciprocate. However, as the two empirical cases illustrate, giver and receiver develop what Bourdieu (1990) defines as the 'feel for the game'. This feel in the context of organized giving implies that both actors – giver and receiver - know what is expected and how to comply with the rules and regulations of the game. One of these rules taken up by the article is the legitimization and localization of the development gift through local culturally adapted rituals and ceremonies.
Here the article shows, that even though these rituals are portrayed as aspects of Sri Lankan life the direct involvement of donators transformed these rituals into a process that reproduces and deepens class structures and positioning of power. For donators and brokers of the gift these ceremonies often become practices to convey habitus of power through symbols of domination and even gentle violence (Bourdieu 1990). On the side of beneficiaries these occasions provide a stage to fulfil their obligation to reciprocate the tsunami gift, as they were able to show their thankfulness and gratitude towards the donators. For Bourdieu (1977: 196) an acceptance of these practices results in symbolic violence. He suggests that symbolic violence works through the 'transfiguration of relations of domination and submission into affective relations, the transfiguration of power into charisma or into the charm suited to evoke affective enchantment' (Bourdieu, 1998: 102). But the transformation can only work if all actors within the social field do understand the rules of the game thereby accepting practices appearing as legitimate and even be taken for granted in the disenchanted economy of ''naked self-interest'' (Bourdieu 1990: 196). The paper therefore shows, that donators and receivers collaborate, knowingly and unknowingly, in a work of dissimulation tending to deny the truth of gift exchange. This in addition shows the subtle and cowardly form violence symbolically takes and how hard it becomes to escape this

logic. To escape, people would need to reflect on their habitus, change both the 'nature' of their embodied thinking and their acting (dispositions). The article finds that even where the 'beneficiaries' play the game creatively and skilfully, political economic realities of international organized gift giving keeps the beneficiaries in place.
The article concludes, that it is not that the recipients lack the capacity to confront their predicament and be deliberately ambivalent in their gratitude. The empirical cases rather highlight that they are aware of and use their capacity to subtly and creatively counteract the domination by NGOs and philanthropists, yet this in itself does not transform social structures and power bases. A change in the social relation of the development gift would require all social agents – giver, receiver and brokers along the aid chain - to accept each other's intrusion into their field and transform their dispositions.

Article 4

Hollenbach, P. (forthcoming)
Seeing like a donator: guiding communities into better lives in the aftermath of the Indian-Ocean tsunami. In International Development Planning Review (accepted 2013)

This article aims to uncover the logic and socialized knowledge on which donators base their visions of 'improved' village life and how they attempted to shape the conduct of beneficiaries, governing their mentality through humanitarian aid and its technicalities. Relating the analysis to Foucault's concept of governmentality the article writes out "…the rationalities of rule, the forms of knowledge and expertise …and the specific and contingent assemblages of practices, materials, agents and techniques through which … rationalities operate to produce governable subjects" (Hart, 2004: 92).
The empirical case illustrates that donators' benevolent and generous act of giving, of building back better, did on the one hand mean to provide technically solid and spacious houses and a more modern design of the village layout, from the donators' personal experience. On the other hand the vision of setting people on a better path of development was defined on a larger scale: it meant to create new political subjects, new citizens that, in a way, would transgress the limited bounds of the mundane, dirty party politics as practiced in Sri Lanka. The vision was to 'conduct the conduct' of beneficiaries in order to implant peace into local

communities as an antipode to the ethnicized antagonisms prevailing in Sri Lanka at the time of planning the project, and even today. In this sense, the project clearly was designed as a model to govern mentalities – the mentalities of disaster victims to make them active political subjects managing their "own community" and starting to participate in state politics. Relating to James Scott's work *Seeing like a state* the post-tsunami relocation scheme can therefore be understood as a miniature-modernizing project (certainly on much smaller scale) however with the same aim "…to create … microenvironments of apparent order as model villages" (Scott 1998: 225).

However the analysis of the data shows that the intention to create an apparent order was not fully successful: only parts of the houses are permanently occupied, the political life of the village is far from the ideals the donators elaborated in the village constitution and considerable frustration is abound among those recipients who accepted to settle in the village. But as Li (2005) suggests, that by looking "beyond ... failed schemes" it becomes evident that project participants find new practices and compromises "to fill the gap between project plans and on-the-ground realities" (Li, 2005, 391). Therefore improvement schemes such as the German tsunami-gift produce new forms of local knowledge and practices, they change and influence 'the conduct of conduct' but not necessarily in the way as laid down and envisioned by the donators but as it is newly interpreted by its recipients (Li 2005; Li 1999; Lewis and Mosse 2006). Moreover the case study shows what the majority of donator-driven aid projects forgot that "…the most important fact about social engineering: its efficiency depends on the response and cooperation of real human subjects" (Scott, 1998, 225). The paper therefore concludes that attempts to build back better in the sense of producing governable subjects through development aid (or humanitarian aid, as it were), is a source of power replicating existing asymmetries and deficiencies in international organized aid.

Article 5

Ruwanpura, K. and Hollenbach, P. (2014) *From compassion to the will to improve: Elision of scripts? Philanthropy in post-tsunami Sri Lanka*. GEOFORUM, 2014, 51(1), 243-251

This paper analyses two privately initiated non-anonymous aid initiatives already discussed and introduced in article three. In this article the emphasis is on illustrating the logics of compassion and how these logics are critical to set up gift exchanges and to generate aid and financial support in post-tsunami Sri Lanka. The two case studies demonstrate how during the construction of post-tsunami housing schemes and at which point of the gift giving process "...the initial compassionate impetus shifted to a will to improve the life of villagers over time" (Ruwanpura and Hollenbach 2013: 2). Thereby donators slip from rhetoric of compassion into rhetoric of governing, opening the possibility to draw the analysis to Foucault's concept of governmentality. Even though donators act upon best intentions and generosity the case studies show what Li notes: ''the objective of trusteeship is not to dominate others-it is to enhance their capacity for action, and to direct it… Their methods are subtle... They structure a field of possible actions'' (2007: 5).

Furthermore the analysis exposes that village planning in this context continues to be governed by principles of modernization and private donators thereby perpetuating hegemonic and nationalist visions of model villages. In doing so the paper examines the manner in which donators' actions are also about subtly shifting social relations favourable to neo-liberal incursions into local village life, which also bear upon nationalist politics. We show that private donators define and envisage post-tsunami 'better life' without proper and continuous consultation of local knowledge or the gift recipients. This illustrates their increasing role in development interventions. Therefore it is important to not only see the state (Jeffrey 2007) but to see the non-state (private donators, philanthropists) and appreciate its entanglements, intercessions, gentle violence and culpability in the social life of post-disaster rehabilitation. The two cases show how socio-political well-established private donators use their personal and political connections with politicians and high high-profile bureaucrats to outwit state/non-state procedures so as to achieve their development vision. Even though the absence of the state in these instances may not necessarily lead to ''anarchy, poverty and despair'' (Li 2007: 280), but rather results in non-state agencies stepping up their role without much scrutiny. The concern then is that social hierarchies are reinforced despite the mobilization of localism, culture, responsibility and sustainability with a

seeming concern for social justice. Such rhetoric deflects attention from grounded political-economic relations, where producing responsible villagers depoliticizes their existing subjectivities and neglects prevailing social relations at the village level.
Therefore the paper comes to the conclusion that the interpellation of religious and moral moves during disasters to assist the affected others are compassionate gesticulations, but when taken to the scale of willing communities to improve, such schemes expose an underbelly that gives prominence to political economy matters. Donators refer 'better life' only to their own frames of reference thereby instilling an ethos of improvement into Sri Lankan village life resulting in an inadvertent obtrusion of donators' moral imperatives disciplining and guiding aid recipients into their predefined will. The moral of the story remains thus: Compassion ultimately does not rid social relations of material inequality and class discrepancies. These can only be addressed through redistributive social justice.

5.2 Synthesis

Mauss concluded in his "*Essay on the gift*" (1990) that even though gift processes become more and more dispossessed by the primacy of utilitarian market economic behaviour in the context of modern societies, they nevertheless remain operative in many aspects of 'modern' life. He continues that the separation of 'economy' and 'gift' is only a modern conception not withstanding the day-to-day organization of human civilization arguing that life continues to be "… steeped in the atmosphere of the gift, mixing interest and disinterest, freedom and constraint, persons and things" (Silber 1998: 136). Till today it seems Mauss' visions prove true. Human relations– personal, political and even economical within the close social environment but also far beyond are still formed and reinforced through gifts. Especially the continuously increasing growth of organized gift giving, institutionalized in multi- and bilateral, state and non-state, public and private humanitarian and development agencies that are testifying that individuals, countries and states are transnationally related through processes of gift giving.

Yet the current PhD articles highlight some major problems of the sector: the aspersion of the Maussian gift. It does so for not only the very specific case of non-anonymous giving, but since a majority of actors and brokers working within the global gift economy consistently present their gifts as 'pure' and altruistic; a gift freed from any obligations and reciprocity. The analysis uncovers that these performances and demonstrations are purposeful and intentional. The logics of

compassion, purity and disinterestedness are critical at the beginning in order to set up transnational gift exchanges and further to convince a broad public to materially and financially support predefined visions of development and 'betterment' for those suffering, in the given case of post-disaster devastation. The problem here is, that development agencies hide the true workings of exchange and the business of doing aid behind a benevolent and altruistic self, covering hegemonic objectives, self-interests and struggles for power within a highly competitive market. As Van Uffold and Giri (2003) remark, "development organisations present an image that they are for the people but in reality they are interested in their own survival and success" (270). However the articles also reveal that within the system of development gifts, actors along the aid chain and in different localities knowingly enter into the gift exchange with clear expectations and self-interest. As Bourdieu (1997) notes: "no one is really unaware of the logic of exchange … but no one fails to comply with the rule of the game which is to act as if one did not know the rule" (232). It is therefore omnipresent that development gifts work on the basis of what Mauss defined as the three-fold sequence of obligations (to give, to accept, and to render) and has to be seen in a system of exchange and market economy. The empirical case exposes that it is not the technical but the political that is at work when gifts are transferred into everyday practice of doing aid. In relations to Mauss' analytical findings on gifts in archaic societies, the fundamental mechanisms influencing the organized system of development gift exchange are consequently: self-interest, compulsion and politics – personal, economic, social, and institutional.

So what can we learn from these observations and findings? In my opinion the ethnographic insights into the private non-anonymous gift in post-tsunami aid in Sri Lanka, being exemplary for the organized sector of development gifts, clearly illustrates that the development and humanitarian sector needs to be self-reflexive and transparent about the hidden workings of the Maussian gift within the everyday practices of doing aid. "The problem with the practice of development…" write Giri and Van Uffold (2003), "…in the last fifty years has been an agenda of hegemonic application of a priori formulations in which the objects of development do not have much say in defining and shaping the contours of their development" (254). Even though aid agencies promote partnerships and participation, talk of ownership and empowerment, the case study shows that it is predominantly the mentality of donators, aid brokers and aid agencies that govern the implementation and gift giving processes applying technologies based on their professional expertise, personal experiences, socialized knowledge and technical repertoire. As Bastian (2005) writes "…this ownership and participation is on the basis of fundamental ideas and decisions brought from outside" (22). Through

combining Mauss' gift theory with Foucaults' concept of governmentality the thesis clearly shows that the ethical discourses around the gift slip into a will to improve. This slippage and the governmentality of the gift needs to be openly and transparently negotiated in order to place policy models within the social context of the political economy of gift exchange. The analysis of the thesis highlights, that it is important to understand both socio-political ends of the development gift but also social, economic and political processes and the logics of actors along the aid chain in order to change the everyday reality of practicing aid on the ground. Policy therefore needs to become the cause of practice rather then the end of it.

However even though it is evident that the day-to-day reality of doing aid is defined and even more important dependent on the social relationship between giver and receiver, the sector on the one hand ignores "the social logic of gift economy and patrimonialism" (Korf 2010: iv), and also does widely underestimate and ignore immediate local initiatives of self-organized help to overcome disaster induced as well as structural suffering. It is the generalisation, the homogenisation of socio-political and economic diversity and definition of problems linked to already known technical solutions that are dominant in the sector (Bastian 2005; Barnett and Weiss 2008; Giri and Van Uffold 2003; Li 2007). Practitioners and the humanitarian sector write Hoffman and Weiss (2008) "…are learning disabled – they do not possess the capabilities of cultural inclination to process information, correct errors, and devise alternative strategies and tactics" (283). They are trained to act and get involved if an emergency situation occurs. Questions on ethics, power and politics are thereby tied to the mechanics of the humanitarian action such as 'code of conduct', 'best practices' and the performance or outreach of their involvement. However these generalised technologies and policies, reminds Bastian (2005), "are unable to capture the specificities of [any] society" (22). It is therefore advisable that researchers and practitioners join up their experiences in order to reflect and to understand the politics and social logics of the organized gift economy of international aid or as Hoffman and Weiss (2008) notice the importance to "…reflect more deeply on why they are doing what they are doing" (284). In practices this means, that researchers and practitioners become equal partners in developing country and disaster specific policy models when it is needed. Researchers have the advantage to step out of the situation and distance themselves of the logics of giving of which practitioners hardly can escape or often do not realize their entrapment within the system and logic of gift giving. Even so humanitarian and development aid organisations follow certain timely rules and regulations, it is important to allocate decent time for planning, coordination and exchange arriving on the ground and starting practicing aid. Even so it seems unimaginable, especially in emergency situations, each aid

situation provides a time window to sufficiently negotiate and to get to know the ground reality – politics, economics, networks, actors – upon which the long-term strategy and aid objectives can be formulated and worked out. The most important matter here is to involve local partners – practitioners and researchers – as they provide an in depth view and analysis on these important facts and findings and can help to guide the process of developing an applied policy frame.
The recommendation then would be that the sector of global institutionalized gift giving develops an attitude of mutual learning or in Giri and Van Ufford terms, "acknowledged dependence" (273). In this understanding, actors within the development gift economy at both ends and along the aid chain "…acknowledge the significance of the four agents of development – state, market, voluntary organisations/social movements, and the self – but not to grant absolute primacy to any" (ibid 273). In doing so it becomes important to understand the socio-political complexity of doing aid and the logic of the gift economy in each specific location. Aid practitioners arriving in countries in the aftermath of disasters need to reflect on involved interests and learn about what Korf characterizes as "the political economy of 'the situation'" (2010: iv). For this reason it is inalienable to start collaborations with scholars and local aid agencies in order to gain local knowledge of socio-political networks, their intermingling with multi-local gift economies and in addition get to know existing evaluations on actual needs and demands. Even so aid workers and researchers seem to have different objectives, at the core both have the intention to improve the achievements and outreach of the humanitarian sector or differently expressed both have the intention to sustainably improve the lives of those receiving aid. Therefore researchers and practitioners have to become partners in order to "…grasp the social and political processes through which aid policy is made and transformed in practice, … [researchers]…have to negotiate space for their involvement to be more ethnographic and resist institutional pressure to conform to dominant policy-driven or economics-based knowledge systems" (Mosse 2007:941). Furthermore common research project should be set up reflecting on questions of the gift dynamic within the aid 'industry' and how institutional politics and sector reforms can be aligned in order to achieve the overall aim to frame existing problems of rehabilitation and relief not only using a language of development technologies but to uncover the political ecology of established gift relations and adjust practices accordingly.

6. Literature

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Personal declaration

I hereby declare that the submitted thesis is the result of my own, independent, work. All external sources are explicitly acknowledged in the thesis.

Pia Hollenbach

Part 2
Publications

Article 1

Hollenbach, P. (2013)

Dynamics of multi-local gifts: practices of humanitarian giving in post tsunami Sri Lanka.

Development in Practice, 23 (3), 319-331.

Abstract

This paper explores the paradox of gift giving in privately initiated forms of post-disaster aid. The paradox emerges from the gap that arises between ideals of the altruistic gift, and its practices in the actual implementation in a complex and multi-local humanitarian aid arena. An ethnographic study of a privately initiated post-tsunami housing project illustrates the paradox. While initiators presented the project as opposite to the mundane world of development aid, they increasingly came under pressure to deliver and perform visible success, such that their practices resembled this mundane world of humanitarian aid and its logics of patronage, favouritism, and politics.

Keywords:
Aid; Civil Society – Partnership; Conflict and reconstruction; South Asia

Introduction

"When we saw the destruction and suffering of the people after the tsunami, from the very first second it was clear: we were going to help." (Donator, Germany)[1]

Since Henry Dunant's Red Cross initiative of 1862, the world has seen the emergence of international humanitarian aid agencies reorganising the social practice of giving with new institutional structures and rules. The nature of the gift thereby undergoes change through what we can call the "geography of gifts" (Korf et al. 2010): gifts are now linking people beyond group boundaries and even

1 Donator is used to indicate private persons giving donations to aid and development organisations. Donor stands for official development institutions like government, semi-official foundations or aid organisations.

beyond their known social space. But while gifts move from donator to recipient, located in different societies and social contexts, they change their character from being an altruistic act to becoming a commodity in a complex aid economy.
This paper explores the paradox of gift giving in privately initiated forms of post-disaster aid, whereby a paradox emerges from the gap that arises between ideals of an altruistic gift and the mundane practices of aid delivery in humanitarian contexts. This paper examines this paradox through an ethnographic study of a housing relocation project in Sri Lanka that private donators from Germany initiated in the aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. The initiators and brokers of the gift positioned their gift as altruistic (or pure), as opposed to the mundane world of development aid.[2] But this claim of delivering another, a purer gift brought the same brokers under pressure to deliver visible success. In doing so, their practices more and more resembled the mundane world of humanitarian aid and its often-described logics of patronage, favouritism, and politics.

The case study is situated within the very specific conditions of gift giving after the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. In this particular case, global media broadcasting brought real-time coverage from the disaster zone in unprecedented intensities making the tsunami "everybody's disaster" (Fernando and Hilhorst 2006, 294). The vast reach of the tsunami, and the fact that several countries hit were well-known tourist destinations, resulted in an unprecedented scale of generous public response and private donations (US$14 billion internationally).[3] A specific feature of this aid response was that it generated new modes of humanitarian gifts, with direct involvement of private and non-professional aid initiatives. In some cases donators abandoned their anonymous position and became active partners in negotiation, implementation, and decision-making of their projects, influencing practices and politics of humanitarian assistance. This created specific, often problematic dynamics of gift giving that this paper will describe. This paper discusses a privately initiated gift that donators intended as a pure, efficient, and direct gift to affected people without strings or conditions attached; the opposite of common development gifts. As one donor states, "The money we collect is given one-to-one for those in need ...not like professional organisations who have excessive additional costs... we just want to help, we have no other

2 The project initiators are called brokers or key brokers (mediators of ideas and translators between different arenas), as they mediated their idea of EcoVillage to numerous donators in Germany and to the political and bureaucratic level in Germany and Sri Lanka (see Mosse and Lewis 2006).

3 Numbers compiled by UN OCHA 2010 (available at http://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=home). For comparison: World Bank estimated in 2005 the amount of tsunami aid to be US$5 billion.

long-term agenda" (8, 102008, DA).[4] The aim of this paper is to present the everyday practices and negotiations around the gift, mediated through a German humanitarian aid organisation, to illustrate the new modes of individualised and privatised humanitarian gifts that emerged after the tsunami, and make "the ways in which humanitarian aid is delivered... increasingly complicated" (Fernando and Hilhorst 2006, 293). I will explain how different "gift arenas" emerged at different geographical locations, producing a plurality of negotiations and a multi-layered complexity of relationships that shaped and conditioned the social practices of the involved actors. By following the chain of humanitarian giving, the study shows how donators, aid workers, local bureaucrats, and recipients had to fill various roles while performing to different audiences in order to juggle multiple rationales and expectations that were often disconnected from each other. I suggest that in order to understand the dynamics of the aid arena in the recipient country, we first need to analyse the dynamics of the gift arena in the donor country and various sub-arenas that emerge in the chain of humanitarian giving.

This research is positioned within the framework of an "ethnography of aid" (Gould and Marcussen 2004; Mosse 2005), which studies humanitarian aid as social practice. Many of those who write in the field of ethnography of aid are practitioners-scholars, i.e. they have worked in various capacities in the development sector. The same applies to me: I have worked for three years (2005–07) at the implementing NGO in Sri Lanka and was responsible for managing the privately initiated housing project discussed in this paper. During my assignment I was a practitioner, an observer, and an active participant in stakeholder meetings and discussions with donators, local bureaucrats, local politicians, and recipients. For reporting reasons, I took notes and wrote reports, which form part of my empirical data. After my assignment, I started to work as an academic researcher conducting additional research outside of my former institutional affiliation. During 2008–10 I conducted several interviews and discussions with the three initiators in German, gaining access to internal documents like minutes of donators meetings, official letters to German and Sri Lankan ministries, and internal communication among the stakeholders. I also carried out semi-structured interviews with seven key informant like former colleagues, the former and current director of the aid agency, and two external consultants working for the project. Re-visiting Sri Lanka in 2009/2010 and 2011 I was supported by two local research assistants in conducting 38 individual and five group semi-structured interviews with housing recipients aiming to follow up

4 The referencing note exists of the following information: (line in transcript, Month Year, acronym of interviewee).

their everyday life, current problems, and their involvement in the project. More information was gathered in interviews with 11 local bureaucrats and politicians, and four interviews with staff members of the local implementing NGOs to trace former and current developments and views on the housing project. The paper proceeds as follows: after discussing the concept of the gift, its incorporation into the study of development, and the analytic distinction between "pure gift" and the "gift of the development industry", I describe the original motivation for the gift and its translation into a housing relocation project in Sri Lanka. I will describe the dynamics between raising expectations among donators in Germany and how these influenced, conditioned, and shaped the practices and negotiations within the aid arena in Sri Lanka. The paper thus exposes the paradox of this privately initiated pure gift: in order to uphold the idea of a pure gift within the donators' home arena in Germany, the project/gift became subject to logics and practices of patronage, favouritism, and politics – the mundane world of the development industry – from which donators originally wanted to detach and distance themselves and their gift-giving practices.

Gifts in humanitarian aid

In his landmark study The Gift Relationship. From Human Blood to Social Practice (1970), Tittmus was among the first to suggest that today's generosity toward unknown deserving others is an act of altruism based on spontaneity, free will, and voluntariness and is specifically intended to enhance their well-being. His study refers to anonymous acts of giving where "donors give to an impersonal organisation" (Silk 2004, 232) without expectations or personal, economic, and political interests. It is a pure gift, freed from the "total social phenomena" in which economic and social motives are inseparable (Mauss 1990, 3). Aid organisations present themselves to the public as producers of such pure gifts.

However, studies on the gift in the development industry highlight that best-intended unconditional donations change "the biography of the gift" (Stirrat and Henkel 1997, 68; Korf 2007; Korf et al. 2010; Hollenbach and Ruwanpura 2011) as soon as they enter the domain of humanitarian aid. These studies point out that actors never act as "free-standing but rather as relational individuals whose behaviour is part of a specific socio-political context" (Silk 2004, 232). Therefore the gift changes its properties from the pure, disinterested gift, to an interest-laden exchange, of the kind that makes up the mundane world of the development industry: "Aid becomes a culturally charged, political commodity" (Korf et al. 2010, 61), highly contested through conditions, expectations, pre-determined

outputs, and rules. The analysis is informed by Bourdieu's writings on the gift as logic of practice defining, the quality of the gift as being both free and obligatory, generated by the habitus of generosity. This habitus, a set of internalised norms, governs the agents by something that lies beyond their freedom: "preperceptive anticipations, a sort of practical induction based on previous experiences, are not given to a pure subject... they are the fact of the habitus as a feel for the game" (Bourdieu 1998, 80). Agents endowed with the habitus of generosity are therefore implicitly aware of the social rule of generous action: the denial of egoistic and interested calculations. Bourdieu, however, notes that

> "without doubt the social universe within which disinterestedness is the official norm are not necessarily governed throughout by disinterestedness: behind the appearance of piety, virtue, disinterestedness, there are subtle, camouflaged interests." (1998, 87)

Therefore actors, who are socialised in a world in which gift exchange is institutionalised and professionally brokered, are implicitly aware of the rules of giving and also acknowledge the very logic of exchange: a system of rewards, recognition, and profit (symbolic and/or economic). Such gifts of development aid presented as aid projects therefore re-enforce asymmetry and domination and demonstrate social, political, and symbolic power demanding obligations and reciprocity, while leaving beneficiaries with a social debt (Bastian 2005; Hollenbach and Ruwanpura 2011; Korf 2007; Korf et al. 2010). Thus the ambiguity of gifts rests upon the interplay between subjective disinterestedness and objective interest, generating the paradox of perception and practice.

To analyse this interplay the paper focuses on the increasing phenomenon of private gifts that transpire from donators to aid agencies, with emphasis on brokerage and mediation. It is argued that even though private donators may practice gift giving with good intentions and present their generosity within their home country as opposed to the mundane practices of aid, their gener osity triggers dynamics and negotiations around the gift that influence how aid is implemented and practiced in the recipient country. It was Marcel Mauss who wrote that in archaic societies, "gifts are presented in rituals looking to be spontaneous, voluntary and altruistic, but in general the gestures accompanying the act of giving are fiction, formalism and social lies covering the truth of the gift: compulsion and interests" (2005, 63). Similar logics continue in aid arenas that are opened up by private and non-anonymous giving to humanitarian agencies. As Korf (2007, 370) explains it, "donating... appears to be manageable, but practising aid as an encounter is more difficult because it involves the activation of

a relationship between self and other, between donor and receiver...".

Case study: private gift giving after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami

The case study, which I will present shortly, traces the ambivalence of gift giving, the tension between the ideal of an altruistic act and its mundane everyday practices in the context of private aid initiatives that emerged as new modes of humanitarian giving after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. I will describe one specific project, the so-called EcoVillage in the southern Sri Lankan district of Galle. I have selected this case study for three main reasons: first, the tsunami as a globalised event generated an immense number of private initiatives, and cooperation of professional aid agencies and private donators as well. Further, the intensity of relief efforts, the involvement of multitude actors, and the constant observation by global media not only raised high expectations on the outcome of aid but also revealed aid practices that remain invisible in non-globalised disasters. Second, based on its settings and specific political and personal relationships of the key brokers, the project generated a special dynamic not only within the donators' arena in Baden-Württemberg, Germany, but also in the receiving arena in Sri Lanka. This highlights how the gift was negotiated in various manifestations in the local arena, raising high expectations, and resulting in pressure from the various actors to perform according to a specific script that was largely designed in Baden-Württemberg and re-shaped along the gift chain. Third, my own involvement opened up some possibilities for research, while also marking certain limitations: I took part in the project implementation for two and a half years; and I originally come from the same area as the three German brokers and my father, a politician in Baden-Württemberg, was politically linked to these three brokers. These two elements gave me insights into the everyday practices of gift delivery, and the opportunity to trace intentions, motivations, and ex-post evaluations of the brokers themselves.

Donors, their background, and the ambition to help

When images of the tsunami circulated around the world, three individuals from Baden-Württemberg (a wealthy regional state in southern Germany), felt compelled to help and initiated a private aid project in Sri Lanka. These individuals – subsequently referred to as Brokers A, B, and C[5] – represent private and semi-

5 To secure the anonymity and privacy of the three key brokers.

official institutions, and all had intimateties to Sri Lanka through past work relationships. Broker A, for example, lived in Sri Lanka for seven years during the early 1970s, where he was involved in a German Development project building up a technical school in cooperation with the Sri Lankan Ministry of Education.
Since then, he had remained involved in fostering educational exchange programmes and school partnerships and continued to participate in several exchange programmes. He regularly spent time in Sri Lanka conducting training courses, while being engaged in small aid projects through Lions Club International. Throughout this time, he had established strong networks with ministries and high-ranking politicians in Baden-Württemberg and Sri Lanka. Broker B's professional history in Sri Lanka and his distinguished political status brought him the position as honorary counsel to Sri Lanka in Baden-Württemberg. Linked to a political and diplomatic circle and in his position as director of a semi-public foundation in Baden-Württemberg, he maintained excellent connections to the regional and state council. Broker C was a high-level administrative official in the State Ministry for the Environment in Baden-Württemberg, and together with Broker B had close ties with Sri Lankan officials as they had previously set up a bilateral aid project with the Ministry of Urban Development and Water Supply (UD&WS) in Sri Lanka to transfer environmental technology.
Two motivations to help thereby came together: the feeling of empathy with tsunami victims, and their distinguished social status and strong ties to politicians in Baden-Württemberg and Sri Lanka. As Broker B indicated: "It was not only empathy, but I received calls and letters from friends and partners in Sri Lanka requesting me to help" (12, 032009, DB). When asked about their motivation, all emphasised that they felt helping was "the only thing to do" (Bourdieu 1997, 233). Broker A emphasised: "We did not even think about it, we just started to collect money... We wanted to give something back...we have good memories of our time in Sri Lanka" (15, 102008, DA). All felt responsible but also obliged to set up relief projects. Broker B proudly continues to report how easy it was for him to raise money and promote his idea to help:

> "I used my good contacts to local companies and started to write 'begging letters' and introduced my idea to set up relief projects in Sri Lanka. As people knew and trusted me, the response was immense. Within couple of weeks I was able to collect more than 100,000 Euros... I used my position in Baden Württemberg to organise help for others." (25, 032009, DB)

In the course of his fundraising activities, he also approached his friend and former projectsupporter Broker C who stated: "The tsunami offered a good chance and opportunity to reestablish our cooperation with Sri Lanka... and support the

local government in its relief efforts" (05,082008, DC). He added "we felt a huge responsibility to assist our former partners in this utterly devastating situation" (14, 082008, DC). For this purpose he managed to allocate third party funding from a (semi-public) state foundation, supporting the project with €700,000 (US$908,530).
The brokers continued to raise funds individually within their home arena, Baden-Württemberg, using their contacts with political and economic leaders of the state to give their endeavour the allure of formality and professionalism but also to entice the public and media. The brokers thereby played into public discourses about suspected inefficiency and misuse of tsunami funds by distancing themselves from the aid industry. As Broker A remarked,

> "all the generously given money in Germany will be given to tsunami affected people in Sri Lanka... We do not operate like huge aid agencies spending up to 40 per cent on administration costs... we paid all our flights and accommodation with our private money." (56, 102008, DA)

Through close ties to and political networks in Sri Lanka, they argued, the gift would be more effective and efficient as its implementation would be direct, based on actual needs, and managed and facilitated through locally knowledgeable partners. Thus they suggested their gift was pure and free, not contaminated by any other interests (that aid organisations might have) or pre-given development policies or targets to be reached.
This particular discourse of raising the pure gift – as opposed to gifts of the aid industry – would henceforth shape the various discourses, practices, and performances of the brokers and others involved. However, the high expectations that brokers raised within their social field in Germany of purity, effectiveness, efficiency, transparency, accountability, and quality were hard to uphold during the ordinary practices of bringing the gift to its beneficiaries. The next section will give an overview of the actual gift that the brokers designed and presented to the public in Germany. Brokers anticipated producing not only another housing project but to introduce a new feature of living: a model village for sustainable, innovative, eco-friendly, and holistic living.

The gift: an eco-friendly German village

The need for houses appeared self-evident; as Broker B stated, "driving southbound along Galle Road we saw so many damaged houses and tents... It was obvious to construct houses" (64, 072007, DB). Further, with the State Ministry

for the Environment co-funding the project one condition was a prerequisite: the project had to be justified as ecological technology transfer. Hence the objective of the project was defined: constructing 90 quality houses with ecological standards.

Given the conditionality, the idea of an EcoVillage was announced early to the press in Baden-Württemberg. On 17 December 2005 the state minister for the environment stated, "the EcoVillage in Sri Lanka can be characterised as role model regarding its ecological standard".[6] Brokers presented EcoVillage as a new innovation and highlighted its educational value and quality. The gift was thereby coupled with paternalistic ideas of improving the lives, mentalities, and capabilities of the recipients. In the official Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that was later signed between the brokers, the implementing aid agency, and the Sri Lankan Ministry of Urban Development and Water Supply (UD&WS), it was clarified that

> "the term 'EcoVillage' in this context means that the project intends to serve ecological aspects in general infrastructure, sewage, waste management and construction. The ecological parts will be included by the Donor on the basis of the analysis of the feasibility, sustainability, and cost effectiveness." (Paragraph 1.1 Memoradum of Understanding, Internal Document)

The location for the housing site also emerged through a rather contingent process of personal impressions and priorities of the German brokers:

> "to be honest, the location for the project was decided on personal preferences. The South is a good location. Our partners told there is still a demand and as well it is much more comfortable to access when we come to visit... We also considered the East. But it is really too complicated; access and difficult political situation... also we have no contacts there with local ministries." (45,082008, DC)

Local bureaucrats helped to identify beautiful and suitable sites (from the point of view of the German brokers) and to find the right location. One tsunami officer in Galle remembered:

> "First time the German delegation came in 2005... it was a special request from a ministry in Colombo to assist them finding a location for a special housing project... we showed them several sites but nothing was good

6 Quoted in Ludwigsburger Kreiszeitung (regional journal), 17 December 2005.

enough... we took quite an effort and time for them." (88, 10012009, ARI)

From the start, the project design had to be shaped and negotiated according to preferences of constellations in Baden-Württemberg, to enable brokers to justify and sell the gift in their home as well in the receiving aid arena. The special networks of the brokers gave them preferential treatment as the MoU documents states: "the UD&WS in consultation with the GoSL and other Local Authorities in recognition of the Donor generosity wishes to reciprocate by providing all necessary non monetary assistance to ensure the smooth and speedy implementation of this construction project" (Paragraph 1.2 Memorandum of Understanding, Internal Document). To contextualise this statement: state authorities had not granted such treatment to other humanitarian aid agencies; the project received this support only through by-passing the official and building on unofficial channels of political support. The brokers felt pressured to do so in order to achieve given promises.

Practicing gift giving

The journey from "pure gift" to "gift of development industry"

As donations increased, brokers realised that they lacked the capacity to manage a project of that magnitude. Even though they had originally intended to disassociate themselves from the aid industry, the need for an experienced implementing partner appeared imperative. Through contacts brokers were introduced to the tsunami coordinator of AID[7] – a humanitarian organisation with its headquarters in Baden-Württemberg. At the beginning AID was not keen to accept the mandate, as one former official said "donors set clear conditions and a finality at the beginning of the project" (32, 012009, MD). However, AID felt that it would lose political support for other work and even feared losing its reputation if it did not help to deliver this (dis)interested gift. A former leading official confessed: "with the political involvement there was no way to disclaim the project..." (06, 012009, MD).

The complex set of relations and the pressure to satisfy the high expectations in Baden-Württemberg led through several trajectories of utilising the brokers' power to leverage and steer the project. The conditions of delivering the gift had to be negotiated with several actors in the aid arena in Sri Lanka and in Germany.

7 AID' is used to secure anonymity of the implementing aid organisation

All these actors had their own and often differing motivations and expectations: those who had donated at home, whose expectations had been nurtured by the brokers; AID, which tried to keep humanitarian standards intact; those who struggled with the everyday management in Sri Lanka; and finally the recipients. Therefore the gift was constantly renegotiated at each of these locations and arenas, significantly influencing the implementation and related practices.

The pressure to deliver: leaving the path of unconditional aid

When implementation started in early 2006, Galle district experienced what Stirrat (2006, 11) branded "competitive humanitarianism": the district was flooded with housing projects that the local bureaucracy could hardly absorb. As the district secretary (DS) stated, "there were too many organisations in Galle, we could not oversee, monitor or guide them with the limited number of officers... the situation was totally new to us, we did not have any experience" (45, 032009, DSG). Therefore many aid agencies introduced parallel monitoring systems, ignoring the official relief structures, and complained about the government's weak management. On the other side housing recipients complained about the poor quality of houses. In 2006 one housing recipient complained during an official donor meeting at the DS office in Galle that he and his family had to live in a house without electricity, a leaking roof, and far from his working place, and that the aid organisation had already left, leaving the recipients alone in this miserable situation. The frustration was high among aid agencies, beneficiaries, and local authorities.

AID staff initially intended to abide by official housing guidelines (of the Sri Lankan government) that envisaged liaising with the DS office, but later felt compelled to return to unofficial channels in order to speed up the process. Local government and administration were overwhelmed, and delays in decisions and authorisations of documents became the norm. However, the German brokers had publicly given a promise (in Baden-Württemberg) to finalise the project within 12 months, and therefore delays endangered their reputation as well as that of AID. In order to protect their social and professional prestige and to avoid a publicised political quarrel, brokers and AID had to achieve given promises. Hence brokers used all their existing networks and goodwill among politicians and central government officials in Sri Lanka to push the local bureaucracy to deliver.

Given the over-supply of houses in Galle district, the choice of recipients became politically delicate. When AID first met the DS, his enthusiasm about a new relocation project was rather limited. When asking for a beneficiary list, he suggested, "You do not worry about beneficiaries; you build the houses and hand

over the keys to me... and I distribute" (17, 032006, DSG). This position was not acceptable to the brokers: "we signed an MoU with the GoSL and they have to take over their responsibilities... we have to secure the quality of the project" (23, 062006, DB). AID came under pressure to deliver progress and present eligible recipients to Germany. The difficulty was not only a missing beneficiary list, but also that brokers had a clear idea how a proper sample of recipients ought to look: "a diverse selection of people reflecting the whole Sri Lankan society – poor people living next to middle class people, Sinhalese living next to Muslims and Tamils... " (23, 032006, DE). They hereby pursued a highly idealised model of a peaceful Sri Lankan village, where different ethnicities and social classes lived side by side, ignoring the social structures of villages which existed prior to the tsunami.

To get such an ideal village together, AID depended upon the cooperation of local government officials. Informing the brokers about AID's difficulties in collaborating with local government officials, they requested the then Sri Lankan prime minister (who had formerly been Sri Lankan ambassador to Germany) lodge a complaint at district level urging the DS office to cooperate and find a solution for the beneficiary problem. The complaint was successful and subsequently all parties involved were required to do things that were normally seen as part of the mundane world of development aid: quid pro quo, give and take, obligations and reciprocity. For example: AID developed a small training system for local administration setting up an effective beneficiary monitoring system. To secure the participation of Grama Niladaris (GNs), AID accepted their request to newly furnish the tsunami-affected GNs' offices. This violated AID's internal regulations which did not allow funding government related organisations. To legitimise the proposal internally, these activities were labelled as a partner workshop and GN officers (who are government officials) were termed semivolunteers.[8] A consultant commented that

> "special circumstances require special adjustments. Disasters and how to deal with them cannot be predicted and formulated in standards... We have to get creative to justify our work." (103, 052006, DE)

These special adjustments continued as AID faced difficulties in setting up a list of 90 beneficiaries. Most people did not favour the location of EcoVillage, which was up to 18 kilometres away from Galle city and in a rural environment with less developed public infrastructure. As one potential recipient said "I am not going

8 Grama Niladari (GN): the smallest bureaucratic level (village level) within the decentralised Sri Lankan administration. GNs are appointed and working under the supervision of the District Secretariat (DS).

to live there... there is no future for me and my family. I lost my house in Galle and I want a house there... ” (73, 052006, HR). Worse, the housing project was far from completion. In this situation AID started to use their positive relationship with the GNs and organised several meetings in different GN divisions to present the concept of EcoVillage. It was a kind of sales pitch supported by local officials, who demonstrated the premium character, potential, and outstanding quality of the project and pointed out the long-term partnership the German brokers had announced. After the presentation recipients demanded:

> “we want to see the houses! You can talk a lot but we just saw the plans... You have to bring us there, it is too far for us to go there.” (44, 062006, HR)

Under pressure to present housing recipients in Germany, AID organised two field trips and hired buses to bring several families to the site. GNs and officers of the tsunami housing unit supported the event and presented the advantages of the project and its location. Using the rhetoric of development, they presented the area’s potential for industrial development. To make the field visits even more attractive, a lunch, soft drinks, and coffee was offered afterwards. After the first field visit 40 families agreed to live in EcoVillage. These observations indicate how brokers used political leverage to impose their ideals of what a post-tsunami village ought to look like: (a) it had to be an EcoVillage and all of what that entails (e.g., a rural environment with forests around), and (b) it had to incorporate the concept of peaceful co-existence that was set on paper concentrating on ethnic representation of the village inhabitants. The foreign brokers interpreted their version of “build back better” – in the Baden-Württemberg way – and had to propagate both these concepts and ideals.[9] In order to deliver visibly and quickly (Stirrat, 2006), the German brokers who were already coming under pressure by donors, the press, and opposition parties in Baden-Wuürttemberg had to use their political leverage heavily to further twist and bend local administrative rules thereby forcing local administrative officials to comply with their demands.

9 “Building back better” was introduced in 2005 by the UN special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery Bill Clinton, highlighting the unique opportunity of a disaster to improve and transform a countries’ pre-disaster situation and “set communities on a better and safer development path” providing ten propositions to be considered in the rehabilitation policy (see the 2006 UN report http://www.preventionweb.net/english/professional/publications/v.php?id=2054).

Performing the successful handing over of a gift

Quid-pro-quo tactics remained throughout the implementation. Whenever it was necessary to speed up processes brokers would not hesitate to utilise their personal or semi-official networks to higher-level authorities to lodge complaints in order to put pressure on the local administration. These practices made the project as well as AID well known to local administrative officials in Galle.
Meanwhile some of the local administrative officials involved in the project started to realise what they stood to gain by making the gift their project as well. The GA, for example, presented EcoVillage to other international donors securing a successful cooperation with his office: "EcoVillage is the best tsunami housing project in Galle... 18, 092007, GA). Also other local bureaucrats made use of the project in order to present their efficiency and to gain recognition. For instance the Urban Development Authority (UDA) struggled for months to get financial support from the central government to construct access roads to tsunami villages; it supported the complaints and pressure from the German brokers by promptly delivering measurements and budget and applying for funds at central government for the access road to EcoVillage. In 2007 UDA was granted the full requested budget and the GA Galle commented on this success:

> "We in Galle were granted one of the biggest amounts for road development in tsunami affected districts. This is very good for the overall development and it is an indication of success and efficiency..." (13, 082007, GA)

Or in the words of a local minister who was using the housing site for his personal political rally: "it is good to have such a well-recognised project in my district. I can show development, modernisation and success... not many districts have this" (07, 012010, MP).
Similarly, the German brokers needed a publicised staging of the successful end of the project. One broker said they didn't want "to lose momentum as public attention in Germany diminishes..." (56, 022007, DB). It was important to make sure that the project would yield visible and convincing results as they continued to narrate the discourse of good intentions and the pure gift for tsunami victims through articles and reports in the German media. Some brokers even got public rewards in recognition of their generosity and humanitarian involvement in Sri Lanka, marking not only a symbolic pay off, but also increasing their social and personal status and appreciation in Baden-Württemberg.
The handing over ceremony was organised as a big event with local and German press documenting the success of the project. In order to give proof of the acceptance and appreciation of EcoVillage within the population, brokers

demanded to invite not only selected homeowners but also the neighbouring villagers and their families. In addition a local school choir and music band was asked to play and sing the national anthem during the hoisting of the Sri Lankan flag. To further underline the appreciation and to illustrate harmony and a peaceful community one representative of each religion in Sri Lanka was asked to participate and hold a short prayer. As one AID consultant put it "the village should be a symbol of peace and harmony, and we want to show that people from different religious backgrounds can live with each other" (04, 11022007, OAC). The stage was prepared for celebrating the success of the project. For three hours brokers, local politicians, and bureaucrats explained in various speeches the exclusiveness and distinctiveness of the gift and what is now expected from its recipients. The recipients were to receive and listen. One family was selected to symbolically receive a key from the three brokers, which marked the official handing over. Further, one recipient held a short acceptance speech and to demonstrate their gratitude they handed over small presents (in the form of Buddha statues, porcelain elephants, etc.) to the international AID staff and the German brokers, saying,

> "we know we can not give back what you gave us, but please accept these small tokens of appreciation for all the effort and hard work you put into the project... by giving us these nice houses...". (123,18072007, RJ)

The problem, however, was that EcoVillage was far from completion and only eight families inhabited the village at the time of preparing for the ceremony. Time was limited and pressures on brokers, AID, and local bureaucrats were high to perform and present success to the invited audience like the Sri Lankan prime minister, German diplomats, and politicians. However, all the gestures of appreciation were examples of a cycle of reciprocity whereby recipients and performers in this staged theatre of the handing over ceremony received a benefit for the gesture they performed. For instance the religious leaders received small donations for their temple, mosque, and church, as did the schools in order to ensure their presence. AID organised a common lunch for all invitees following the official ceremony and each housing recipient with children received a gift hamper consisting of school stationery as well as cotton shopping bags, caps, and t-shirts for the children with AID's logo and an official letter signed by brokers, AID, and the DS office, stating that they were selected for the project.
This final act of the handing over of the gift highlights, once more, the paradox of gift giving in a highly publicised, media-heavy setting: in order to celebrate the success of the gift to the donators in Germany, recipients had to be incentivised to perform their gratitude.

Conclusion: the geography of the gift

The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami was a highly publicised disaster, which generated an unprecedented wave of public and private donations, of pure expressions of global solidarity, and bringing out a number of new modes of humanitarian gifts, specifically the involvement of private and volunteer-based aid initiatives. This paper shows how private donations presented as pure altruistic gifts, as ethical ideals of generosity detached and separated from other mundane forms of humanitarian aid and exchange relations, became embroiled in exactly such exchange relations. The case study also shows that when studying the geography of gift giving in humanitarian contexts, one needs to study the aid arena in the recipient country as well as the complex setting of donors and brokers in their home constituencies.

The case study discussed in this article illustrates how private initiatives, brokered by political and socially influential figures with well-established networks in Sri Lanka and Germany, fell victim to the expectations that they raised through discourses and narratives about the idea of staying outside the aid industry and delivering a pure, dis-interested gift. Instead, those expectations generated and reinforced the paradox of humanitarian gifts in different arenas along the aid chain: in order to uphold the pure gift – to enclose aid in a space of purity – one has to apply the mundane practices of tit for tat, of give and take. In other words: one has to contaminate the gift's purity. Even more, the expectations raised and nurtured by donors' discourses and narratives in their political home arena impacted and put pressure on aid agencies, local officials, and politicians who had to deliver the pure gift to its recipients. Actors in the receiving arena were left with a debt not only to continue to uphold the discourse of the pure gift, but to demonstrate their thankfulness and gratitude. In order to accomplish visible and successful outputs everyone complied with rules and logics of give and take and everyone utilised the gift to fulfil their own purposes (Korf et al. 2010). The case study highlights Bourdieu's (1997, 232) point, that: "no one [in our case: those involved in negotiating the gift in different arenas] is really unaware of the logic of exchange... but no one fails to comply with the rule of the game which is to act as if one did not know the rule".

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Article 2

Korf, B.; Hasbullah, S.; Hollenbach, P.; Klem, B. (2010)[1]

The gift of disaster: the commodification of good intentions in posttsunami Sri Lanka.

Disasters, 34(1), 60-77.

Abstract

This paper analyses the commodification of post-tsunami aid in Sri Lanka, a process that 'contaminated' the 'purity' of good intentions with the politics of patronage and international aid. It argues that gifts are not just material transfers of 'aid', but also embodiments of cultural symbolism, social power, and political affiliations. The tsunami gift re-enforced and reconfigured exchange relationships among different patrons and clients in Sri Lankan communities, perpetuating the political economy that has driven social conflict and discontent in the postindependence years. Beyond dominant rationales of ethnic or political party patronage, the paper finds that gifts by disingenuous patrons not only became patrimonial, but that the patrimonial rationale emerged as much from above as from below—a dynamic that became nearly inescapable and self-reinforcing. Through three case studies, we explore the intricate chain of relations, obligations, and expectations pertinent in the co-evolving, but often contradictory, gift rationales that permeate the practices, performances, and discourses of tsunami aid.

Keywords:
aid, faith-based development, gift, patrimonialism, Sri Lanka, tsunami

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Introduction

In her foreword to Marcel Mauss's seminal work entitled The Gift, Mary Douglas (1990, p. vii) writes that 'though we laud charity as a Christian virtue we know how much it wounds'. 'Pure gifts', note Stirrat and Henkel (1997, p. 73), 'are good for the giver but . . . bad for the receiver'. In fact, the aid in response to the Indian Ocean tsunami of 26 December 2004 could be seen as a paradigmatic case of gift— of charity, Christian caritas, a global form of compassion that transformed into a large and unprecedented level of donations from people living in Europe and North America to people affected by the tsunami in Asia and East Africa. In many cases, these gifts were given with the 'pure' intention of helping the victims. Yet several reports concluded that many recipients of such charity were not so happy with the process and outcomes of aid, or even felt humiliated and reduced to being passive 'victims' (Cosgrave, 2006; De Mel and Ruwanpura, 2006; De Silva and Yamao, 2007; Fernando and Hilhorst, 2006; Hyndman, 2007; Keys, MastermanSmith and Cottle, 2006; Korf, 2005, 2007; Ruwanpura, 2008a, 2008b; Sarvananthan and Sanjeewanie, 2008; Stirrat, 2006; Telford, Cosgrave and Houghton, 2006; Telford and Cosgrave, 2007).

The humanitarian imperative—'the desire to prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found . . . to protect life and health and to ensure respect for the human being' (ICRC, 1994; see also Hilhorst, 2005; Walker, 2005; Weiss, Disasters, 2010, 34(S1): S60–S77. © 2010 The Author(s). Journal compilation © Overseas Development Institute, 2010 Published by Blackwell Publishing, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX42DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA 1999)—is still considered as the leading guideline. This paper, though, contends that the altruistic gift implied by the humanitarian discourse—which materialised in the form of posttsunami aid—inevitably collides with divergent discourses, practices, and expectations associated with 'gift' when it enters a local domain. Aid becomes a culturally charged, political commodity. In other words, posttsunami gifts—seemingly altruistic acts of generosity—became entangled in the economy of charity and reciprocal obligations in the political economy of aid (Bastian, 2005; Korf, 2007). Or, as Stirrat and Henkel (1997, p. 74) put it with regard to charity in development aid more broadly, '[w]hat starts off as a counterpoint to the logic of the real world (gifts versus markets) ends up as part of that real world. The pure gifts become, in the end, the currency of systems of patronage'.

In Sri Lanka, this entanglement of gifts in chains of reciprocal obligations and expectations has been quite pronounced. The country is a wellknown holiday destination and was easily accessible for the media, foreign aid agencies, and volunteers that came in large numbers in the days, weeks, and months

after the event. The incredible inflow of aid moneys, charities, professionals, and volunteers and the prolonged attention given to posttsunami relief and reconstruction projects in Sri Lanka in the international media created what Jock Stirrat (2006, p. 11) has branded 'competitive humanitarianism': competition was less about getting donations, but spending them by finding 'marketable clients': aid beneficiaries and photogenic projects. Aid agencies had to demonstrate to their private donors that their gifts were making a difference, that they were having a visible impact. 'From the beginning, the pressure was on the agencies not only to be effective, but to be seen to be effective' (Stirrat, 2006, p. 13) (emphasis added).

This paper explores and analyses the intricate chain of relations, obligations, and expectations that developed in the economy of private gifts supplied for the purpose of humanitarian assistance after the tsunami. Three small case studies trace the 'biography' of the gift in the situation of posttsunami aid delivery and the intricate entanglement of various forms of gift in coevolving, yet often contradictory, gift rationales. Our exploration is located in the perspective of an ethnography of aid (Gould and Marcussen, 2004; Korf, 2006; Long, 2001; Mosse, 2004; Olivier de Sardan, 2005; Rossi, 2004), which provides critical analyses of aid relationships and their matrices of rhetoric, ritual, power, and material transactions (Gould, 2004, p. 1). Indeed, we argue that gifts are not just material transfers of 'aid', but also embodiments of cultural symbolism, social power, and political affiliations. The tsunami gift reenforced and reconfigured exchange relationships among different patrons and clients in Sri Lankan communities, perpetuating the political economy that has continued to drive social conflict and discontent in the postindependence years (Brow, 1996; Moore, 1985; Spencer, 1990). Our material, however, also pinpoints multiple patronage relationships beyond the realm of politics.

Ethnographies of the gift

Gifts given to humanitarian agencies are normally channelled through a chain of relations in the sphere of humanitarian aid. Donor and receiver are not directly interacting, but are different types of aid brokers (Bierschenk, Chauveau and Olivier de Sardan, 2002; Mosse and Lewis, 2006; Sørenson, 2008) that mediate the multiple interfaces (Long, 2001, p. 89) among donors, humanitarian organisations, and aid receivers. These brokers enter at various nodes in the aid chain and are both internal to the humanitarian agencies (as consultants, experts, project managers and volunteers, for example) and external to it (as local bureaucrats who channel the distribution of aid, as local politicians who

cater for their electoral clientele, or as other agents of a local or national elite that attempt to tap into the resources). Gift relations and their economy of obligations and reciprocity are not confined therefore to the relationship between Northern donors and Southern receivers, but are constituted by a far more complex chain of relations, rituals, and practices that equally play into domestic patterns of patronage and victimisation.

We conceptualise the 'biography' of the gift (Stirrat and Henkel, 1997, p. 68) as a process of increasing commodification whereby the ideal of the gift as an ethical, disinterested act of generosity becomes polluted by the worldly practices of the mundane and interested world. Indeed, Marcel Mauss (1990) denounced the modern separation of interested and disinterested exchange into 'economy' and 'gift'. Mauss's point was that in the 'primitive societies' he studied, exchange was both interested and disinterested—gift giving was located in systems of exchange that involve obligations to give, to receive, and to return, thereby emphasising the relation between giver and receiver. He argued in particular that it is a modern conception to consider the gift as an interruption of 'economy'.

There has been considerable debate, though, on the universal applicability and the logical validity of Mauss's concept of the gift (see, for instance, Derrida, 1992; Jenkins, 1998; Laidlaw, 2000; LeviStrauss, 1987; Parry, 1986; Testart, 1998). In Given Time, Jacques Derrida (1992, p. 24) maintains that Mauss's Essai sur le don talks of everything except the gift (cf. Jenkins, 1998, pp. 85, 87)—or the 'pure' gift, the gift as an interruption of 'economy'. The pure gift denies reciprocity. But then, a pure gift becomes an impossibility as any act of giving is already entangled in reciprocal relations of obligations, return, and recognition. The problem with the pure gift, according to Derrida (1992), is that 'as soon as a gift is knowingly given as a gift, the subject of generosity is already anticipating a return, taking credit of some sort' (Barnett and Land, 2007, p. 1072)—a pure gift could not be recognised as a gift by another party (and thus, not even by the receiver). Indeed, Derrida (1992) asserts that there is no such thing as a 'pure' gift: it is not possible to give without immediately entering into a circle of exchange that turns the gift into a debt to return, an obligation to reciprocate.

Arguably, the 'biography' of the gift traces the multiple chains of obligations in the system of aid delivery—from donor through brokers to receivers. However, while looking into the gift's 'economy', we found discourses on gift giving as an ethical practice, as 'pure' giving—as separate from 'economy'. These discourses uphold the notion of a pure gift. They are moralising discourses that lend legitimacy to the relationship forged between giver and receiver—at times with the help of humanitarian agencies or other actors, such as local bureaucrats, serving as brokers.

Biographies of the tsunami gift in Sri Lanka

The tsunami occurred at a time when Sri Lanka's peace process, which started in 2002 after the conclusion of a ceasefire agreement between the government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), was in stalemate. In spring 2003, the LTTE had withdrawn from the negotiations. In 2004, the eastern LTTE commander, Vinayagamoorthi Muralitharan, alias Colonel Karuna, had split from the movement, resulting in infighting within the LTTE and increasing levels of political violence. Tsunami aid became enmeshed in the politics of ethnic conflict and violence. Most notably, controversies arose about the appropriate ways of allocating aid to the three main ethnic communities (74 per cent Sinhalese, 13 per cent Tamils, and 7 per cent Muslims[2]; Department of Census and Statistics, 2006) and about channelling aid to rebelcontrolled territories in the north and east. These discourses created a dominant dichotomy between the 'south' (Sinhalese) and the 'north' (Tamil) and focused on the administrative mechanisms needed to direct aid to areas under LTTE control (Bastian, 2005; Frerks and Klem, 2009; Hyndmann, 2007; Uyangoda, 2005). As a result, they sidelined the concerns of the second minority group, Muslims, who already felt marginalised in the peace talks (Hasbullah, 2001; Lewer and Ismail, 2009; Uyangoda, 2005, p. 343).

In the patronage system of Sri Lankan society, so well explained by Brow (1996), Moore (1985) and Spencer (1990), aid becomes incorporated into the exchange relation forged between patrons (politicians) and clients (voters). Tsunami aid provided a rich resource for patronage and consequently, the gift was reappropriated. The patrimonial rationale with its mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion is a driving force of social conflict, political violence, and ethnic antagonism in Sri Lanka. While many observers hoped that the tsunami would create an opportunity for peacebuilding (as all three ethnic communities suffered), the tsunami aid that came to Sri Lanka in fact increased the gulf among the different communities and exacerbated the patronage rationale along ethnic lines (Frerks and Klem, 2009; Hyndman, 2007).

While the dynamics of the peace process and the 'ethnic conflict' have dominated national debates on tsunami aid, at the local level, multiple patronage relations have had an impact on the gift economy. The tsunami gifts reinforced and reshuffled loyalties, group boundaries, and connections. In political patronage

2 These are the figures from the 1981 census; the 2001 census does not provide a comprehensive picture as it excluded some of the waraffected districts in the northeast. For reasons of brevity, the figure for the Tamils refers to the Sri Lankan Tamils only and thus excludes the 'Indian' Tamils, who constitute another 6 per cent. The figure for the Muslims concerns the 'Moors', thus excluding the 'Malay' who comprise another 0.3 per cent.

relations, gifts are supplied in return for votes (Case 1). But the patronage rationale is not confined to the realm of politics and to the local scale. Patronage rationales also permeate faithbased exchange relations between churches and believers (Case 3) and a multilocal chain of relations linking donors from Europe and Sri Lankan receivers (Case 2). The three case studies presented below demonstrate the convoluted processes through which a gift, local or foreign, considered as 'pure' ethical practice, ends up 'in the real world' (Stirrat and Henkel, 1997) of 'dirty' systems of reciprocal obligations.

This is illustrated by the political geography of our three case studies: two are in the southeast and one is in the south. Civil war affected Maruthamunai (Case 1) and Akkaraipattu (Case 3), both in the form of Tamil–Muslim antagonisms and violence, and in bloody fighting between government forces and the LTTE. Baden

Table 1: Three gift biographies

	Case 1 Maruthamunai	Case 2 Ba-Wü Village	Case 3 Akkaraipattu
Location	Ampara District (southeast)	Galle District (south)	Ampara District (southeast)
Dominant ethnic group	Muslim	Sinhalese	Tamil
Politics	Mosque federation versus Muslim party politics	Multi-local patronage and Sinhalese politics	Church politics and humanitarian principles
Methodsand material	Participant observation (ongoing); interviews, group discussions (mainly with key informants and mosque leaders, but also with beneficiaries). 01/2005–12/2006	Participant ethnography: researcher was consultant for Diakonie—responsible for organising livelihood projects and the inaugu-ration ceremony. 05/2005–12/2007	Interviews; group discussions (with beneficiaries, aid personnel, key informants, and church members). 07/2007–10/2008
Lead researcher	Shahul Hasbullah	Pia Hollenbach	Bart Klem

Württemberg Village (Case 2) is in Galle District on the Sinhalesedominated southern coast and is a major tourist destination. While these locations were not at the centre of combat, national debates on tsunami aid, of course, affected the discourses, practices, and rituals of the gift economy in all three settings. However, this was only one of a number of equally important discussions. Controversies concerning Tamil–Muslim antagonisms, political favouritism by Sinhalese politicians, and alleged Christian conversion played a part as well.
The three case studies are indicative rather than comprehensive. Each illustrates a particular biography of the gift and the inherent patronage relations. They draw on empirical material collected in different contexts as well as on interviews, group discussions, participant observation, and participant ethnography[3] (see Table 1).

Case 1: from local generosity to competitive humanitarianism

When the tsunami hit Sri Lanka's coastline, Maruthamunai, a Muslim town on the waraffected southeast coast, suffered major devastation. Approximately onetenth of its population died because of the tsunami. As the Muslim community received less attention in national debates on aid delivery, foreign aid agencies reached the Muslim and Tamilinhabited southeast coast only after some delays.
Relief and rescue efforts immediately after the event involved many acts of local solidarity and pure kindness, often transcending ethnic boundaries (Harris, 2005). In Maruthamunai and its neighbouring settlements, Tamils and Muslims shared relief items and assisted each other with rescue and cleaning activities. They received local donations from people throughout Sri Lanka—from Sinhalese, Tamils, and Muslims. On several occasions, people told us stories like the following:

> *the Tamil village of Kalaru, situated north of Periyaneelavanai and Maruthamunai, was cut off from the land route. Consequently, Muslims from Maruthamunai shared their own relief items with Tamils in Kalaru, transporting them by boat.*

Such narratives of kindness and solidarity indicate a 'kind of give without take, generosity without expectation of any return' (Clark, 2005, p. 385), borne out of

3 Participant ethnography builds on the material of developmental practitioners who reflect on their own involvement in developmental or humanitarian work and their observance of practices, rituals, and discourses while engaged in developmental work, including as a consultant or as a project manager. For information on the potential and limitations of this method, see Korf, 2006; Mosse, 2004; Rossi, 2004; Sørensen, 2008.

the magnitude of the event, the scope of suffering—a type of pure gift. Indeed, the kindness appeared as a significant rupture with the widespread patronage and ethnic antagonism in the district's politics—a disjuncture of 'politics'.

The mosque became a natural place of refuge for many displaced people who sought material and spiritual support. The mosque federation (palibail samasam)—a coalition of leaders from various mosques in Maruthamunai—organised the distribution of relief items, the burial of corpses, and the provision of temporary shelter (in mosques, schools, and other public buildings). It received food gifts from local donors within the community and from neighbouring communities, and it implemented a system of relief distribution that distinguished three categories of affectedness and defined the specific entitlements of each group. These strict rules were designed to institute transparency and accountability to the distribution of scarce relief items. The mosque leaders explained to us that they wanted to avoid falling into the trap of politics, favouritism, and patronage—practices common within the trappings of Sri Lanka's welfare state and developmental aid. Gift giving was seen as a religious act of generosity that needed to be kept clean, 'purified', left free of the 'dirty', mundane procedures of politics. And the mosque was the place to guarantee this purification.

Immediately following the tsunami, relief items were in short supply. A few weeks later, Sri Lankan and foreign aid agencies and volunteers brought more relief items and aid money. As a result, the nature of gift giving and its handling changed: giving became competitive as the different aid agencies had to find the most viable and marketable (photogenic) projects on which they could spend their funds visibly (Korf, 2007; Stirrat, 2006).

The change in the gift economy did not happen suddenly, but was rather a gradual process. In the beginning, the state authorities and the few nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) already present in the area continued to coordinate their work through the mosque federation. However, a rising number of new, foreign, and often inexperienced agencies largely bypassed the federation and distributed their relief directly to 'suffering people'—frequently in conjunction with the media, which reported these gifts back to the public in the donor countries. These agencies operated in an increasingly competitive aid market and felt pressure to offer an attractive package to beneficiaries in order to gain 'clients'. This competitive humanitarianism aggravated a lot of social tension, discontent, and jealousy among the recipients of the gifts.

Aid dynamics were further complicated by the government's buffer zone policy, announced in January 2005, which required the relocation of all inhabitants

who had formerly lived within a specified area along the coastline.[4] All families that had had their houses in this buffer zone were eligible for a new house in a relocation site (see, for example, Hyndman, 2007). Because of this policy, largescale relocation and house reconstruction activities commenced, including in Maruthamunai. With the start of these programmes, the gift became part of the system of patronage and mutual obligations in the fragmented Muslim polity of the area, as these relocation schemes provided ample resources for the patronage system of exchange relations between politicians and voters.

The electorate expected their members of parliament (MPs) 'to deliver'. The pressure on Ferial Ashraff, a local MP and the national Minister for Housing, was particularly high. Locals believed that as 'the minister' she should ensure that funding and land were available to her home electorate. Ashraff, though, was not alone in tapping into the gift market. Another local Muslim MP offered land in his native town of Sammanthurai to relocate displaced families from Maruthamunai—Sammanthurai had hosted these families immediately after the tsunami. This proposal created concern and resentment among local politicians in Maruthamunai who belonged to another political party. The latter thought that the MP from Sammanthurai had offered this land to expand his electoral bloc as voting for different Muslim political parties is largely placebased. Politicians from Maruthamunai did not want to lose votes and thus discouraged the families to accept the MP's offer. Ashraff made paddy land available to end the stalemate, but this land had to be filled and elevated to be suitable for housing—a very expensive option, but one that allowed the families to be located near Maruthamunai (Hasbullah and Korf, 2009).

The case of Maruthamunai indicates three realms of the biography of the tsunami gift: its religious, economic and political dimensions. Immediately after the event, the mosque attempted to create a space of antipolitics—the gift was considered as a religious practice, and it was to be kept pure, free from 'economy' and 'politics'. The inflow of foreign money and agencies changed dynamics and incentives in the gift economy and replaced practices and discourses of pure kindness and local solidarity. The gift became competitive in the evolving aid market. This commodification of the gift also saw the entrance of new kinds of brokers: consultants, foreign volunteers, and project managers with their own rationales and procedures that were largely shaped by actors from outside of Sri Lanka—private donors in the North expected to be shown the effect of their gift. When

4 The buffer zone policy specified a 'no building' zone 100 metres from the sea in the south and west, and 200 metres in the north and east. The larger distance in the north and east was justified by the generally more extensive intrusion of the sea along this coast and the higher risk of cyclones.
A new policy was launched in 2006 under the name of 'Coastal Zone Regulation', which introduced new zones. The minimum distance was now set at 35 metres from the sea and the maximum distance at 125 metres, depending on the location, the physical environment, and damage caused by the tsunami.

the housing relocation programmes started, the foreign gift was appropriated as a patronage resource within Muslim politics.

Case 2: a ‘German village’ gifted to tsunami-affected families

The posttsunami gift economy developed a particular dynamic because new types of collective private donors in Europe—private companies and public and semipublic administrative units—collected gifts from among their staff or allocated organisational funds as gifts (Fernando and Hilhorst, 2006). These donors then sought to find partners who could implement their project ideas in Sri Lanka.

In the German federal state of BadenWürttemberg, senior officials of four semipublic organisations pooled donations and formed a donor group called the Tsunami Relief Cooperation. The donor group wanted to implement a housing relocation project. Its four representatives all had longlasting personal ties or organisational and political linkages with Sri Lanka. For example, the regional Ministry for Environment, one of the four donors, had been collaborating with the Sri Lankan Ministry of Development and Water Supply. The donor group utilised its relations with toplevel Sri Lankan bureaucrats and politicians and signed a memorandum of understanding with the Sri Lankan government, thereby formalising the ‘German gift’ of BadenWürttemberg through a bilateral agreement. This memorandum allowed the donor group to sideline the bureaucratic and legal procedures implemented by the Sri Lankan governmental Task Force for the Reconstruction of the Nation (TAFREN), later the Tsunami Housing Reconstruction Unit (THRU). Local politicians helped to acquire ‘beautiful sites’ in the Galle region, which served the purpose of the project idea of building ecofriendly houses in a liveable environment.

The German donors soon realised that they did not have adequate capacities to implement the housing programme. Consequently, they drew on personal relations in their home country, BadenWürttemberg, to identify a professional broker, an aid agency, to implement the housing project. Some ministry officials and the representative of the Rotary Club had strong personal ties with the German Protestant aid organisation, Diakonie. Diakonie (whose headquarters is in the capital of BadenWürttemberg) was reluctant at first to accept the mandate, but it finally agreed. A leading Diakonie official told us that because of the high profile of the people involved, ‘there was no way to disclaim the project any longer’. Diakonie depended on the goodwill of influential people within the donor group for future funding and cooperation.

Diakonie started implementing the ‘BadenWürttemberg Village’ in early 2006, when Galle District, where the relocation site was located, was experiencing

increased competition among different aid agencies for access to relocation sites and beneficiary lists. This competition created a number of tensions among different agencies, as well as among foreign aid professionals and Sri Lankan bureaucrats (who were considered to be slowing down the pace of implementation) and the large numbers of potential beneficiaries who became increasingly frustrated with slow progress in house construction. Sri Lankan friends felt obliged to support their German counterparts. Several political party officials wrote recommendation letters and made their influence felt with local governmental authorities to speed up certain decisions, such as on the allocation of sites, on the recognition of land titles, and on obtaining an exemption for valueadded tax (VAT). Diakonie formally followed official procedures, but the 'recommendations' and 'persuasions' helped it to resolve its concerns much faster than a number of other aid agencies that did not have such political networks.

In the donors' home constituency in BadenWürttemberg, the 'Sri Lanka project' received mounting criticism. The Ministry of Environment was challenged in the regional parliament. The donor group urged Diakonie to bring the project to completion and to conduct an inauguration ceremony to demonstrate visibly its success.

The donor group decided that the opening ceremony should be held in July 2007, during the German vacation season, so that the donor representatives and their families could travel to Sri Lanka easily. The donor group insisted on the erection of street name signs such as Stuttgart Para (street), Rotary Road, Speidel Pedesa (small street), and Neckar Padipela (stairs)—all related to BadenWürttemberg or to the donor representatives' organisation.

The ceremonial setup was a great concern for the donor group, too. It insisted on the hoisting of the German, Sri Lankan, and Baden Württemberg flags, accompanied by each country's national anthem. Each donor wanted to deliver a speech, which generated tensions regarding who was to speak when. One donor claimed: 'as we donated more money we should have the right to speak first and longer'. Several artistic performances were to take place, such as by a choir or a dancing group—'something from the local culture'. Diakonie headquarters' officials wanted to use the ceremony to demonstrate peaceful harmony in the village and among ethnic communities in the region, instructing the local Diakonie office to invite and ensure the presence of religious leaders of all ethnic groups at the ceremony.

State officials, including the Government Agent (GA) from Galle District, and local politicians, while exerting their influence and power to speed up project implementation, used the 'BadenWürttemberg Village' as a model case to make evident their political effectiveness. The GA publicly announced that 'this is the best housing project in the Galle region'. The 'German gift' thereby entered into

Galle's dynamics of political appropriation and patronage. When, in early July, the GA noticed delays in road construction, he personally ordered the Road Development Authority (RDA) to prepare the roads for a high profile visit by Germany and Colombo. The inauguration ceremony and the noticeable political interference in its implementation demonstrated that the housing scheme had gained strong political backing. In the eyes of the recipients of one house, this scheme was 'special'—some said that they had the best housing scheme in the area.

Case 2 shows two interrelated discourses and practices at work. On the one hand, the German donors wanted to invigorate a 'German' gift—with German credentials (ecofriendly, for instance). They visibly inaugurated the gift and communicated the generosity back to audiences at home in BadenWürttemberg. Diakonie, the aid broker, attempted to rescue the inauguration of the gift from worldly and mundane elements—the inauguration should become a celebration of peace, of the common good, an interruption to Sri Lanka's messy politics of conflict and antagonism. It was designed as a celebration of a 'pure' gift, but by commemorating the gift, presumed 'purity' became impossible. On the other hand, local politicians and bureaucrats transformed the gift into a political resource, embedding it in the reciprocal networks of obligations. Thereby, the 'German gift' became reappropriated as a patronage resource in local politics. Both elements of the gift, however, were coevolving: the 'German gift' and the patronage gift each had their own rationale, ritual(s), and recipients.

Case 3: religious patrimonialism in Akkaraipattu

This third case involved the neighbourhood of Akkaraipattu, a coastal town in Ampara District in the southeast with some 60,000 inhabitants. Traditional caste, kudi (matriclans), and dowry systems are still an everyday reality in Akkaraipattu (McGilvray, 2008). The study explored the relocation programme for the inhabitants of Sinna Muhattuvaram, a small settlement (1,100 people) just south of Akkaraipattu. It lies on a narrow coastal strip between the lagoon and the sea and thus the tsunami almost completely washed it away. Its inhabitants are mostly lowcaste Tamils (and some Burghers) who are either Hindu or belong to the Catholic or Methodist Church. They could not resume life in Sinna Muhattuvaram after the tsunami, because most of the village lies inside the buffer zone. The Divisional Secretary (DS) took vital decisions about planning and coordination of the relocation scheme. He selected three organisations to implement the relocation and allocated beneficiaries to each of them: the Smyrna Fellowship; the

Eastern Human and Economic Development (EHED); and the Methodist Church.
All three organisations are explicitly Christian. Smyrna Fellowship is the aid channel of a USbased evangelical church and relies on private funding from a Swedish family.[5] EHED is the wellestablished local developmental agency of the Catholic Diocese in Batticaloa, which has been working in the east of Sri Lanka for a long time and has a dense network of offices throughout the region. EHED is still embedded in the Church's hierarchy, but operates as a professional developmental NGO with offices and cars. It receives funding through the Catholic Caritas network as well as from secular donors and governments. Compared to EHED, the developmental wing of the Methodist Church is more firmly connected to the clergy and congregation. The housing scheme discussed was operated through the Methodist circuit in Thirukkovil (south of Akkaraipattu) and was supervised directly by the priest.
The Methodist Church and EHED were eager to represent themselves as nonpartisan. They explained that they assist Hindus, Muslims, and Christians, because need is their only valid criterion—they provide aid regardless of the recipient's religious or ethnic affiliation. Both churches have a long history of offering help, education, and consolation to marginalised segments of society. Methodist informants were vividly aware of the views of their founder, John Wesley, who created the church to reach out to the underclass and underlined that 'there is no holiness without social holiness'. Catholic priests emphasised that nonpartisanship could be directly related to Jesus Christ's and the Catholic Church's teaching on caritas. Gift giving as a religious practice is deeply embedded in the Church's networks—Caritas, for example, is a global organisation that channels gifts from donors in far away countries to Sri Lanka. Christian aid agencies were therefore quite accustomed to the dual nature of the gift as a religious practice and as a developmental resource, including the reciprocal relations between donor and receiver attached to it.
Although connected to the church and its religious and ethical teachings, the developmental wings of the two mainline churches also operate within the modus operandi—networks, practices, and discourse—of the humanitarian sector. In their proclamations, Christian NGOs, such as EHED or the Methodist developmental wing, describe themselves as professional aid agencies, but working with the inspiration of Christian values, making them even more committed to charity and development than secular NGOs. However, the massive influx of funds after the tsunami created concern among Christian NGOs that the pressure to deliver could compromise their Christian values. The Office Manager of a Dutch Christian NGO

5 At the time of our research (2007–08), the Smyrna Fellowship was no longer present on the sites. Given its noninstitutionalised nature, it was not possible to interview a representative and it was difficult to get more details on its views and activities through other channels.

in Akkaraipattu said that: ‘To the extent it was there previously, the tsunami and the subsequent aid rush destroyed all the Christian ethos . . . All organisations go through that boom and they are confronted with competition, spending pressure, audits and so on. It evens out the difference’.

In Sinna Muhattuvaram, this tension emerged quite clearly. The three organisations accepted the division of labour decreed by the DS, which allocated houses irrespective of the religious identities of the future inhabitants. However, the recipients attached significant importance to religious identity and had clear expectations about their religious leaders and the way they handled gifts. While the churches had long abandoned the idea of using gifts for conversion or as a patronage resource for their followers, their constituencies appeared to expect them to do exactly that. Christian respondents wanted their religious patrons to provide assistance to them. Informants living in the Smyrna section of the tsunami housing project complained that their own churches (Catholic and Methodist) had not helped them much, and what they had given came from foreign gifts. Smyrna, though, had done well. The receivers considered the church that had delivered gifts to be one that cared for them. Therefore, this church deserved their loyalty. One informant said: ‘The priest [from their original congregation] was worried people might join Smyrna, but no church came . . . If Smyrna builds a church, certainly we will go there. They built all the houses and the playground. Certainly, we will join’. Apparently, the villagers did not know that state officials had allocated the beneficiaries to the three agencies. Aid workers and priests of the Catholic and Methodist Church acknowledged the tension. The EHED Information Officer explained: ‘The Catholics expected us to help them, but actually we are not the ones to decide who helps whom. The DS does that’. The Methodist priests protested: ‘we did so much for these people, but they are complaining’.

Inside the Methodist congregation in Akkaraipattu, faithful people were concerned that the priests were so involved in aid work that they were neglecting their religious services for their home congregation. As the congregation in Akkaraipattu town itself did not suffer much in the tsunami, priests were mainly helping other people. Prominent Methodist Church members said: ‘The people are busy earning money. They don’t think about Jesus. Christians have started a lot of NGOs. The fathers don’t have time for preaching anymore. They are busy doing NGO business and neglect visiting the houses and praying with the people’. These criticisms fit into a wider religious discourse of antipolitics that surfaced in the Maruthamunai case as well: worldly affairs are seen as temporary and inferior to the religious. Money and politics are key symbolic manifestations of the world and are viewed as dirty or sinful. From this perspective, the churches had transformed their religious service of caritas and gift giving into an NGO business, thereby becoming similar to secular NGOs.

This case presents the story of the reappropriation of the developmental gift in religious terms. Although inspired by religious faith and practices of caritas, mainline Christian aid agencies nowadays largely operate using the discourse, practices, and principles of the developmental world. Paradoxically, however, religious followers expected their churches to use the developmental gift as a patrimonial resource for their own flock. This divergence of expectations created tension at a time when gifts were abundant. While the 'pure' gift as caritas—as religious service—has been an important Christian value, the expectations attached to the relational and symbolic meaning of the developmental gift differed among the Christian aid workers, who were often from the clergy and the Christian laity. Many tsunami victims from Sinna Muhattuvaram wanted their church to care for them first—to provide them with tsunami gifts. It was unreasonable to them that their church offered gifts to people other than those in their congregation.
Their view suggests a sense of religious patrimonialism from below, where the gift becomes a relational object that binds the laity to the church. This mirrors the rationale of political patronage relations that bind politicians to voters through gifts. The mainline churches have been insisting that their gifts should go to all who are in need, regardless of their affiliation. While they can find justification in the Christian teaching on caritas, based on the notion of 'pure' religious service, these principles also adhere to the frameworks and guidelines of humanitarianism. But engagement with this kind of developmental gift brought the priests criticism, first because some of their own people felt that they engaged too much with the mundane and worldly affairs of the NGO business, and second, because other followers felt that the church did not do enough for them.

The entanglement of the gift

In posttsunami Sri Lanka, the narrative of the gift has been permeated by development discourse, jargon, and rituals: all kinds of coordination meetings, terminology, minimum standards and principles, different project phases, beneficiary categories, the latest fashion of crosscutting themes, and a continuous 'stock trade' of projects, target groups, aid commodities, budgets, contacts, and so on. These rituals and practices of humanitarianism blended with different gift rationales. What started as an otherworldly practice in the global North—as a 'pure' gift—ended in a chain of relations, obligations, and reciprocal expectations and the dirty world of politics and patronage. Table 2 summarises and compares the logic of the gift in its state of coexistence as humanitarian gift and as patrimonial gift. These two spheres are, of course, not separate, but entwined.

The contradiction lies in divergent gift rationales. Different actors employ different strategies to negotiate, bend, or circumvent the contradictions between these gift rationales.

	Case 1	Case 2	Case 3
Place	Maruthamunai, Ampara District (southeast)	Baden-Württemberg Village, Galle District (south)	Sinna Muhattuvaram, Akkaraipattu, Ampara District (southeast)
Donor	First local, then foreign	German donor group	Foreign
Broker	First mosque federation, then international aid agencies, then politicians	Diakonie and local politicians	Churches, Christian aid agencies
Recipient	Muslim	Sinhalese plus a few Tamils and Muslims	Tamil (Christian and Hindu) plus a few Burghers
'Humanitarian' gift	**From non-political kindness to competitive humanitarianism** The inflow of foreign money and agents disturbs the 'non-political' space of kindness and fosters com- petitive humanitarianis	**The 'German' (eco) gift as symbolic domination** Special relations between German donors and Sri Lankan patrons provide the ground for a very special 'German gift', which needs an adequate gratification ceremony	**Thechurch'sengage- ment in the developmental gift** Christian charities are inspired by religious values to care, but also demonstrate that they follow universal (secular) principles of humanitarianism (such as non-partisanship)
'Patrimonial' gift	**Political contestation** 'The minister' needs to deliver the gift to her local electorate, but other politicians contest the move, wanting to use the gift to expand the realm of their patrimonial system	**The re-appropriation of the German gift as a Sri Lankan patrimonial gift** Local and national politicians and state officials re-appropriate the meaning and symbols of the 'German gift' as an expression of their caring patronage	**The laity's expectation of a patrimonial gift** Some believers expect their clergy to provide caritas primarily to church members and others argue that priests have sacrificed their religious work for worldly NGO business

Table 2 Humanitarian and patrimonial gift

The three case studies indicate how gifts given in situations of asymmetric relations create what Pierre Bourdieu (1990) calls symbolic domination: in extending a gift, a donor transforms his or her status in the relationship from dominant to generous. In accepting a gift, particularly one that cannot be reciprocated equally, the receiver implicitly acknowledges the social order that made this gift possible—he or she becomes grateful (Bourdieu, 1990, pp. 98–110; Hattori, 2001). The recipients of tsunami gifts could express gratefulness, demonstrated in various ways common in the realm of humanitarian aid, including donation 'handover' ceremonies and the performance of dances, songs, and theatre plays as part of donor celebrations.

The gift is also embedded in local systems of patronage, as local patrons reappropriate the foreign (humanitarian) gift, making it 'their' patrimonial gift to be given to their clients. Here, the receiver acknowledges the social order by accepting this kind of gift—and provides a return in the form of political support, electoral votes or, in the case of religious leaders, faithful following. However, several tensions emerged at the intersection of humanitarian and patrimonial rationales of the gift. Catholic and Methodist aid workers attracted criticism because they failed to deliver a gift to their faithful. Many believers expected the churches to transform a humanitarian gift into a patrimonial one (Case 3). Muslim politicians felt pressure to find appropriate land and housing for their voters, otherwise they could have been lost to competing patrons (Case 1). Gifts became patrimonial not simply through disingenuous patrons, but also via the penetration of patrimonial rationale dynamics from above and from below—the dynamic became nearly inescapable and selfreinforcing.

Conclusion

The tremendous, destructive force of the Indian Ocean tsunami seemed to have created a moment of rupture, a break with the mundane world of politics. The global wave of solidarity and local acts of kindness in waraffected areas were often seen as opportunities to reconcile the divided society of Sri Lanka and to promote the peace process. However, this 'gift of disaster' vanished into the air. National contestations regarding aid distribution hardened the frontlines of the different political camps and ethnic communities and triggered the disintegration of the peace process (Frerks and Klem, 2009). The international NGO community became subject to vociferous attacks by the Sri Lankan media for failing to deliver the tsunami gift. The 'purity' of good intentions became contaminated in the local politics of patronage and the international gift economy. Indeed, Jacques Derrida (1992) has argued that the notion of a 'pure' gift is unfeasible: it is not possible to

give without immediately entering into a circle of exchange that turns the gift into a debt, an obligation to reciprocate.

The humanitarian or developmental 'gift' is loaded with ethical ideals of otherworldly generosity, as an expression of religious practice, of global solidarity—it is a manifestation of the separation of 'gift' and 'economy'—drawing a boundary between disinterested and interested exchange. In his study of the gift in 'primitive societies', Marcel Mauss (1990) suggested that gift giving has to be located within systems of exchange that involve obligations to give, to receive, and to return. The kinds of gift giving that Mauss described were embedded in social systems of prestations. Indeed, the French term prestation is closer to the idea of social welfare or insurance than disinterested generosity.

Prestation is possibly a good term to describe the nature of what we have depicted as patrimonial gift: reciprocal obligations are articulated in patrimonial relations where both giver and receiver have specific expectations. The gift economy is not simply created by disingenuous patrons. Its patrimonial rationale permeates social reasoning from above and from below—it is almost inescapable. For instance, Muslim politicians provide gifts to ensure votes—potential voters expect their 'minister' to deliver according to the very same logic of the patrimonial gift. Disjuncture occurs when giver and receiver follow different gift rationales. Faithbased charities, for example, failed to respond adequately to the expectations of their laity who wanted the humanitarian gift to be transformed into a patrimonial gift.

The idea of the 'pure' tsunami gift—to enclose aid in a space of 'antipolitics'— was surely naive in a society shaped by patronage rationale. The national debates on mechanisms to allocate tsunami aid to different communities and on political favouritism brought out the political patronage rationale quite clearly. These antagonising discourses and the seeming inescapability of patrimonial rationales penetrated and reinforced social divisions along political and ethnic lines and as a result, they contributed also to the social conflict and political discontent that undermined the peace process (Goodhand, Korf and Spencer, 2009).

Our material, however, also suggests that in addition to these dominant discourses of patronage and ethnic communalism, several other patronage rationales pervaded the practices, performances, and local, often more silent, discourses associated with the gift, exacerbating social conflict and discontent. In the words of Mary Douglas (1990): charity wounds.

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Article 3

Hollenbach, P.[1] and Ruwanpura, K.[2] (2011)

Symbolic Gestures: The Development Terrain of Post-Tsunami Villages in (Southern) Sri Lanka.

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Abstract

This article analyses how rituals and ceremonies were deployed in the post-tsunami rehabilitation process in Sri Lanka to 'incorporate' development projects into the habitus and social reality of local communities. It argues that even though the aid delivery process is represented as a gift, in reality it is more concerned with strengthening the social capital of the local and foreign donors. Through this process there is an expectation and an implicit demand for acquiescence from the beneficiaries, which leaves them with a social debt. This, in turn, compels them to participate in the game of development rituals and ceremonies, in order to express their (ambivalent) gratitude and thankfulness. Through two case studies, we explore how the good intentions of donors to provide aid and alleviate suffering and the acceptance of this aid by the local communities, results in an asymmetric relationship where both become accomplices of Bourdieuian notions of subtle and gentle violence.

I. Introduction

Rituals in Sri Lanka are not uncommon. In a country that proclaims to be steeped in a 2,500 year old history, there is often great fanfare marking particular moments as auspicious, celebratory occasions. From the mundane, for instance shifting to a new abode, to the more propitious occurrences such as marriage, the performance of numerous rites is considered a crucial aspect in the cultural life of Sri Lanka. Even though rituals are largely associated with people's private life, there is no shortage of ways in which ceremonies are drawn upon to legitimise activities in the public world – whether it is for opening a newly constructed hospital or a prize-giving ceremony at school (see also Spencer, 2007).

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Unsurprisingly, development efforts in post-colonial Sri Lanka too have employed ceremonies and rituals. In such cases '''tradition'' is copiously invented in state rituals, political speeches, (and) offcially sponsored ''revivals''' (Brow, 1988: 316). Given the involvement of the state in development projects in the immediate post-independence years, it became the leading actor in creating, reinventing and advancing traditions to legitimise numerous development practices and projects (Brow, 1988; Tennekoon, 1988). In more recent decades, Sri Lanka has witnessed an explosion of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) making incursions into the world of 'development'. In particular, in the immediate post-tsunami period there was an intense flurry of activity by both NGOs and private philanthropic foundations. Given that these institutions are increasingly the primary vehicles of development practice, a key question is how do they deploy ceremonies and rituals in the Sri Lankan context?

In the immediate post-tsunami phase, the authors became intimately linked to the efforts at reconstruction in two separate villages in southern Sri Lanka. Our association with each village was arrived at through different means. In what we term E-village, one of us was an implementing officer for more than two years, and took on management responsibilities for reconstructing a new village. In L-village, the other author has strong ties, as a close relative is the founder involved in rebuilding the village; it was also a site where previous fieldwork had been undertaken. Because of these unusual connections, we were able to easily gain access to, and hold frank and lengthy discussions with, respondents. These associations also meant that there were numerous opportunities to become participant observers over an extended period of time and record the different phases of a village construction. It was during this time (2005-2008), we had the chance to partake, observe, and even initiate ceremonies and rituals. Given the extensive use of symbols and ceremony as critical markers of achievements, of moving onto another phase, we thought it was important to understand what the use of symbols and ceremonies signalled regarding the reconstruction process in the post-tsunami context.

Existing debates on the post-tsunami Sri Lankan context have explored a range of themes including: the temporality and places of recovery (Ruwanpura, 2009); the multiple dilemmas and ambiguities embedded in the recovery process (Brun and Lund, 2008; Brun, 2009); the politics of memorialisation and purification (Simpson and de Alwis, 2008; Hasbullah and Korf, 2009); the gendered world of post-tsunami spatial politics (De Mel, 2007; Hyndman, 2008; Ruwanpura, 2008); and the geographies of goodwill (Korf, 2007; Korf et al., 2010). A key theme which underlies these interventions is the impossibility of understanding the reconstruction process without recognising the wider political, cultural, social and cultural terrain of war, ethno-nationalism and uneven development in Sri Lanka.

The recurrent failures to grasp the fissures in the country's social fabric mean that the mantra of 'building back better'[3] has not really tackled existing fault lines or the continuing tensions in an already fragmented sociality. Our article extends these debates to look more closely at the symbolic gestures deployed in reconstructing the post-tsunami villages. We argue that these gestures underscore the prevailing modes of social hierarchy.

The literature on the politics of development highlights the importance of how 'authoritative interpretations have to be made and sustained socially' and where supporting actors need reasons to become stakeholders in 'interpretive communities' of development (Mosse, 2004: 646). As post-tsunami reconstruction efforts shifted from humanitarian relief to development work, a cornerstone of numerous initiatives taken to socially legitimise these activities was that of generous giving. The generosity of the giving state as an imperative of development is well documented, where 'inputs are framed as gifts, and they are ritualized accordingly' (Li, 1999: 314; see also Brow, 1990). Ceremonial idioms highlight the processes of generosity; at the same time, the gift is reified through the mundane visits by state officials, at which people constantly record their gratitude. What the logic of gift then does is to 'preclude an alternative framing in terms of rights and entitlements' (Li, 1999: 314). The post-tsunami milieu in Sri Lanka presents a situation in which villagers have survived the onslaught of the tsunami waves noting their good fortune to live, where gratitude – rather than claims to rights and entitlements – is registered for any 'gifts' obtained.

We show through our article that it is not simply the state that invests in the construction of generous giving and evokes tradition through ritual, but so do the private philanthropists and NGOs (Simpson and Corbridge, 2006; Simpson and de Alwis, 2008). As NGOs and private philanthropists participated in post-tsunami development via the process of gift giving, their involvement in creating and participating in ceremonies and rituals became a central plank in legitimising the ways in which they uphold their custom and culture. More critically from a Bourdieuian perspective, these ceremonies and rituals are important for deepening the NGO/philanthropist power base by investing in initiatives which enhance the social capital of these individuals and institutions (see also Jeffrey, 2008, 2009).

A corpus of existing literature points to the ways in which Bourdieu's work is deployed by scholars of South Asia to tender perceptive readings of ethnographic material (Thapan and Lardinois, 2006; see also Jeffrey, 2009). These contributions are useful in analysing the ceremonies deployed in the post-tsunami development

3 This is the espoused Sri Lankan government policy position on post-tsunami reconstruction efforts.

context since they show how 'symbolic systems (are) efficacious in maintaining relations of domination... in the obscurity of habitus' (Jain, 2006: 111). Within every field, symbolic forms, struggles and violence are constitutive elements of each symbolic system (Jain, 2006). We show how ceremonies and rituals deployed unravel the ways in which 'internalized orientations to action... reflect people's (agents) histories and structure future action' (Jeffrey, 2009: 186). These symbolic manifestations are then expressions of the social and material environments where class-power and its representational forms are transferred across multiple communities in seemingly durable forms. Yet even as some of these rituals are portrayed as vital aspects of Sri Lankan life, Bourdieu (1990, 1998) serves as a critical entry point to show how they are also social practices which convey habitus of power, symbols of domination and even gentle violence.

II. A New Lease of Life: The Process of Rebuilding Villages

The two institutions under scrutiny here became involved with the reconstruction of villages in the post-tsunami context in different ways. In this section a synopsis of the critical particulars of this involvement relevant for the purposes of this article is offered.[4] We show that despite the different trajectories of the organisations involved with rebuilding the villages, both establishments used ceremonies, rituals and symbols as key aspects to their reconstruction efforts.

Research in L-village came about through the involvement of a local foundation, which had an active base of philanthropic work in the community. The tsunami, as unexpected and unfortunate as it was, offered the opportunity for the foundation to become a significant agent in attending to the needs of the neighbourhood. Rebuilding destroyed and partially damaged houses became a significant aspect of the reconstruction efforts put into place by the organisation. These efforts had rudimentary beginnings in the immediate post-tsunami context. Although a significant portion of the village was devastated by the tsunami, the local founder did not have the finances to commence a village rebuilding scheme. Financially, the initial rebuilding plans were made possible through the generosity of a network within the Sri Lankan diasporas. It started with building the destroyed residences of the 'poorest' members of the community – with a woman who lost her spouse to the tsunami waves being the first recipient. Over time, however, the local foundation – given its impressive achievements of reconstruction efforts and well established links – moved on to acquire an NGO status and struck

4 Elsewhere a detailed analysis of fieldwork processes is given (Ruwanpura and Hollenbach, 2011 forthcoming).

partnerships with corporate and foreign donors to embark upon an ambitious programme of rebuilding smaller compounds of houses within the village. As of today, the foundation has built or renovated some 600 houses in L-village. The ceremonies and rituals that went on display in this shifting scene of events moved from the small scale to the large scale, and in the following pages we present the ways in which the events came to be performed.

Events unfolded in E-village rather differently. Here the rebuilding of the village occurred through a concerted plan of putting in place a new village housing 90 dwellings. The purpose was to relocate villagers from the coastal belt[5] who were caught in the tsunami waves, losing their homes and belongings, to a new place inland up to 18 km away from their original location. The impetus for building this new village was the coming together of a small group of foreigners who had previous links to Sri Lanka through their work and business. They used their social and political standing in their home countries to raise large-scale funding and started the village rebuilding scheme on a site identified as suitable where the villagers would 'become responsible for their welfare'. The connections of this group of foreigners to politicians and high offices in Sri Lanka also assisted in expediting the work through established processes and protocols. State-level procedures required that donors work together and implement the village construction scheme via registered NGOs already working in the country. The NGO became the executing agency and this meant that it had the task of not simply constructing the dwellings but also had to demonstrate to the donors when particular milestones were met. These clear aims and goals meant that commemorating the achievements of the donors was crucial in indicating that the project had been successfully completed.[6] The scale at which the opening ceremony was conducted in E-village was thus of a different nature to that of the L-village – although opening ceremonies at the latter stages of the project resonated with that of the one opening ceremony in E-village. The next section of the article describes what constituted these practices and what it aimed to signal regarding the achievements of the institutional actors.

5 The Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) declared in 2005 a 'buffer zone' of 100–300m around the coastal line in order to secure the inhabitants in case of a further tsunami and people were relocated accordingly (Hyndman, 2008).

6 'Success' for the donors was measured by completing the physical infrastructure necessary for constructing a village, rather than necessarily how community life will be organised and managed in the new social, political and economic environment. The donors neglected the fact that people are forced to migrate into a new environment and leave behind their habituated social world. The new village is formed out of 13 different villages along the coastal belt, and so social, ethnic and economic structures and relations began anew.

III. Ceremonies and Rituals: A Commemoration of Achievements?

The donor driven scheme had a clearly stated objective of building a specific number of houses. It meant that a sense of finality to the project needed to be registered at some point through the lifetime of the village construction. By the start of 2007, there was increasing emphasis placed on holding a mid-year inauguration ceremony and the planning for it therefore had to get underway. The thinking was that a ceremony would show the results to the donor country and the respective institutions as the village building was nearing completion. Further delay beyond July 2007 was likely to minimise attention and lose interest in the project, it was thought. Although holding a celebratory launch was being stressed, the village construction process was still not completed and it was facing major problems with the water supply and road construction. Moreover, the 90 families who were identified as eligible for new housing were increasingly unwilling to move into the new village. There was great pressure placed on the NGO to deliver through 'participative' meetings with the housing recipients. Consequently, there was much persuading done by the NGO to get villagers to move to the site while construction was going on. Fifteen families ended up agreeing to move to the village. Several other recipients were also coaxed to move in temporarily, in order to make the houses look occupied for the inauguration ceremony. The NGO had to demonstrate its accountability but the donors too were under pressure to show responsibility towards their generous friends and supporters. Nevertheless, more than half of the houses remained empty at the inauguration ceremony.[7] However, the recipients agreed to participate in preparing for the inauguration ceremony and to help make the village look attractive on the day.

The ceremony itself was a celebration of the donors' efforts and a staging of their generosity. The donors arrived a day before and took their time to walk through the village with journalists and photographers. They took pictures and gave interviews to the foreign press. They also requested to walk into occupied houses in order to 'familiarise' themselves with how people live. The recipients more or less voluntarily opened their doors and invited the donors to come in. However, as the implementing NGO had anticipated that the donors would make such a request, four families were approached with this request ahead of time. It was like a show, a well-arranged theatre play. Because the NGO was aware of the 'donors' visit game', it was important to play it; there was dependency involved as well as the aspiration to get further donations and financial support (see also Li, 1999).

7 The majority felt that to move out to Akmeemana division into unfinished housing was worse than their current temporary living conditions, because there was no running water, no roads and access to main roads, food markets and construction was still ongoing.

At the opening ceremony the rituals continued. The donors and official invitees arrived at the village and a school choir dressed in lama-sariya (white traditional clothing worn by girls attending Sunday school at Buddhist temples) welcomed the guests. The village square became the stage, that was decorated with additional donations gifted to the village – a tractor, a gully bowser, a waste disposal collector wagon – were all on display. A hewisi (Oriental/Kandyan) school band, dressed in colourful lungi (a long straight cloth and short jacket) and piping Oriental percussion and string instruments, guided the invitees to the first event, the hoisting of the national flags which included the flag of Sri Lanka, the donor country, the donor state, and agencies. Each flagpole demonstrates that the partners are now permanently monumentalised in front of the community hall. The monument, a huge wall made of natural stones, carried the emblem of each institutional actor and its sponsorship was inscribed. It symbolically demonstrates to the villagers on a daily basis that the place they live in is generously gifted; 'it is made for people affected by disaster rather than by them' (Simpson and de Alwis, 2008: 7). After the flags were hoisted, the guests of honour were invited to the ribbon cutting ceremony in the community hall and were again guided by a Kandyan-dancing group and the band to their seats. The housing recipients were standing to the side, watching. Their part in the play was only to watch, a passive form of acting; their contribution to the ceremony was to be present as a thankful audience. However, their children had to dress in shirts, which carried the logo of the NGO involved in the project.

The inauguration lasted almost three hours. With the lighting of the traditional lamp and blessings of religious leaders from different faiths, the ceremony was initiated. Because the village was to represent a 'model' for peaceful living among all ethnic and religious groups, one important element was the representation of all religious groups at the ceremony. 'It is important to bring all the religious groups together, especially now as the country again faces political problems. The village should be a symbol of peace and harmony, and we want to show that people from different religious backgrounds can live with each other' said one donor. The implementing NGO had to engage in protracted conversations, convincing and negotiating with the religious figures of the temples, church and mosques to accept their invitations. In the end all agreed to attend the ceremony; one convincing fact was a small donation to each religious institution. The Buddhist monks opened the ceremony with prayers and blessings at the astrological auspicious time, which was followed by the Imam and Hindu priest blessing the donors and the village.[8]

8 This moment of harmony is well recorded with many photos taken by foreign journalists. In a

Speeches were given by the donors, the NGO and official representatives from the donor country and Sri Lankan politicians. Alongside, traditional dancing and singing were staged for the guests in order to create a convivial and ritual 'Sri Lankan' spirit. The arrangement of the seating was also symbolic. The donors were seated on comfortable chairs in good condition looking on at the receiving families, who were either seated on plastic chairs or standing in the sun due to lack of space. The asymmetric power relations could not have been starker. Even the placement of the stage connoted the thankfulness to the donors. The speeches by the donors were all monotonous. They talked about their solidarity and obligation towards Sri Lanka in this devastating moment of the tsunami disaster and the efforts taken to help raise and finance the village. Each speech emphasised the responsibility the recipients now had in taking over the ownership and management of the village, to sustain good and peaceful living within the community. 'You, the new citizens of the E-village... have to grow together and become a community, a community in the true sense of the word' said one of the donors in his speech. Ironically, talk of ownership was incorporated at the behest of the donors.

Since the 90 houses comprising the new village were not completed, the key handing over ritual was carried out via one family who represented the villagers. It was an important moment. The four donors handed over a symbolic key,[9] cut out from cardboard with a huge red ribbon and the name of the village written on it, while paying attention to clicking cameras. The family selected to receive the symbolic key was an exemplar of an active member of the village community. They were always the first to support new ideas and participate in events to show their gratefulness and appreciation; 'we know without the tsunami we never could afford to own property' said the woman.

IV. Marking Milestones via Staggered Rituals

The staging of ceremonies in reconstructing totally and partially damaged houses by the local foundation in L-village was, in contrast, staggered. Because there was no stated aspiration by the local foundation to construct and reconstruct 600 houses from the inception, there was no moment of finality. Indeed given the founder's aspiration for a holistic village uplifting scheme, he was aware that 'it is difficult to state that there is an end-point to what I have in mind for the village'.

documentary done by a foreign TV production company, this 'moment of harmony' is represented as a positive effect that the project has achieved in Sri Lanka.

9 This was merely symbolic because legal questions on land ownership are still not clarified (2010).

Since the primary goals of the foundation were modest and the preliminary steps were taken through the assistance of individuals, the initial ceremonies were spread out. The rituals of the sort enacted for the E-village only occurred afterwards, when institutional donors became players in the rebuilding of sub-villages within the local village.

During May–August 2005 the first batch of rebuilt houses was being 'gifted' to the tsunami-affected recipients. This 'gifting' ceremony consisted of a seemingly minor ritual whereby the donor, in this case Canadians of Sri Lankan origin, cut the ribbon at the entrance of the rebuilt house and handed the keys[10] over to the head of the family. Then the family member opened the door and other family members – already inside the house – welcomed the donor with a plate of milk-rice (kiribath) and fruit. Alongside the donor family was the founder of the organisation, numerous foreign volunteers and friends of the founder, with a photographer taking photos. The family then served all the onlookers and strangers – of which there were quite a few since this was one of the initial houses to be rebuilt and donated – kiribath and bananas. All of this was done at the nakath (auspicious) time.

It was a sunny day and around mid-morning we had ventured to the house a good few minutes prior to the ribbon-cutting ceremony. The family members were anxious that the founder and the donor family would not arrive on time. Their fears stemmed from the fact that the founder and the chief guest were apparently officially donating the keys at another house nearby. Amidst the people who had gathered around the house, it was evident who were the locals and who were the outsiders. During this time through casual conversation with the family our research was explained to them. We inquired if it would be alright if the ritual ceremony was observed and there was no objection.[11] When we spoke about the tsunami and the destruction to property, the family mentioned that they considered themselves to be fortunate to be an early recipient of a reconstructed house. When queried about the layout we were told that it was a two bedroom house; they suggested that we walk around the house after the chief guest/donor had officially handed over the keys to them. Through our conversation, when it seemed apparent that the family itself was larger than an

10 At this point, the symbolic gesture was to hand over the keys and not necessarily the title deeds to the house. In fact in early 2008 during a return visit to the village, some villagers noted that there was some variation in obtaining the legal deeds to their new abodes. Some had obtained the title deeds, especially where the houses were rebuilt within the land premises of their destroyed houses, while others got them after some delay and still others who had not received the title deeds at all – and were unaware as to when they would obtain these.

11 And in every sense, how could there be – in so far as the researcher was of a different social standing who is unlikely to have been turned down at a joyful event.

idealtype nuclear unit with mother, father and two children, they explained that every house was of a standard size and even though it may be a tight fit for the family they were still grateful for being given a restored house (Hyndman, 2008; Caron, 2009; Ruwanpura, 2009). Their ambivalence about the house, even for practical concerns, was tempered by appreciation of the 'gift' of a house, similar to the sentiments echoed by recipients in the foreign-built village. The father then showed us around the small garden path and noted how the foundation was offering an incentive for the best kept garden by offering a monthly supply of dry rations and groceries. In the midst of the conversation, the guests and their friends arrived and everyone fell into place – with cordial welcomes and the usual hustle and bustle which facilitated the start of the ceremony.

The ceremony of 'gifting the keys' was also about marking the milestones achieved in reconstructing a tsunami-affected village. It was, in the words of the founder, about 'performance and delivery' – of accomplishing goals. But this rite of passage was also about the numerous unstated structures and symbols that mark the giver and the getter as stemming from rather different social milieus. The tsunami-affected family should now be doubly grateful – for not simply being lucky enough to have survived the tsunami, but also for being a donor beneficiary within six to seven months of the tsunami. The bows, the welcome smiles, and the passing around of kiribath, fruits and aerated-water drinks was all put on for the donor family, the founder and all other participants. The privilege and status were all unstated markers at this joyous occasion which the founder reflected upon subsequently. These practices are not only symbolic of the habituated status occupied but are also ways of reinforcing people's place in society through 'special' rituals. Serena Tennekoon (1988) reminds us that it is possible to understand that 'rituals, whether sacred or secular... are socio-cultural constructs, endowing authority and legitimacy to the positions of particular persons... and structure the way that people think about social life' (1988: 294). We pursue this point further by showing that the legitimacy sought and reinforced through ritual practices also inscribe moments of symbolic and gentle violence (Bourdieu, 1990; see also Wilford, 2008).

While the initial house warming and opening ceremonies were spread out, the L-village also had inauguration ceremonies for the larger compounds of its subvillages. The involvement of corporate or foreign donors who facilitated the construction of sub-villages, where each patron built 30 to 85 houses, required such grand events. The construction of these plots had specified time lines attached to them; hence celebrating its completion through rituals and ceremonies was crucial for marking and displaying the milestones achieved to the donors and community. The founder said, 'I have been often asked... what the purpose of

these ceremonies is? You know the truth of the matter is that the villagers want these rituals and celebrations; it is a moment for them to come together because for them it is part of their way of doing things, something native. It is also for them to see what has been achieved. For us, the foundation, it is to show how we are ''performance oriented, accountable, transparent, and deliver as promised'' ... which is important for our implementing partners.' However, according to a village recipient, by the time their sub-village was completed, one of the last, the enthusiasm and need for such ceremonies and rituals were overkill. 'Yes, yes ... we had an opening ceremony too. There was quite a bit of tamasha that the Foundation put together because this was the final constructed sub-village – and we got two-storied houses too. We went for the event because it seems to be expected of us, and it makes the people at the foundation happy. To tell the truth, by now [end 2007] we are a little tired of attending so many ceremonies. You will notice there are fewer people who go for these functions these days.' Quite in contrast to the founder's reading of the village recipients 'liking' and 'wanting' these ceremonies, the villagers had a slightly more jaundiced take on such rituals. But the show was important, in particular for the donors – as the village man said. The ceremonies usually involved a representative of the donor agency cutting a ribbon and walking around the compound, approving and appreciating the construction and layout of the houses. The recipients watched, standing on the sidelines of a designated house or two; they received the guests of honour by serving kiribath, savoury accompaniments and fruits. Ambling in the compound was important for the donor, as they appreciated the layout that resonates with their image of idyllic rural communes located in lush tropical areas with coconut palm trees, green grass and well laid-out shrubbery and gardens. Upon entering P subvillage one comes across small and pretty garden paths with street lighting fashioned after old gas lamps leading into a small and seemingly cosy community of 9–10 houses. V-Gardens are designed with paved/tarred roads and have a children's playground in the midst of 84 two-storied houses, a novelty in any Sri Lankan village. Large or small boards adorn the entrance to each sub-village complex explicitly denoting its association to the donors, where the benefactors' contribution to uplifting the village through these compounds is recorded. The quality of the housing and the effort put into designing the layouts of each compound is impressive. Yet these built communes and the ritual opening ceremonies signal the interventions of foreign and corporate donors and their claim on these villages. Indeed, it did not seem that the local villages and owners of these new houses had any say, except for the colours used to paint the houses, in redesigning of the village into smaller compounds. Instead, it was the founder – elite and English-speaking – who as the Colombo-based 'local' mediator spoke a donor-friendly language and negotiated the funding and reconstruction plans on behalf of the villagers.

V. Power Politics or Celebrations of 'Authenticity'

Even though the commemoration efforts of the local foundation and foreign donors gathered pace over time, their occurrence differed, given the distinctive rhythms of each project. Yet in both instances the public display of ceremonies and rituals were important moments for analysing the ways in which social distance and power relations are stabilised and negotiated. The differences in the ways in which these rituals were enacted in the two rebuilt villages can be explained by the different pathways used to regenerate village communities. This distinction also feeds into the different scales of ritualistic performances of the inauguration days and handing over key ceremonies in the two locations; yet underlying similarities remain and need closer reading. In both projects donors have a certain interest in requiring rituals and celebrations. As Bourdieu states, 'social agents don't do just anything, ... they are not foolish... they do not act without reason' (1998:75). But is it always a conscious reason or does the habitus of the social agent provoke certain reasons? Habitus represents the social structures of our subjectiveness, which describes the process of internalisation of outwardness – internalisation of social structures: 'The habitus fulfils a... socialized body, a structured body, a body which has incorporated the immanent structures of a world... and structures the perception of the world as well as action in the world' (Bourdieu, 1998: 81). Therefore action is not only the result of conscious calculus but chosen by the relation between subject and society. The habitus relates to a certain social field within the process of internalisation and establishes certain structures by which to think, act and perceive. It is a multidimensional matrix of social reality, constructed through existing practices of society which represents a differentiated social space within which social practices are continuously produced and achieved. Bourdieu (1990) substitutes the term social field with the metaphor of the game, 'Pre-perceptive anticipations, a sort of practical induction based on previous experiences, are not given to a pure subject, a universal transcendental consciousness. They are the fact of the habitus as a feel for the game. Having the feel for the game is having the game under the skin' (Bourdieu, 1998: 80). These embodied dispositions are apparent in the conversations with the donors and the local philanthropist on the one hand, and the villagers, on the other hand: each busily and skilfully playing their own game.

In the illustrations used in our article it is clear that one aspect of celebrations and rituals is the legitimisation and accountability towards financial and political supporters. The donors at the ceremonies represent the smaller benefactors who contributed to reconstruct and rehabilitate the tsunami affected houses. Results had to be shown to these non-present supporters. As the founder of the L-village

stated, it is about 'performance and delivery' or as one of the donors of E-village stated, 'the opening ceremony has to take place in July 2007, afterwards the attention from Germany will be less'. The founder and the foreign donors acted in their social field of being a receiver of funds and within this field it is important to show results, be accountable, keep the social standing and not lose their credibility. The donation of funds was not only about the physical construction but also about serving their interests and reinforcing their privileged social position. 'Strategies aimed at producing practices ''according to the rules'' are one among other types of offcialization strategy, aimed at transmuting ''egoistic'', private, particular interests into ''disinterested'', collective, publicly avowable, legitimate interests' (Bourdieu, 1997a: 202). It is about the accumulation of their social capital even via episodes of symbolic violence which secures the continuation of the social standing within a social field (Bourdieu, 1998).

The involvement of local politicians and celebrities in the rituals and ceremonies further helped to solidify their existing social ties and connection. Rituals are then used not only to inaugurate development but also to demonstrate political and social presence as the country 'modernises' (see also Spencer, 2007). The habitus of donors and givers within the field of aid in Sri Lanka includes the celebration of donation, and through local rituals, the acceptance of development work (Tennekoon, 1988). These rituals help internalise and localise the imposed and external-driven development projects. But this also involves reinforcing local power structures. In the above cases, the local politicians, officials and celebrities were able to re-formalise their social positions within their social field. Participating in a development project funded by foreign agents, having access and personal contacts to this social field of international relations shows superiority and exclusivity; it enhances their social capital and social recognition.

In E-village many local politicians from various authorities were involved and the foreign donors used these good social relations in order to achieve project milestones. The external access road construction, for example, started just one day before the opening ceremony. At this point it was clear that a high-profile minister from Colombo would attend the ceremony and his influence made the local road authority fear sanctions; consequently the road was constructed within a day! Again, this example illustrates how habitus and social fields influence actions and strengthen existing power relations, with agents trying to keep their social position and recognition within their social field. In L-village the social position of donors was also demonstrated by inviting Colombo-based celebrities to highlight the importance of the tsunami project and its exclusivity. Listening to the initiator of the L-Village and the way he explained the need for the inauguration ritual, his habitus becomes clear: his relationship with society makes him believe in the need for such a ritual. It is as Bourdieu (1998: 98) says, 'everything occurs

as if'. The embodied habitus demands that the ritual be a natural consequence of constructing a development project. 'In such a social universe, the giver knows that his generous act has every chance of being recognized as such (rather than being seen as a naivetee or an absurdity) and of obtaining recognition (in the form of a counter-gift or gratitude) from the beneficiary' (Bourdieu, 1997b: 233). Or, in other words, 'Generosity very often proves to establish a good reputation and to serve our longterm interests. It supplies us with honour and gratitude' (Vandevelde, 2000: 2–3). It becomes clear that the game of honour and recognition within one's social field, in this case the rebuilding of post-tsunami villages, represents the entrenchment of micro-level political structures even when it comes in the guise of generosity and goodwill.

VI. Ambivalent Gratitude

The local founder and the implementing NGO for the foreign donors for L-village and E-village, respectively, were convinced of the positive deeds enacted by them in rebuilding and regenerating rural communities. Indeed, the rhetoric of 'empowering' communities was frequently used. The local founder, for instance, said, 'But I personally think if you compare our village to the one neighbouring it, ours is conceded to be a rural community model – the disadvantaged families, rural youth and children are being empowered with facilities that they would not have got even if they came to Colombo.' The ways in which this confident ethos is shared by the villagers in both locales is more ambiguous. Segments of the community in each of the villages appreciate the ways in which their communities have been revived and renewed and how they have become beneficiaries of houses with a minor plot of land. Yet this gratitude has to be counterbalanced with the ways in which villagers were playing the system and appropriating the rhetoric of gratefulness to garner access to resources they would not have had in different circumstances. Their ability to turn the tables and play their role in the donor/philanthropy games are also important illustrations of the ways in which their agency is registered, albeit under constrained conditions. The ambivalence of their gratitude is critical in understanding the ways in which symbolic gestures deployed by those in positions of power are sometimes overrun and inverted by those at the receiving end. Quite in contrast to Bourdieu's emphasis on class reproduction through gaming spaces, which tends to render impotent the capacity of marginalised groups in effecting resistance, what we find is how they engage in practices which play with the system in a manner that is beneficial and critical for their welfare (see also Jeffrey, 2008, 2009).

Juxtaposing motivations for obtaining houses and wanting to participate in the

ceremonies and rituals performed in E-village highlight the ambiguity at play. One villager mentioned, 'for me the tsunami was the only chance to obtain a legal housing deed. In my situation, working as a seamstress and with my husband as a daily labourer, we could never a□ord to own a house. I move there, even if it is far away from Galle and it is still very dirty because of the construction taking place.' Here, even though the distance from Galle Road was counterproductive to the economic life of both her and her husband and the village site was noted as being dirty, the promise of receiving a legal housing title was the motivation to move into a village under construction. Another recipient was blunt when she said, 'Madam, we help you to make the donors happy. You have worked hard for us. So we help you to make this a good day and make donors happy.' Here she was echoing the sentiments of some villagers who recognised that they would participate in and undertake these rituals – not because they wanted to but because they were aware that their participation would 'make the donors happy'. They were acutely aware that without them, the ability of the donors to create a particular type of representational space would be thwarted. The game, therefore, was played when it was deemed to be of benefit to them.

Even though the two housing reconstruction schemes show differences, they have one major aspect in common: the direct involvement of donors in the giving process. This turns generosity around and unfolds its double truth. Tittmus (1971) agues that the modern altruistic giving has nothing in common with the giving in archaic societies (Mauss, 1924). Therefore modern giving rules out 'the three-fold sequence of obligations (the obligation to give, to accept, and return)' (Silber, 1998: 138) and the capacity to create and transform social relations that Mauss ascribes to the archaic gift giving systems. For Tittmus (1971) modern anonymous giving makes this exchange very close to an altruistic gift with no strings attached and no expectation of any return. The Tittmusian modern altruistic gift is certainly not in place in these projects.

Since the writings of Marcel Mauss (1924) and Jacques Derrida (1992) we know that there is no such thing as a 'free' gift. Giving always involves reciprocity and even being aware that a gift is given does invalidate the spirit of a 'free' gift. Giving binds people together, it creates individual and social ties; it is motivated by the nature of human relationships (Douglas, 1990; Bourdieu, 1997a, b; Komter, 2005). In both projects we see this direct involvement, the strings attached to the gift and reciprocity demanded, even extracted in certain instances. The donors create their own vision of a village, they make decisions about the implementation process, the housing plan, the village design and they put pressure on how aid is delivered. The recipients in return accept to participate in various ceremonies knowing that this is the only way 'to make donors happy'.

This exchange illustrates how the giver and receiver stand in relation to each other in their capacity to reciprocate. It also reveals that the universal obligation of reciprocity no longer holds where the social divide is vast and the recipient cannot offer anything in return. Sahlins (1972) suggests this type of reciprocity a□rms social hierarchy over time. If generous gifts cannot be reciprocated they leave behind a significant social debt and dependency. Or in other words, 'giving is also a way of possessing (a gift which is not matched by counter-gift creates a lasting bond, restricting the debtor's freedom and forcing him to adopt a peaceful, co-operative, prudent attitude)' (Bourdieu, 1990: 195).
The depth of this ambivalent feeling of gratitude still binds people together in an asymmetric relation of domination and hierarchy. As Bourdieu states, 'one of the ways of ''holding'' someone is to keep up a lasting asymmetric relationship such as indebtedness; ... because the only recognized, legitimate form of possession is that achieved by dispossessing oneself – i.e. obligation, gratitude, prestige, or personal loyalty' (1990: 195). Gratitude therefore serves the interest of one's social position. Furthermore, the accumulation of social capital legitimises the standing rule of the field – prestige and power – obtained in our cases through forms of symbolic and gentle violence.

VII. Conclusion

The proliferation of NGO and private philanthropic giving is presented as a laudable, necessary and charitable act – as it has the potential to unpick the vulnerability of the giver (Clark, 2007). Yet we have shown that this process is legitimised with cultural meaning extended through rituals and practices: the positions of giver and receiver do not merely show the social and power divide, but also the ways in which the 'physical world and the human world participate in the construction of meaning' (Wilford, 2008: 659). These are often etched through forms of symbolic capital. The involvement of local philanthropists from the English-speaking middle class and foreign donors in these acts of generous charity always entail employing 'cultural' practices as a crucial conduit of situated development. However, we have shown that this does not necessitate an alternatively imagined development but rather often becomes about 'reproducing and deepening class structures' and positions of power (Bourdieu, 1998; see also Jeffrey, 2008).
Acceptance of these practices, however, results in a Bourdieuian non-violent form of violence being perpetrated through masked acts of generosity. Bourdieu (1977: 196) calls this symbolic violence and suggests that it works through the 'transfiguration of relations of domination and submission into a□ective

relations, the transfiguration of power into charisma or into the charm suited to evoke affective enchantment' (Bourdieu, 1998: 102). This transformation can only work if all agents within the social field have acquired the same habitus and do understand the rules of the game. Therefore, 'agents lastingly ''bind'' each other, ... , only through the dispositions which the group inculcates in them and continuously reinforces, and which render unthinkable practices which would appear as legitimate and even be taken for granted in the disenchanted economy of ''naked self-interest''' (Bourdieu, 1990: 196). Here it becomes clear that through the development of the same habitus all actors become accomplices of symbolic and gentle forms of violence. The dominant and the dominated collaborate, knowingly and unknowingly, in a work of dissimulation tending to deny the truth of exchange. This shows the subtle and cowardly form symbolic violence takes and how hard it becomes to escape. To escape, people would need to reflect on their habitus, change both the 'nature' of their embodied thinking and their acting (dispositions). We find that even where the 'beneficiaries' play the game creatively and skilfully, political economic realities keep them in place. It is not that marginalised groups lack the capacity to confront their predicament and be deliberately ambivalent in their gratitude. Even though their voices and narratives have shown that they are aware of and use their capacity to subtly and creatively counteract the domination by NGOs and philanthropists, this in and of itself does not transform social structures and power bases. That would require all social agents to accept the intrusion into their field and transform their dispositions.

The cultural practices and rituals in the post-tsunami context then go beyond what Tennekoon (1988) showed to be taking place through the various development projects over nearly two decades. Quotidian cultural practices are no longer used and deployed to generate, reinvent, legitimise and press on the quest for modernisation. The destruction caused by the tsunami meant that the urgent need for physical reconstruction was taken for granted while the entrenched positions of power, social standing and authority of foreign donors and local elite actors were legitimised through these rituals. This was visible in the seemingly simple act of gifting the key to new homes: the donors were on one side of handing over the key and the recipient family on the other, smiling and showing their thankfulness and happiness. They were aware that they were part of a game but had to feign their lack of awareness. Here generosity reveals its double truth: it reveals social asymmetry, hierarchy and the manifestation of power. However, material conditions prevent a stripping away of the inherent tensions in these symbolic gestures where cultural rituals and practices are used to convey the habitus of power, the symbols of domination and the episodes of gentle violence.

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Article 4

Hollenbach, P. (forthcoming)

Seeing like a donator: guiding communities into better lives in the after math of the Indian-Ocean tsunami.

International Development Planning Review.

Abstract

The paper provides an ethnographic insight into a well-intended private initiated housing project conducted in the aftermath of the Indian Ocean Tsunami in Southern Sri Lanka. Informed by the Foucaults' concept of governmentality the aim is to understand the governmentality of 'building back better' and how donators define, guide and create 'better lives' for the recipients of their benevolent intentions. Therefore the paper presents the logic, thinking and vision of donators showing that this particular socialized knowledge not only shaped the project plan and implementation process, but also how donators attempted to shape the conduct of beneficiaries, governing their mentality through humanitarian aid and its technicalities. Moreover a small aperture is presented of how recipients find allies in order to re-shape and re-define everyday community life in relation to the newly defined 'modelled' life.

Post-disaster housing: improving peoples' well being

On 26th December 2004 two thirds of Sri Lanka's coastal region had been affected by one of the biggest natural disasters in recorded history. In February 2005 the Department of National Planning and the Ministry of Finance and Planning presented a first damage assessment and proposed a way forward for rehabilitation - 'Rebuilding Sri Lanka: Action Plan' (TAFREN, 2005). The report identified housing, with over 100'000 houses partly and fully damaged, as one of the most important and most cost intensive sectors[1] that urgently needed attention and reconstruction assistance. The report stated:

1 The overall costs for rehabilitation and reconstruction was identified with US$ 1,8 billion. The amount was divided among different sectors crediting Housing the biggest share with 21% of the total amount, followed by Fisheries (13%), Road Development and Water Supply &Sanitation (each 10%), Microfinance &SME (8%) and Rail Transport (6%). The remaining 32% were divided among Electricity, Telecommunication, Health, Education, Tourism, Environment, Enterprise and Industrial Development, Law and Order, Port Development, Agriculture and Social Services. Source: (TAFREN 2005: 11)

> "Rehabilitation and resettlement of the families needs to be done with utmost urgency… They need immediate assistance to get back to their normal livelihood" (TAFREN, 2005, 7)

In order to achieve quick results in rebuilding permanent houses and creating new homes for tsunami affected people, the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL), multi- and bilateral aid organisations, national/international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) as well as private and other aid initiatives joined their workforce, financial as well as knowledge capacities and divided the labour. It was agreed, that the GoSL takes over the responsibility for distribution and allocation of land, infrastructure and beneficiary lists and other stakeholders undertake the task of funding, planning and construction of houses. However as Korf writes "The whole process of housing relocation is state-centred …[and] by subscribing to these conditions, charities supported this process which deepens a state-centred, hierarchical political system of clientelism and creates conditions that foster favouritism" (2002, v).

Through this agreement the GoSL broke away from its long-established tradition of planned housing schemes, which emphasized internal and indigenous Sri Lankan processes in housing, villagization and social development, while avoiding ''western'' development catchwords. Since Sri Lanka gained independence in 1948, the government placed a huge emphasis on defining an "indigenous Sri Lanka development strategy" (Gunaratna, 2006, 8) to revitalize a well functioning society based on harmonious village communities that had supposedly been ruined by foreign invasion and the imposition of colonial rule (Brow, 1988; Brow, 1999; Brun and Lund, 2009; Gunaratna, 2006; Tambiah, 1992; Woost, 1994). In the aftermath of the 2004 disaster however an unprecedented number of western aid organisations entered Sri Lanka with good intentions to improve the well being of affected people, to enhance their capacity for action, and to direct and guide them into a 'better life'. Both intentions from government and from western aid agencies came in the guise of benevolence (Bryant, 2002; Korf, 2005; Korf, 2007; Korf et al, 2010; Li, 1999; Li, 2007; Scott, 1998; Watts, 2003).

This paper looks into these benevolent intentions and asks: how do these stakeholders define, guide and create 'better lives'? And what pathways towards leading better lives are propagated? The 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami and the aid wave it generated are a particularly useful case to study how these benevolent intentions of guiding people into better lives operate, in particular as

the destruction created a seemingly blank space to "build back better"[2], which became pronounced through the numerous housing reconstruction schemes aiming to guide Tsunami-displaced families in an improved direction. The ambition of shaping and forming new social behaviour and living patterns relates to Foucault's' concept of 'governmentality' - shaping and ordering "the possible field of action of others" (Foucault, 1982, 221). The concept helps to diagnose, "…the rationalities of rule, the forms of knowledge and expertise they construct, and the specific and contingent assemblages of practices, materials, agents and techniques through which these rationalities operate to produce governable subjects" (Hart, 2004, 92). The aim of this article is to uncover the logic of a private donator-driven[3] post-disaster housing project and to gain insights in the socialized knowledge upon which donators base and define their vision of 'better life'. Therefore, the analysis is informed by governmentality as a productive way to conceptualise the logic of donators and to identify the how of doing aid. As Scott (1998) emphasises: it is important to first understand the logic of a vision in order to understand it's engineering. Moreover the paper looks "beyond" (Li, 2005) donators' vision, providing a small aperture of how recipients find allies in order to re-shape and re-define everyday community life in relation to the newly set path for their future.

Since the Tsunami occurred, a lot has been written on the outcome, the dilemmas and the ambiguities of aid activities in Sri Lanka (Bennett et al, 2006; Brun and Lund, 2008; Khasalamwa, 2009). Others critically analyse the different processes and practices involved in aid delivery (Fernando and Hilhorst, 2006; Haug and Weerackody, 2007; Korf, 2007; Korf et al, 2010; Telford and Cosgrave, 2007; Ruwanpura, 2008), or how tsunami rehabilitation fostered and influenced the countries' long-term conflict situation (Hyndman, 2007; McGilvray and Gamburd, 2010; Uyangoda, 2005). All these studies give a detailed overview of aid processes in the aftermath of disaster, and their influence upon the recovery and rehabilitation of social life. However, an ethnographic view that analyses the rationale of projects, the thinking and logic of donors/donators, and how they

2 The slogan ‚building back better' was introduced in 2005 by former US President B. Clinton acting as the UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery and widely adopted by various actors in post-tsunami recovery. In 2005 the Sri Lankan government presented under the 'building back better' slogan their official national post-tsunami policy

3 Donator is used to indicate private persons giving donations to aid and development organisations. Donor stands for official development institutions like government, semi-official foundations or aid organisations. The phenomena of private (national/international) donator-driven aid projects emerged in a multitude of tsunami projects in Sri Lanka in which private donators acted as ‚experts' and part of the project planning team becoming and active part in the rehabilitation process. This led not only to new relationships and networks within the aid chain, but also to new practices of how aid was delivered (cf. Henkel/Stirrat 1997; Korf et al 2009; Stirrat 2006).

transferred their visions into practices and technologies of development aiming to create governable subjects has been underexplored.

Seeking to understand the governmentality of "building back better" the paper diagnoses the rationale and logic behind one specific donator-driven planned model village in Southern Sri Lanka, in the Galle District, as the product of a specific vision and a particular socialized knowledge. The housing scheme is interesting, as it was designed and funded by a group of private individuals from southern Germany who had the intention to create a model village: an eco-village. The model village was to be designed technically as a sustainable settlement and also entailed a self-governing structure that sought to guide its inhabitants to a more independent and self-determined political life, as civil society. The paper provides an ethnographic insight into a well-intended private housing project presenting that the logic, thinking and vision of donators not only shaped the project plan and implementation, but also how donators attempted to shape the conduct of beneficiaries, governing their mentality through humanitarian aid and its technicalities.

Towards a genealogy of model villages and housing schemes

Many post-tsunami housing projects in Sri Lanka show evidence, that project implementers created a vision of an ideal 'model village' that is a product of their ideas, picturesque ideals, and socialized knowledge of village and community life. Donors "…carried in their mind's eye … a certain aesthetic, … a visual codification of modern … community life" (Scott, 1998, 253). These architectural and technical visions became a driving force for the rehabilitation process in Sri Lanka underlining what Scott pointed out for authoritarian high-modernism schemes: "to look right becomes more important than whether they work; or, better put, the assumption is that if the arrangement looks right, it will also, ipso facto, function well. The importance of such representations is manifested in a tendency to miniaturize, to create … microenvironments of apparent order as model villages" (Scott, 1998, 225; emphasis added). Therefore, the model village described here stands for an underlying logic of tsunami villages in Sri Lanka as in many other disaster development scenarios: creating a 'model', an 'apparent order' of physical structure via the feasibility of architectural and technical planning, will produce 'appropriate' governable subjects, and an immediate social community (Bryant, 2002; Darley, 2007; Hart, 2004; Lewis and Mosse, 2006; Li, 2007; Rose, 1999; Scott, 1998; Watts, 2003).

Various actors in post-tsunami housing were ambitious to improve the well being of the tsunami-affected population by constructing houses and introducing new forms and ways of community life (Brun and Lund, 2009; Khasalamwa, 2009; Ruwanpura, 2008; Saravanthan and Sanjeewanie, 2006). Benevolent intentions and the ambition to set and guide people onto a better path of development turns donators in to what Li (2007) defines as trustees: "The objective of trusteeship is not to dominate others – it is to enhance their capacity for action, and to direct it…their intentions are benevolent, even utopian. They desire to make the world better than it is" (2007, 5; emphasis added). Thereby all activities of recipients are based on the willingness to voluntarily participate in the pursuit of donators' objectives, visions and nobility of ideals. Donators consider the subject of 'their' good intentions no longer as passive and powerless victims without the ability of a self-regulating agent, rather it presupposes their capacity as agents (Cruikshank,1999; DeBois, 1991; Foucault, 1991; Hart, 2004; Li, 2007; Rossi 2004; Watts 2003). The ability of a self-regulating agent, yet not in the way donators comprehend self-regulating, appears, particularly if we observe the everyday life within the planned village. Recipients start to live with the new situation and adjust their lives towards newly set rules or the other way round, adjust set rules to their lives. As Li (2005) writes: "…improvement schemes are simultaneously destructive and productive of new forms of local knowledge and practice. Rather than attempt to generalize, the effects of planned interventions have to be examined empirically, in the various sites where they unfold… " (391).

The empirical material for the case study is based on ethnographic observation and participation, as the author was involved in managing the donator-driven tsunami housing project today known as German Haritha Gama (GHG)[4] in Galle District, Southern Sri Lanka from early 2005 to late 2007. The project was initiated by three individual persons in Southern Germany, co-financed and implemented through a Germany based Emergency Aid organisation (AID[5]). During the author's involvement valuable insights into the rationale of the project, the thinking and logic of donators, their professional and social background and how they created the vision of an ideal village were ascertained. This phase of participant observation was complemented by subsequent field research in 2009/2010 and 2011 when interviews with village inhabitants, local officials

4 The name German Haritha Gama was given by the new villagers. During a community meeting local aid workers in cooperation with new villagers created this name as villagers wanted the village be identified with Germany (German). The ecological notion is expressed in Haritha, which can be interpreted as "green place where the flowers grow and bloom" (explanation of villagers, February 2006) and Gama is the Singhalese word for village.

5 The abbreviation AID is used to secure anonymity of the implementing aid organisation.

and government authorities were conducted. Further German donators, German project managers and project managers of two Sri Lankan NGOs that took over the project management from 2008 when the German aid agency withdrew from Sri Lanka were interviewed and several informal discussion took place.[6]

In the following sections I first introduce the housing initiative, its formation and actors and its political dimension showing how donators understand to guide themselves and others, and which technologies and practices were used in order to achieve a new 'apparent order' of community life. A second section will introduce the vision of the "Eco-Village"; the logic behind this vision and how it materialized and was legitimized in practice. Donators hoped with the introduction of their ideals and the construction of high quality houses, that the recipients would develop the desire to move into the village and adopt the concept of eco-friendly living and self-governance, a newly introduced form of village management in Sri Lanka. In a last section I will introduce examples of the 'dark twin' to present the adjustments and the reality of everyday living in a 'modelled' manner. Overall the paper intends to show that the particular housing project can be understood "as a right manner of disposing things so as to not lead to the common good… but to an end that is convenient for each of the things governed" (Foucault in Watts, 2003, 13, emphasis added; cf. Li, 2005).

The idea of a model village – making of governance

The subsequent sections will introduce the 'Eco Village' project, later named German Haritha Gama, and will analyse how a group of private donators developed and designed their ideas and visions of a "model village". The material will illustrate donators' rationale and socialized knowledge, showing how this informed certain claims and activities in the implementation process, and how donators' thereby produced an identity of community life.

When asked why Galle district was selected for the project, one donator honestly stated: "We knew the East was more in need for housing projects, but with the distance and troublesome travel conditions we thought it is better to choose Galle … you know we wanted to participate and attend the implementation process and

6 89 households, 25 government officials and 8 key informants have been interviewed (semistructured) several times during fieldwork period in 2009/10 and 11. Further 9 group discussions were held in the village. Also during this period interviews and conversations were held with 9 informants in Germany.

visit the site from time to time… also the political situation in the North and East was still insecure and we could not risk delays or even rupture of the project" (34,082009, Donator A).

This quote is indicative of the process that led from the original affect of benevolence among donators (as from now: donator A, B and C) to the selection for a site and subsequent implementation of a housing relocation scheme, designed as a "model village". The whole set-up was shaped by the dense networks of politically influential figures and their relationships in Baden-Württemberg (Ba-Wü), Germany as well as in Sri Lanka; networks that the project initiators had established long before the tsunami happened. These networks of personal contacts up to the highest political levels, both in the governments of Baden-Württemberg and in Sri Lanka gave the project a particular prominence and urgency, which required special attention by the subordinated organizations and bureaucracies in order to make the project become a success, both for the donators in Germany and for their political allies in Sri Lanka. This created a significant dilemma: On the one hand the strong networks of the donators made their efforts publicly visible and showcased the importance of the project, making fundraising very successful. On the other hand, the conditions that different donators attached to the project made its design complicated and created high pressure to produce successful and visible outcomes fast.

Each of the donators worked (or had done so) for governmental institutions or had close linkages to governmental agencies thereby gaining good reputation in their political and private social field. Further they had built up long-term business as well as personal relations with Sri Lanka. Donator C, for example, had worked seven years in Sri Lanka building up the 'German Vocational Training Centre' in Moratuwa, today one of the most accredited technical schools in the country. He had remained well connected to Sri Lankan institutions, ministries and senior officials and almost every year voluntarily organized courses in Moratuwa or exchange programs for Sri Lankan students to visit Germany. Donator B had an established business rapport and linked Ba-Wü companies with Sri Lankan companies for business knowledge and technology exchange. For his efforts he was honoured with the position as honorary consul to Sri Lanka. Subsequent to the tsunami he reported, "I was asked by many people if I am going to help in Sri Lanka … people trusted my knowledge and contacts … but also I was asked from Sri Lankan friends, colleagues and politicians if I am willing to donate money" (22, 102009, Donator B). He therefore wrote "begging/ letters" to companies and work colleagues in order to raise money and was overwhelmed by the response. The third donator (Donator A), a senior official of the Ministry of Environment in

Ba-Wü (MEBW), considered Tsunami rehabilitation as a promising opportunity to revitalize a former cooperation between his ministry and the Sri Lanka Ministry of Development and Water Supply. In the mid 1990s the two ministries had partnered in a bilateral development cooperation to transfer knowledge and newly invented eco-friendly technologies for waste water systems and energy generation for small rural communities.

Due to their social standing and political linkages, fundraising was very efficient. This coincided with the then German chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, using his traditional New Year speech 2004/2005 to call for solidarity with the disaster affected communities in Asia and Africa. The Chancellor's appeal was particularly directed towards states, cities and communities to take over partnerships[7] in tsunami affected regions, which created new forms of public and official financial support. In early 2005 the state of Ba-Wü organized a meeting for such private initiatives in which Donator A, B and C met and collated ideas. The outcome was the formation of the 'Baden Württemberg Tsunami Relief Cooperation' (BWTRC), officially linked to the MEBW with the aim to rebuilt houses. The then state minister supported their idea using his contacts to the Baden Württemberg Foundation (BWF) to set up a Tsunami Fund (1 Mio Euro) for private initiatives to access money for long-term engagement in tsunami affected regions.[8] In mid 2005 the BWTRC was granted 750'000 Euros of this fund to construct an 'Eco-Village'. The project had to fulfil the following criteria[9]: (1) focus on long-term investment into infrastructure, by (2) building a new village model for eco-friendly living, (3) introduce new technologies originating from Baden-Württemberg, and

7 Abridgement official German New Year Speech 2004/2005:
"Ich habe von der Dimension des Leidens gesprochen, der wir gerecht werden müssen und zwar jeder an seinem Platz. Die Staaten, die Regionen, die Wirtschaft und die ganze Weltgesellschaft. Ich möchte nachhaltige Hilfe für die Region. Ich will, dass wir uns lange verantwortlich fühlen. Alle wohlhabenden Länder sollten Partnerschaften für den Wiederaufbau bestimmter Regionen übernehmen... Das würde zeigen, dass wir über das Spenden von Geld - das gewiss wichtig ist - weit hinaus wollen. Dass wir Verantwortung als etwas Dauerhaftes begreifen..." (Source: http://www.lc-bonn-venusberg.de/lcbnvb_d_eingang_20050102_bk_n-anspr.htm)
The Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation guided the process of the Partnership Initiative. The ‚Service Agency Communities in One World' (SKEW) of the Ministry was assigned with the task to coordinate and match partnerships. Communities, town councils, regions, schools, or companies were able to place a request for a partnership with SKEW and they provided the service to identify local aid projects in which the initiators were able to invest there money. However many private initiatives directly contacted aid agencies in order to directly communicate and negotiate possible aid projects and to have a bigger influence in the delivery process.

8 „…für längerfristige Probleme wie Infrastrukturmaßnahmen oder Präventivprojekte großen Hilfsbedarf geben. Der Aufsichtsrat hat daher einer grundsätzlichen Bereitstellung zunächst bis zu 1 Mio. Euro in den Wirtschaftsplan 2005 zugestimmt…" (Source: http://www.bwstiftung.de/index.php?id=401&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=274)

9 Source: Internal Memo MEBW (13052005, MEBW)

(4) transfer knowledge to improve peoples eco-friendly behaviour.

With growing funds and involvement of official authorities the BWTRC decided to partner with a knowledgeable and experienced emergency aid agency. The partner was found in AID with its headquarters in the capital city of the state of Baden Württemberg. Even so, the former director of the agency suggested in an interview that she was reluctant to accept the partnership at one point, however it was not possible to decline, as "…there was so much politics involved, that to withdraw from the project would have caused problems and a bad reputation for our agency" (44, 012009, HH). To counterbalance donators' influence AID topped up the project budget with 1,2 Million Euros - half of the total budget - to keep a say in its planning and implementation and to legitimize the project under the organizational mandate.

The politically charged importance of the project in Germany was also carried over to Sri Lanka. During a preliminary fact finding mission[10] conducted by the founders of BWTRC, the idea of a 'Green Village' was introduced to the Sri Lankan Ministry of Development & Water Supply, and to the Minister of Skills Development, Vocational & Technical Education, the former partner of Donator C. Both agreed to support the project and to liaise with the relief cooperation to provide necessary assistance. In a first step the Sri Lankan Ministry of Development & Water Supply signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) creating bilateral project cooperation. Later this cooperation was transferred into an official tsunami project under TAFREN, later RADA[11], to allow for applying full tax exemption and accessing other key benefits like access to government land, allocation of basic infrastructure, and support in beneficiary selection. Even though the bilateral agreement first sidelined the official Tsunami rehabilitation approach the political involvement of higher senior officials helped to revoke the MoU and transfer 'Eco Village' into an official tsunami project. Further evidence of the political influence of senior officials lies in the fact that 'Eco Village' was one of the first international tsunami projects to be granted full tax exemption in early 2007.

10 Source: Internal Memo of Fact Finding Mission (29042005, MEBW)

11 Task Force for Rebuilding the Nation was immediately set up in the aftermath of the tsunami disaster in order to coordinate the reconstruction programmes. Its main activities was to coordinate, facilitate and assist implementing organizations, coordinate donor assistance and fund raising activities, to expedite the procurements process, and to build capacity in government implementing agencies. In November 2005 RADA was created as a government agency by presidential decree taking over TAFREN's coordination activities.

German Haritha Gama: Planning and implementing

Making a "A suitable site"

> "I remember when the Germans came first time. We received a call from Minister's Colombo office that we have to support them finding a nice land in Galle… we showed them 3 sites but nothing was good, too far away, too small, too hilly, very difficult. But later we found Walahanduwa Watta in Akmeemana Division and this they liked" (45, 022010, AP).

This quote by an administrative official of the Galle District Secretariat (DS office) takes notice of the complicated process of finding a "suitable site" that would please the donators' expectations and indicates the level of attention and urgency that the local officials attributed to complying with the demands from these specific individuals due to their special connections to high-level politicians and "the minister". As a result of the complicated negotiation among local (DS Galle, Government Agent Galle, RADA Galle) as well as central-government officials (RADA Colombo, and befriended officials from the Ministry of Development and Water Supply and Ministry of Public Administration and Home Affairs) Walahanduwa Watta, a former tea and rubber estate located in the Akmeemana Division, was transformed to an official tsunami reconstruction site.

Even though the location is quite far away from the place of origin of future village inhabitants[12] and thus not necessarily ideal, donators and local authorities justified the quality of the location by creating a narration of future 'economic development'. With Walahanduwa Watta closely located to the newly constructed Colombo-Matara highway, the local authorities as well as the central government anticipated fast economic development for the region. The Galle Government Agent (GA) said, "You know the location seems to be far off but I can assure that this will change with the upcoming Colombo-Matara Highway. A new economic zone is planned – 'Economic Development Plan Akmeemana' - and therefore all tsunami housing projects will be in the centre of growth and development…" (15, 022007, GA). Visiting the Mayor of Galle City in 2010 to discuss the issue of 'Economic Development Plan Akmeemana', he said, "I am very sorry. Since many years we talk about the upcoming economic zone … all is negotiated in several planning meetings on City and District level, but nothing agreed yet" (18 ,012010, MAG). The visionary 'economic boom story' developed a certain truth, which helped to encourage beneficiaries to accept the disadvantageous location

12 The land is 12 km inlands from the main Galle road and up to 18km from the Grama Niladari Divisions the new villagers originate from

as a new place for living and also attracted other international donors to finance and reconstruct houses at this location. In total 11 new villages were constructed in the region (Akmeemana, Imaduwa, and Habaraduwa Division) under the donor driven housing program with over 600 new houses and about 2’500 new inhabitants (Source: DS Document_Donor Driven Housing Program Galle District, 23012007).

The local authorities anticipated receiving further support by the central government for infrastructural development, an expectation which proved to remain unmet, as an administrative official of Akmeemana Division Secretariat complained: “I really thought the new tsunami villages will bring development for the region… but today I have more work, more complaints and less options to support the new villages… the central government should have done a proper planning because now we face lot of problems, many conflicts in the villages, no proper access to school, health, income…” (26, 022010, DSA). The vision of the ‘economic hub’ proved to be unfounded later on, and was merely used to produce a legitimizing truth for the project stakeholders to justify the disadvantageous location and guide them into the direction aimed for.

Village layout – creating picturesque ‘little Germany’

> “The village should be like a German village”
> (German Technical Engineer (GTE))

> “The public buildings should present Sri Lankan architectural tradition”
> (Donator B)

This seeming paradox – a village that should be like a German village and represent Sri Lankan architectural traditions – shows the implicit tension in the spatial and technical design of a sustainable, eco-friendly “model village”. To some extent donators seemed to solve this paradox by hiring a German architect familiar with local architectural styles as well as design requirements for local houses. And yet, donators were eager to see their visions of a “village” represented in the spatial design of the relocation scheme – a village, as they knew it from their home country. The village plan was developed based both on the possibility of the landscape, and following the vision of a ‘typical’ well-functioning German village. The village plan of German Haritha Gama illustrates the organization of many German villages: a public square in the centre surrounded by public buildings, shops, a market place, church and often a fountain. As the reconstruction site is quite hilly, the houses had to be built on different levels but the middle, flatter

area was reserved for a huge public square enclosed by a community centre with kindergarten, doctor's room, a public library and office and surrounded with flowerbeds, benches, shops, a bakery and a parking ground.

The village layout satisfies all indicators and visions of the donators: it lays out the 'apparent new order'. Moreover the plan includes a designated space to practice peaceful coexistence of all ethnicities, religions and socio-economic groups. A special area in the village was disclosed for acting out religious rituals including a building offering small segregated open departments in which each religious group can establish a shrine. To further support the identification process of villagers with their new home, donators insisted that the public buildings should be designed based on Sri Lankan architectural style. As one donator mentioned, "the public buildings should present Sri Lankan architectural tradition…they should look like Bawa designed houses with open areas, the typical Bawa roof and so on…" (54, 102009, Donator B). Bawa architecture is linked, however, to upper class and caste society, which is indicative of the kind of imagination of "Sri Lankan culture" that was guiding the visions of donators and not representing the social origin of the new villagers.

In effect, the plan was designed as a spatial layout to guide the new inhabitants into a specific mode of life – eco-friendly and peaceful. The plan included all measures of how donators foresaw the future village, its organization and maintenance. Through proper planning of the spatiality of village life and the architectural layout of its public buildings they used "…a variety of technics and micropolitics of power (from the map, to national statistics, to forms of surveillance) to accomplish, or attempt to accomplish, stable rule…" (Watts, 2003,12) intending to "educate [the inhabitants'] desires and [to] reform their practices" (Li, 2007, 16).

Realizing 'Eco'

As the village was planned under the notion of 'eco-friendliness', donators and village engineers integrated several eco-friendly and sustainable technologies. For example solar operating street lamps, solar panels to generate electricity for public buildings and each house was equipped with a three-chamber cesspit, which in a long natural process dehydrates the waste and cleans the water releasing it back into the ground, and a rainwater tank, collecting rainwater from the roof to be used for the toilet and the garden. The other aspect was to influence the ecological awareness of recipients as one donator mentioned: "You know, people have to change their ecological behaviour… just think how strict we are with waste collection in Germany, we separate everything, really everything! And people in

Sri Lanka still burn everything; even plastic… this has to change otherwise our efforts to strive towards a clean environment will be without success… it is about education and awareness on ecological effects of their behaviour" (12, 082007, GTE)

To achieve changing behaviour several trainings and community meetings on environmental issues were held. Between 2007-2008 several trainings in cooperation with the Department of Agriculture (DOA) were organized to introduce composting technologies and how to set up home gardening. Donators supported this education process by financing a gardening set for each household comprising of a pick, bucket, garden shovel and a barrow. Further each house was provided with a composting system developed by a local environment organisation. In addition a reforestation project was started in which new villagers were asked to participate in planting trees, hedges and vegetables in public spaces. Also recipients were encouraged to set up kitchen gardens.

To expand the 'eco-friendly'-part into the long-term, the village community was equipped with a waste collecting shack, a tractor, gully bowser and waste-collecting hanger to separate and collect the waste. To present waste separation in more attractive manner additional trainings were offered illustrating the value of waste and how the community can make a profit with waste. The donators' idea: generate money through waste processing and selling it to recycling companies in the region. 'Eco-Village' was perfectly planned in order to change behaviour and to adopt an ecologically friendly life style in the future.

Governing victims to better lives

A model village of liberal governance

> "Germany Haritha Gama should be a model to show that people participate in community politics and take decisions together for their lives… I am sure if they learn to participate in community politics, they will start formulating their political desires and make demands for their rights as a Sri Lankan citizen…" (42, 102009, Donator B).

This quote indicates that the donators had a clear imagination in mind of a politically self-governed village "community" and that such a "community" could not only be realized through spatial and architectural design, but requires educating villagers to become "citizens". Based on their everyday experiences

with local governance and politics in southern Germany, donators identified a supposed deficiency in Sri Lankan politics that needed to be readdressed and regulated. Cruishank writes: "…democratic participation and self-government are regarded as solutions to the lack of something: for example, a lack of power, of self-esteem, of coherent self-interest, or of political consciousness…" (1999, 3). In the case of German Haritha Gama donators wanted to transform passive victims and supposedly apolitical villagers into active (liberal) citizens, but – and that is the paradox – politically active outside of the mundane and dirty world of Sri Lankan party politics. They sought to achieve this through educating villagers and regulating their 'conduct of conduct' in the political life of the village.

Two problems were identified: first, corrupt local and national politics, and second, lack of a critical public opinion in Sri Lanka that could push national politics into a more peaceful future. The problem with this view is reflected in two statements asking donators why they designed a special governing constitution for the model village: "We know the government authorities in Sri Lanka and how corrupt they are and therefore we think it would be good if the village is managed and functioned autarkical. Villagers should control where the money goes to, they should take decisions for the village and develop it further in their own understanding… I think this will train them in democracy, decision-making and good governance… I am sure this will help to develop an active political mindset which I believe the Sri Lankan society urgently needs" (24, 052007, Donator B). He continued: "I think the people need to be more active and challenge the government and its politics…" (32, 052007, Donator B). Both statements indicate some assumptions, first, about the actual affairs of Sri Lankan politics, as being deficient, dirty, corrupt, and second, a normative suggestion of how local politics should be designed and regulated – participatory, transparent and autarkic (administrative and economically).

To achieve a "coexistent living pattern" (Village Constitution: 2) and to be more independent of the formal local government structures, a self-governing system based on donators' knowledge and experience of community self-governing was introduced. The core idea was an active self-managing village community, which in turn would create a new political identity and assertiveness to become a self-caring and independent society member, challenging politics and politicians. This ideal is reflected in the mission statement of the village constitution:

> To establish a coexistent village whereby the community who have been displaced by the Tsunami disaster is capable of independently managing and

> developing the village to create and generate income to the betterment of themselves (Village Constitution 2009: 2)

The vision of self-caring and politically active people originates from donators' own professional and private experience with the self-administrative political community system in Baden-Württemberg. That governing system has a long tradition and is seen within Germany and Europe as a model for democratic peoples participation, as it provides the community with great power and many opportunities to actively participate in village politics and decision-making. In general the German Constitution regulates, that each state has to warrant communities to implement a self-governing system but the how of the system can be decided individually. The only prerequisite is a democratically elected town council. Since 1945 various self-governing systems had been developed, however, in the mid 1990's many states conducted reforms and re-oriented their self-governing systems along the Ba-Wü model. The two particularities of this system are a) the strong position of the governing mayor, directly elected by the people and unifying three leading positions: head of local council with voting power, head of local administration and representative of the community; and b) the strong position of the community members. They elect the governing mayor and can directly influence decision-making processes of the local council and the governing mayor via democratic measures (e.g.: petition for a referendum or public decision). The Ba-Wü bylaw ascribes its citizens a high position to show, that community institutions and authorities have to serve for and are only legitimized by their community. Community participation is seen as a tool of quality management, power regulation and a model for anti-corruption (Wehling, 2009).

This model of self-government was complemented by an ideal of "peaceful co-existence" of different ethnic groups within one community. Donators saw this as a model to work towards peace in Sri Lanka more broadly. The aim was "…to create a village in which all Sri Lankans, irrespective of their ethnicity, social and economic background, will live next to each other peacefully…I think the village should become a model for peaceful coexistence, this is important for Sri Lanka, especially in the current situation… People have to develop a sense of community and togetherness" (43, 022007, GTE).

Forming liberal subjects

Both, the self-governing system and the plea for peaceful co-existence create an imagination of liberal subjects, citizens who actively take part in the constitution and making of a democratic political space, where decisions are taken in an open

space of debate and consent. The challenge for the model village designers was to transform relocated beneficiaries into these liberal subjects. This created a paradoxical situation, because donators had to implant their vision into the minds of the new villagers.

Based on their model ideas, donators asked a local lawyer in Galle to write a constitution for the 'German Haritha Gama Community Development Foundation' according to their vision but complying with Sri Lankan laws. Writing this constitution could only be the first step; it had also to be brought to life in the everyday political practices of the village inhabitants. To achieve this, two local non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that had experience in forming community foundations and educating people in self-management were hired. One was responsible for the social mobilisation; the other to train and educate villagers how to properly maintain the new eco-friendly technologies that were introduced (cf. p. 12). For social mobilisation training in 'friendly'/open communication and discussion, problem-oriented management, team building workshops, and trainings on democracy and peoples' participation were provided with further training in financial management to set up a transparent system.

However the biggest challenge was to form the Community Development Foundation in the way donators had already planned. This involved the election of a Management Committee including an elected Community President, a Secretary, a Treasurer and seven members of the village plus two representatives of the 'Tsunami Relief Cooperation Baden-Württemberg' and one representative of the Divisional Secretariat Galle. This Committee "shall manage, administer and perform all the affairs of the Foundation" (Constitution 17022009: 4). As one NGO representative mentioned, "…all was well elaborated along donators' knowledge and vision…" (09, 012010, ARY). Yet, even the NGOs did not fully understand the content of the Constitution. In this situation educating and guiding the people did not mean asking their consent but telling them what and how to do things. Everything was pre-given. Donators and their experts set out the way forward and villagers had to be "remade into modern producers following the instructions of experts" (Scott, 1998, 235).

The vision of an apparent order, and conviction through which conduct can be shaped and changed did not leave any flexibility in the planning process, nor changes related to the everyday reality on the ground. This created discontent, both among villagers who were told to become liberal subjects and among NGOs who had to provide training for a pre-designed governance set-up. One NGO representative told: "You know, usually we organize everything in the way we

know self-governing or village community organization; but in GHG donators had kind of a 'road map' showing how to do it ... There was not much space to negotiate and you know they prepared the constitution with minimal influence of villagers or us… I have to admit: this was a very hard job and honestly, I am quite disappointed with the result" (12, 012010, ARY). How villagers felt underlines the following quote: "Never in my life I had to go to so many workshops ... I felt like a school boy when teachers told me what to do and how… but sometimes I just participated in these trainings because it was in a nice hotel or once we travelled to Batticaloa to visit a village in which the NGO set up a community foundation before. This was interesting; I had never visited the East before, you know the war…" (22, 012010, PRE). The paradox is, of course, the pre-designed set-up and the time pressure to deliver results, was counter-productive to the very idea of self-reliant, liberal subjects and citizens who critically engage in a political space.

Looking beyond the modelled plan – the everyday in GHG

Some of these tensions also arose later. Only few tsunami victims could be convinced to adjust to the newly created life, the new social order. In early 2011 only 59 houses were permanently occupied, of which only 42 were actual tsunami victims. 12 houses were temporarily occupied and the rest either non occupied, rented out or sold to 'others' (as tsunami housing recipients call them). This created a huge divide within the community. The actual tsunami recipients didn't want to have the 'others' being part of the community foundation as one villager said, "they should not be part of the community foundation, they should not profit from the tsunami… they are no victims! We do not want them in the village, but we also understand that some want to make money with their house rather than to leave it empty" (18, 04012011, SNJ).

With regard to new patterns of eco-friendly living, villagers adjusted or rejected donators' ideals of integrating it into their economic and cultural life-style, which I briefly illustrate with the help of the composting and waste management issue. Composting is mainly regarded as regressive and poor life standard as one villager said, "Composting is old-fashioned and too much work… especially here in the nature… I tried during the training but it smells and animals come. Now I burn my organic waste and from time to time other waste as well" (34, 122009, NK). The second component, waste separation was also not realized in the envisaged manner, as villagers not only have another understanding of waste processing but also no one was willing to work with waste. The 'Waste Management Committee' officially exists and having discussions with its members it became clear, that

various obstacles and cultural misunderstandings of waste collection hinder a successful implementation. A member said, "Waste collection is dirty, it's done by certain people. We do not have them in the village you know… no one from GHG wants to do this job, it is considered a poor job…" (22, 122009, GP). But it is not only the social and cultural interpretation of working with waste but also from a practical perspective waste collection is not an easy task to manage. Recycling in Galle District is organized on various levels – private and public – and to integrate one village into this complex system separately becomes a problem. Economically, to use private recycling companies brings profit only if a high volume can be sold and GHG would have needed to store the waste until a profitable amount has been reached. "We have no room to store waste nor money to built a waste storage… its not nice to have waste everywhere in the village, no? We need a place or we cannot collect it…" (9, 122009, RS). Based on these obstacles the committee remained inactive and today most of the households burn their waste. One housing owner told, "There is no waste collection from Pradeshiya Sabha, so what to do, we cannot leave the waste no, so we burn most of our waste or some just throw it (pointing down the valley) look you can see, bad no? But what to do?" (45, 122009, GP). The idea of an autarkic, environment friendly village did not work out, as villagers based on their socio-economic and cultural understanding were not willing to interfere with waste on professional or private level; waste is associated with a poor standard.

The above statements and examples are quite apart from donators' imagination of eco-friendly, peaceful co-existence and active citizenship, although politics of inclusion/exclusion and adjustment are certainly part of liberal political life itself. But the ambivalences that the whole process of trying to create liberal subjects and a model village based on a certain socialized knowledge reminds us that those who designed and established the vision of GHG had "forgotten the most important fact about social engineering: its efficiency depends on the response and cooperation of real human subjects" (Scott, 1998, 225).

Conclusion

> "We the donors provided you with a new village, new houses and infrastructure. The foundations for a better future are laid… Now it is your responsibility to make the village a place of peaceful and prosperous coexistence…" (26, 072007, Donator C).

This statement taken from an inaugural speech of one of the German donators

indicates the fundamental logic of the vision of the German "model village" in Sri Lanka: the engineering of a better future – "building back better". The benevolent and generous act of giving, of building better, did on the one hand mean to provide technically solid and spacious houses and a more modern design of the village layout, from the donators' personal experience. On the other hand the vision of setting people on a better path of development was defined on a larger scale: it meant to create new political subjects, new citizens that, in a way, would transgress the limited bounds of the mundane, dirty party politics as practiced in Sri Lanka. The vision was to 'conduct the conduct' of beneficiaries in order to implant peace into local communities as an antipode to the ethnicized antagonisms prevailing in Sri Lanka at the time of planning the project, and even today. In this sense, the project was designed as a model to govern mentalities – the mentalities of disaster victims to make them active political subjects managing their "own community" and starting to participate in politics.

What does the example of German Haritha Gama tell us? We could look at the model village as another example, of how visions and ideals have rarely proven to be translatable into reality, how utopias, which are a continuing currency of development projects and aid, are bound to fail especially if they are the utopias of outsiders. It could be understood as a miniature-modernizing project of the kinds that James Scott had in mind (certainly on much larger scales) in Seeing like a State (2000). And surely, even on its own terms, the model village cannot claim to have been fully successful: only parts of the houses are permanently occupied, the political life of the village is far from the ideals elaborated in the village constitution and considerable frustration abounds among those who accepted to settle in the village. But as Li (2005) suggests, that by looking "beyond ... failed schemes" it becomes evident that project participants find new practices and compromises "to fill the gap between project plans and on-the-ground realities" (Li, 2005, 391). Therefore improvement schemes such as German Haritha Gama produce new forms of local knowledge and practices, they change and influence 'the conduct of conduct' but however not in the way as laid down and envisioned by the donators but as it is newly interpreted by its recipients (Li, 2005; Li, 1999; Lewis and Mosse, 2006).

The 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami was an extreme case of a natural disaster: in magnitude - 13 countries in Asia and Africa were affected but as well in its global solicitousness. No other disaster, man made or natural had and since then has ever evoked so many donations – private, national and international. These yield a high inflow of money into disaster-affected countries with its well-known shortcomings of mismanagement, high competitiveness and inefficiency. Also the

Tsunami highlights a new upcoming trend in international aid: privately driven and financed aid projects. Private donators with huge financial resources attract notice as partners in international aid, however donators in return demand their participation in concrete project planning and decision-making as well as in defining core areas of development. Even so private donators consider and define themselves as an antipode to the official aid 'business' the above case study shows; that the attempt to build better – producing governable subjects – is a source of power replicating existing asymmetries and deficiencies in international development aid.

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Article 5

Ruwanpura, K.[1] and Hollenbach, P.[2] (2014)

From compassion to the will to improve: Elision of scripts? Philanthropy in post-tsunami Sri Lanka.

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Abstract

The paper analyses how two private post-tsunami reconstruction initiatives in Sri Lanka mobilized well intended aid to support and assist tsunami affected families, drawing on narratives of compassion, which resulted in an inadvertent obtrusion of the moral imperatives of donors upon the lives of aid receivers. We trace the discursive terrain around goodness, kindness and compassion utilized to generate donations. This quickly slipped into the practical construction of village models that reflected individuals' ideas and understandings of development, modernism, social consciousness and peaceful coexistence. This merging, we argue, quickly subverted intention for the 'betterment of villagers lives', and became a means through which donors made claims on villages and impressed their will upon recipients. Given that private donor involvement in post-tsunami Sri Lanka was a critical factor shaping conditions on the ground, we contend that it is important to unpack their (powerful) role in giving meaning to building back better.

1. Introduction

> ''Our expectation was to create a new way of living, to increase the standard of housing in Sri Lanka. We wanted to build more than houses. We wanted to build homes.'' Donor A

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> ‘‘We realized that communities are poorly managed in Sri Lanka as people do not feel responsible for their village assets. For our Tsunami housing project, we wanted to change this and wanted to make the new villagers feel responsible to maintain the village.’’
> Donor B

> ‘‘Ten years before the tsunami when I went to the village, I had a dream. The dream was two fold. One was to try and get a kind of new rural community development plan right, especially with a focus and aim to give back...Right, so for me, you know I’m at the end of the day so pleased and gratified that we have been able to at least – you know – create something positively better for those in desperate circumstances.’’ Founder of philanthropic institution

Travelling down the Southern coast of Sri Lanka nearly 10 years after the tsunami, we no longer see the devastation and debris of tsunami waves. Instead, the coastline is dotted with pleasing and colourful sites of housing communities and sign-posts signalling various donor-funded model villages. Just as the destruction caused by the tsunami waves was hard to miss, it is difficult to ignore the spread of newly built post-tsunami villages along the southern coast-line of Sri Lanka. The signs not only denote which country, federal state, corporate firm or donor agency was instrumental in rebuilding the destroyed villages, they also indicate bold claims of model village construction. They signify a certain ethos of self-belief regarding model villages. The above quotes capture a widespread confidence that each recreated community was to stand for a better order of village life; a different social order. The architects of model villages seem to suggest that ‘improvement’ can be achieved through the physical construction of houses and solid village planning; to ‘‘try and get a new kind of rural community development plan right’’. Compassionate rhetoric slips into technical and programmatic registers as the only viable means of making a ‘difference’, echoing Li’s (2007) observation that problems are constructed and framed such as to be amenable to technical interventions.

In this paper, our association with two philanthropically-supported village construction efforts in the post-tsunami context of Southern Sri Lanka is used to explore the extent to which ‘model’ villages were attempting to create a new social order.[3] Based on fieldwork, which included conversations with various actors involved in rebuilding ‘‘model’’ villages, we uncover the ways in which the initial

3 Section two offers a more detailed description of the fieldwork site and methods adopted.

compassionate impetus shifted to a will to improve the life of villagers over time. Research has shown how compassion initially motivated by ''pure intentions to help'' morphs into other facets. For example, Korf (2006) argues how such intentions slide into a ''consumption good'' where donors use various technologies because of expectations placed upon them to produce success (2006:246). We, in contrast, focus on how it is not merely the accomplishment of the project that matters, but also the production of particular images of village life. Abiding to their own frames of reference, private donors were keen to instil an ethos of improvement into Sri Lankan village life by invoking their own understanding of improvement and development. Hence, we argue that they discipline and guide villagers into a better life inverting the status quo, making ''the new villagers feel responsible for their village assets'' said Donor B (see also Li, 2007).

The temporality and politics of recovery (Hyndman, 2011), the multiple dilemmas and ambiguities embedded in the housing rebuilding process (Brun and Lund, 2008, 2009; Ruwanpura, 2009), the politics of memorialisation and purification (Simpson and de Alwis, 2008), the commodifying of good intentions (Korf et al., 2010), and the gendered world of post-tsunami spatial politics (De Mel, 2007; Ruwanpura, 2008) are well documented and researched topics in post-tsunami Sri Lanka. This literature emphasizes ways in which the reconstruction process is embedded within a wider political, cultural, social and cultural terrain of war, ethno-nationalism and uneven development. They point out that despite the mantra of 'building back better',[4] existing fault lines have been overlooked, creating and perpetuating stress and anxiety in an already fragmented social context. Hyndman (2011) in particular notes how disasters always occur within specific political situations, and that those countries most affected by disasters tend to suffer from both man made and natural disasters. In this context, the task of humanitarian aid is to focus not just on the relief but also on political futures since receiving countries also have certain agendas. In contrast to Hyndman's (2011) focus on the circuits of official aid exchange, our gaze shifts to philanthropists, themselves positioned outside official aid and its practices. We are interested in those whose purported aim is to help people in need. Our paper shows that since private aid givers are positioned within a political field, i.e. the aid business and the local political context, they too cannot avoid the existing fault lines.

Our discussion explores more closely the ways in which human interventions in the physical world – rebuilding villages – are also about the will to rebuild a Sri Lankan sociality (Li, 2007; Woost, 1994; Brow, 1990). Our case studies point to

4 This is espoused Sri Lankan government policy position on post-tsunami reconstruction efforts, and its policy contours traced elsewhere (Brun and Lund, 2009; Khasalamwa, 2009).

how discourses of compassion and moral cultural rhetoric elide into righteousness about improving village communities. Moreover, by scrutinizing the deployment of cultural and moral tropes by non-state actors, we highlight how these scripts also encompass individualist undertones. We show how emblematic models ''don't attempt to accommodate messy realities of pre-existing social and economic relations'' (Li, 1996:519), but are moreover subtle architects reifying a neo-liberal political economy. More specifically, post-tsunami Sri Lanka witnessed private individuals taking an active role in mobilizing the flow of foreign funds, which was unusual in the development landscape as non-accountable philanthropists were taking an active role in post-tsunami reconstruction. Rather than the state or NGOs, it was individuals who initially raised and disbursed funds. Logics of compassion hence were crucial in the nascent stages – striking a chord both with the aid givers, but also with the local communities. This script of compassion differs from Li's scholarship (2007). Similar to Li's (2007) research, however, these rhetorical devices eventually lapsed into a discourse on the will to improve communities, which also intersected with previous efforts of the Sri Lankan state to rebuild a nation of villages that harked back to a hegemonic vision of a mythical and glorious pre-colonial past (Woost, 1993; Brow, 1996). These registers invariably evoked Sinhala-Buddhist registers – which nearly three decades later were effortlessly resurfacing.

Wilful village construction and revitalizing the village community can be traced to colonial and immediate post-independence Sri Lanka, thus revealing a genealogical association with Sinhalanationalism (Woost, 1994; Brow, 1988). Uplifting rural communities was a tool of various political regimes (Woost, 1994; Brow, 1988). Villagers were used to the idea of revitalizing a ''Sri Lankan'' way of living in order to overcome a history of colonialism and oppression. Brow (1999) using the early works of Tambiah (1992) notes how post-colonial development efforts focused on creating a self-conscious society, which ''were believed to have flourished under the ancient kings'' (1999:68). The explicit task for the post-colonial state was to recreate imagined self-confident and harmonious villages, reinforcing hegemonic visions of nationhood. Pioneered through village-level housing constructions, which commonly came to be known as the gam udawa (village awakening) scheme in the 1980s, it became a politically expedient development strategy. Gam Udawa evoked Sri Lanka's glorious (Sinhala-Buddhist) nationalist past while registering its commitment to a path of development (Woost, 1993, 1994; Brow, 1988, 1996). A similar impetus lay behind the Accelerated Mahaweli Development Programme in the 1980s; tanks and temples were important metonyms for ''material prosperity and spiritual well-being, respectively'' and were placed alongside rebuilt housing communities for forcibly displaced villagers (Tennekoon, 1988:297).

The tsunami, by contrast, offered a catastrophic ''natural'' event necessitating the reconstruction and rebuilding of various coastal villages. In the post-tsunami period it is crucial to consider the ways in which a plethora of private donors, numerous non-governmental organizations, and international actors have taken on this mantle of national housing to boost villages. Brun and Lund (2009) offer an overview of Sri Lanka's ''One National Housing Policy'' (ONHP) and the ways in which land distribution politics and ethnic formations coloured these initiatives historically and in contemporary times. We analyze how compassionate discourses deployed by private individuals eventually coalesced with enduring nationalist visions of village life. From our fieldwork, we unravel the discursive strategies used by donor communities and other stakeholders' rehabilitating model village community schemes; a neglected topic in post-tsunami scholarship. The potent currency of nationalist development politics noted previously, honed in on state processes in the hegemonic formation of a nation of villages (Woost, 1994, 1993, Brow, 1988, 1990a, 1996). The important distinction is that this mantle now is taken on by individuals in post-tsunami Sri Lanka, where its will to compassion clouds a hegemonic vision.

2. Fieldwork in a nation of model villages

The village settings for our study are in southern Sri Lanka; one in the deep south 120 km from Colombo and 18 km inland; the second approximately 80 km south of Colombo and on the coastline. Research in both these locations began in 2005 (Hollenbach and Ruwanpura, 2011). Ruwanpura's fieldwork started as part of a larger project funded by UNIFEM (Ruwanpura, 2008, 2009) and entailed conducting in-depth and semi-structured interviews lasting 40 min to an hour with twenty villagers. Numerous fieldtrips during 2005–2008 continued with follow-up visits in 2009/2010 and early 2011 to sustain the relationships built with interviewees.

These frequent visits helped establish close familiarity with some villagers, with conversations in and out of their homes on various facets of village life and the activities of the institution. She also conducted 17 interviews with non-governmental organizations, local government officials, religious clergy and local activists to obtain a sense of the ways in which they operated in the area. On average these interviews approximated 45 min, with some of lasting as long as 2 h. Repeat interviews took place as well. These were supplemented during 2009/2011 by interviews with senior level project managers at ten multi-lateral agencies that eventually came to develop partnerships with the institution

initiated by the philanthropist. Prior social connections with the founder aided several lengthy formal interviews (lasting over an hour) and casual conversations on the plans and activities for rebuilding the village. They also offered easy access to project documents and interviews with five staff working for the institution. The frequency of visits and privileged access through social connections to the founder afforded the researcher personalised encounters and dialogues with the activities of the place in both formal and informal contexts. As a bi-lingual researcher, all interviews by the first author were conducted in either English or Sinhalese and recorded. The transcribing was done by a bilingual Research Assistant who was present at almost all interviews.

Similarly, Hollenbach shares an intimate association with the inland field site. She worked for two and a half years (2005– 2007) as project manager for the privately initiated housing project discussed in this paper. Afterwards, as an academic researcher she conducted fieldwork for a further 2 years (2008–2010) at the same site. During the research phase, semi-structured interviews were held with the three foreign project initiators, 15 senior personnel of the NGO managing the reconstruction site, 25 local politicians and bureaucrats. This research also included document analysis of donor meeting minutes and internal discussion papers. Because of the rapport built with housing recipients, it also became possible for her to understand the complex motivations of affected families who moved to the housing scheme and participated in village community workshops. Two Sri Lankan researchers helped her to interview 62 villagers and to conduct five focus groups. These were translated and transcribed by Research Assistants, as all were done in Sinhalese – of which Hollenbach has a working knowledge. As a bi-lingual speaker, all other interviews were the sole responsibility of the second author – which were recorded and transcribed.

At all times the respondents were made aware that these conversations will be used for research and fieldwork analysis, guaranteeing their anonymity, hence we have concealed the names of the villages. Our fieldwork did not involve long periods of habitation in the villages – as both Woost (1994, 1990) and Brow (1988, 1990) have done with their situated ethnographic research, which captures the fine grain of village life. However, because we were both very close to the founders of the project, we are able to illuminate findings based on more than mere formal interviews. In other words, the insights gained through interviews and personal conversations offered the chance to interrogate the slippage between rhetoric and ideas that was not otherwise easily available to researchers. So while we do not make claims of knowing everyday village life as Woost (1994, 1990) and Brow (1988, 1990) do, we find ourselves in a position to capture the fine grain of village life across different scales of thinking, particularly where the founder and donors claimed to ‘know better’ about good community life in Sri Lanka.

3. Model village(s): Ownership and construction

houses built are seemingly high calibre and aesthetically pleasing. There is an order to the village plans; the houses are neatly interspaced in equal measure, decoratively painted, with eye-catching brickwork and tiled porches and pretty front gardens. The villages are not simply visual. The establishment of community halls, libraries, medical facilities, playgrounds, and village squares was also a crucial dimension to the physical erection of these model villages, even though these were not facilities previously available. Such efforts reflect what Woost (1994) notes as a ''floor plan for the ideal village'' (1994:79; see also Li, 1996:518–519). The programmatic aspects to the reconstruction then shows how donors draw on what they believe is 'good' for those receiving 'their' help and ''they occupy the position of trustees, a position defined by the claim to know how others should live, to know what is best for them, to know what they need'' (Li, 2007:4).

Though there are differences between our field sites – one is a foreign donor-driven initiative and the other a local private philanthropic scheme operationalized through urban and foreign networks, there are important overlaps between them which the following analysis will focus upon. This analysis is concerned to outline the modus operandi of the villages to show the ways in which reconstruction efforts came into being. We start, however, by showing through tabulated evidence the key features of the two village rebuilding projects.

	Local village (L-village)	Foreign village (F-village)
Location	Southern Province, on the Galle Road	Southern Province, 20 km off Galle Road
Initiators	Local person with natal connections to the village and previous charity work in the area. Initial funds sought through private individuals, with established corporate and international donors getting involved afterwards.	Four German private donors funded through private and official donations
Size	600 houses	90 houses
Construction/ funding period	2006–2010	20016-2009

Information on villages

The foreign donor driven project came into existence through the initiative of four foreign individuals with long-standing relations to Sri Lanka. After the tsunami, they instigated a high-profile fund raising project from an assemblage of institutional actors in their home country. A national-level ministry, local branches of international service clubs, volunteer organizations, and large scale foundations with the mission of promoting, peace, development and democracy were all involved.[5] Leading figures were directly involved and were motivated to implement a ''good'' project to improve the situation and lives of tsunami-affected people permanently and sustainably. ''We felt the need to help, as we lived and worked in this beautiful country for such a long time; and our friends were helpless. We had an obligation and felt responsible to help and give'' said one donor, while another noted ''It was a good opportunity to re-establish our working relationship to Sri Lanka and continue the partnership with the country. After a couple of years we were able to implement a project, we could legitimize and get funding from the local government''. In contrast to previous times where development is framed as restoring an ancient, mythical and glorious past not influenced by western concepts of living (Woost, 1993:505; see also Brow, 1996), the idioms deployed attempted to reflect the befallen calamity.

After several visits and conversations with local partners, donors assessed the demand for houses as a priority. This led to the conception of creating a new village for tsunami-affected communities from the Galle area, where they hoped to instil ''a new way of living''. Eco-friendly housing and living was an underlying premise reflecting the interest of the Ministry involved: ''we need to focus on eco-friendly aspects as we had to legitimize the funds within the portfolio of the Ministry''. Core to the eco-friendly vision were: eco-friendly construction materials, minimizing electricity consumption per unit, instituting better sewage tanks to recycle waste water, re-forestation of the village area, and waste water management. To be holistic in their 'model' it was important in donors' understanding to implement a new community self-administration system where villagers were to take more responsibility and ownership to secure developmental sustainability (see also Li, 2007). The way philanthropists defined better community life shows that they were influenced by their knowledge of eco-friendly construction, community organization, and by preconditions given by the Ministry. Suggestions on self-governing were based on community self-governing systems of the federal state of their native country. This clearly reflects how ''[t]

5 The issues raised in this paper are not necessarily about the particularities of the organizations per se as much as much as the particularities of the Sri Lankan social hierarchy and political economy fabric which enables the existence of social practices which gets evaluated in this article. We call the village which came through direct foreign intervention the 'Foreign Village' (F-Village) and the other the 'Local Village' (L-Village). This binary categorization is used for ease rather than to connote a parochial reading of difference between the foreign and the local.

he identification of a problem is intimately linked to the availability of a solution... experts are trained to frame problems in technical terms...their claim to expertise depends on their capacity to diagnose problems in ways that match the kinds of solutions that fall within their repertoire'' (Li, 2007: 7). Self-administration echoed with past state-led initiatives, with routines motivated in ''the dominant quest to redefine village society'' where ''covert efforts to restructure the habitus'' are constantly invoked (Woost, 1993:82; see also Bourdieu, 1977). To identify potential beneficiaries, surveys were undertaken in order to pick the 'right eligible' person. As Li (2007) notes, ''planned development is premised upon the improvability of the 'target group'', where ''deficient subjects can be identified and improved only from the outside'' (2007: 15). According to a principal coordinator the surveys helped to get a ''proper mix of Sri Lankan society together'' and prevent the risk of, in their words, a ''squatter village or slum''. The eco-friendly village emphasis was congruent with the latest environmental discourses and an apparent social justice concern for ''promoting the moral and material welfare of the poor'' (Brow, 1988:318). This drive, however, is undergirded by interpellations of the ''deserving poor'', which attempts to thwart undesirable manifestations of an idealized village community.

Responsibility and ownership by the villagers was crucial to the success of the 'model' village. Yet, the donor group identified that the planning and implementing capacity of the Sri Lankan partners would be insufficient to ''properly'' transfer all the ideas into this new village. Therefore, a knowledgeable implementing partner had to be found. An international NGO was given the mandate of identifying appropriate land in Southern Sri Lanka and consultating with a close Southern political figure. An old rubber and tea estate in the interior of Galle was ear-marked because of its proximity to the Southern Expressway, which they told villagers opened new socio-economic vistas.

In contrast the momentum for the other field site came ''locally''. The philanthropic institution was initially involved in charitable activity in a small village enveloped between Ambalangoda and Hikkaduwa for approximately 10 years prior to the tsunami. It started off as a one-person led initiative seeking to contribute to a parental village from which the founder came (from a family of privilege unlike other villagers). With an educated legal professional as a father, the founder was from the English-speaking village elite. Though mostly Colombo-educated, his parental family resided in the village. After inheriting the parental home, he tore it down and rebuilt a tropical home making ample use of the spacious land, coconut palm trees, the nearby beach breeze and local vegetation. The newly built residence was used as a holiday home, hosting a swimming pool, tennis courts, and basket ball courts. The new abode was a symbol of luxury, wealth, and privilege in a village-community which is dotted with small cadjan houses. Yet, the

founder claimed a social conscious, noting ''....I'm going to my roots where my father and mother came from. And I have gone and
[I] basically work....for the good of the people in the region.'' Here too the trusteeship, of which Li (2007) reminds us is invoked, with a twist of claims to 'authenticity' given that the village is the founders natal village. This was no 'external' intrusion. Instead the initiation emerges from apparently well-grounded internal and local interest, if only one was to ignore class dynamics which create propitious conditions for one group of people to ''do good'' towards others (see also Korf, 2006). The tsunami offered him the opportunity to transform these moral aspirations into new ambitions.

The holiday home with its spaces of leisure was destroyed by the tsunami. The founder survived because he was at the local Buddhist temple, which was on a higher elevation made of large granite rocks. After the tsunami waves had receded and a few days later, when the founder returned to the village and his holiday home the destruction was monumental. His network of Colombo-based friends and family mobilized to start cleaning up operations. He also used his skills and capabilities to tap into the deluge of donations, which had started pouring into post-tsunami Sri Lanka. He accepted that the first step to rebuilding the village was to clean/clear-up the debris and dead bodies from the physical destruction. After this clean-up, the next step involved starting to rebuild the houses. This required not just available voluntary help, but also financial help, architectural input, and planning. These all came from urban-based English-speaking middle classes. Individual assistance and social connections mattered here too in the immediate aftermath. Financial goodwill found in the immediate post-tsunami period came not just from the donors, but also from the Sri Lankan diasporic community. Quite astutely, the founder used his networks existing at multiple scales to channel resources into rebuilding houses and homes for those whose homes had been destroyed by the tsunami. The 'indigenous' knowledge was his vital asset. Initially he drew upon resources from a network of friends, later he tapped on bi-lateral aid donors in his will to improve village life. His ability to make claims on behalf of his natal village, despite his distinctly different socio-economic standing, offered him an ''insider's'' legitimacy that he did not need to create from scratch (see also Li, 2007: 176).

The initial phase was modest: to rebuild the partially destroyed homes of families who had lost a breadwinner. Afterwards, the goodwill of private individuals (mostly from the diaspora) enabled funds to rebuild houses on a larger scale. The motivation to envision a rebuilding scheme was only dreamt of in his earlier philanthropic activities: ''But for me, if I look back ten years ago – just planting the seed with purity of intention to help people compassionately has taken me to an extreme level of establishing what I dream of in the most unfortunate

of circumstances, of course, by way of a tragic tsunami. But I have made that huge setback into a blessing.'' In Sri Lanka's long history of restoring villages, individual participation in the development project in the search for utopian communities is, however, not novel (Brow, 1999, Woost, 1993). It offers the chance to construct and recreate ''an image of society that modifies and represent ideological elements of both past and present'' (Woost, 1993:506). By evoking tropes of compassion and kindness, the founder was citing Buddhist culture as the moral compass precipitating action in reconstructing a village after a catastrophe. The mobilization of dominant themes opportune for the time augmented the probability of effected communities and people recognizing ''themselves in the forms of address contained in those discourses'' (Woost, 1993:506; see also Brow, 1988:322; Li, 1996). Unlike in the past, where it was state-led official rhetoric that papered ''over cracks and cleavages'' and bound people through articulations of Buddhist idioms in Sri Lanka (Brow, 1990:9), in the post-tsunami landscape this mantle was increasingly taken on by philanthropists and non-governmental organizations.[6] While the Sri Lankan state is not quite in retreat (Hyndman, 2011; Jazeel and Ruwanpura, 2009), the space for individual actors – unelected and unaccountable – was on the rise. Moreover, the lip service paid to Sinhala-Buddhist rhetoric in a country besieged by a three decade ethno-nationalist conflict was ignored by the donor community in its eagerness to embrace development activity via the philanthropic and non-governmental sector. Holding non-state actors and philanthropists culpable for the dangers of deploying Buddhist idioms via development projects was less of a concern for the corporate and donor community than celebrating the 'successes' of doing productive development work with the non-state. The neo-liberal development ideology of rewarding performance by the non-state sector was more fundamental than being concerned with the pernicious effects of Sinhala-Buddhist ideology (see also Li, 2007:239–243). When the first author interviewed USAID and World Bank officials on the potential problems of being involved with nonstate actors peddling Buddhist idioms through their development work in a context of an on-going and prolonged ethno-conflict, they deftly avoided responding to the query. Slippages between ideological frames of reference and its potential dangers were rarely registers of concern; as Li (2007) notes: ''Trustees cannot addressindeed, may not acknowledge-the contradictory forces with which they are engaged.... Capitalism and improvement are locked in an awkward embrace'' (2007: 21), despite other existing political realities in a war-ravaged and staunchly ethno-nationalist Sri Lanka.

6 Hyndman (2011) reminds how geopolitical shifts and stresses on aid effectiveness also meant donors becoming more entrusting of ''neutral'' NGOs and civil society and sometimes working only with this sector (2011:877).

An inflow of a steady stream of funds meant re-imagining a rebuilt village emblematic of an idyllic community. Two room houses were built with small, beautified garden patches for each recipient family. Within the village, each house was separated with low-level brick, hedge or picket fences that cordoned off individuals properties. Whilst initially the houses built were single storied, over the years two-storied houses were built as well. Shortage of land did not pose an insurmountable problem because donorfunding was not lacking. Hence building two-tiered houses was a logical step in the reconstruction process; it also signalled to donors' bold thinking by the institution. Moreover, so long as it paid attention to systems, donors were attracted to working together with such NGOs. As the founder put it: ''There are donors, don't get me wrong, who like to be associated with projects...where there are systems and discipline.... You plan your work and work your plan; that is a simple thing...that should be the agenda.'' The vectors of success had merged into plans, systems and disciplining with barely a reflection on the impetus of compassion that led to aid waves in the first place.

Eventual support from corporate entities and state-level donors led to each institutional benefactor becoming responsible for smaller communes within the village. Today there are many smaller compounds with names designating the corporate or donor-named sub-villages within the local village. This donor imprint on 'model' villages exists in both situations. For the foreign donor driven scheme, the new village name starts with the name of the donor country, while for the locally initiated 'model' community, the donor and corporate imprints are on recently created sub-villages.

Despite the rhetoric of ownership by local communities, the interest of the villagers, and language of sustainability, the imprint of ''my/our'' model is an integral component of reconstruction efforts. Stewardship and the self-assurance of knowing which comes with it underscored the activities of both the local and foreign donors. It reflected what Li (2007) notes as trustees intervening in social relations ''in order to adjust them'' while pulling them together from ''an existing repertoire, a matter of habit, accretion and bricolage'' (2007:6). However, we show how this aim, in the post-tsunami landscape, is taken up by non-state mediators, and how emerging ideological frames are not subject to scrutiny as the state is.

4. A new kind of rural development – Planning an ideal village

In L-village, the founder portrays himself as a local figure, albeit from the English-speaking upwardly mobile class and with necessary networks to make a socially conscious difference. Post-tsunami, the philanthropic institution's goals shifted

from offering temporary shelter to rebuilding partially destroyed houses, and then to constructing sub-village compounds for the affected. Currently it has rebuilt approximately 600 damaged and new houses, cited as testimony to its resounding accomplishments. As the success of plans shifted from one scale to another, the funding altered from individual members of the diaspora to corporate and foreign donors. Accordingly, the official status evolved from a one-man charitable institution to a legally recognized non-governmental organization (NGO).[7] At all times, however, the village and smaller sub-community compounds were designed by a Colombo-based architect with village needs assessed by committees made up of Colombo-based friends and relatives. The preparation of the main needs of the community and the designing of the village was all undertaken elsewhere. As Woost (1994) reminds us, the urban elite have a mental image of a typical village, which may not necessarily resonate with the messy community and spatial formations on the ground (see also Scott, 1990; Li, 1996). The legitimacy the founder and the philanthropic institution drew upon was a narrative of being a ''local'' institution seeking to empower poverty-ridden communities in a holistic manner.

Reflecting the urban biases of the Colombo-based elite, the ''ideal'' village and the smaller compounds are planned to have hubs, such as libraries, learning and activities centres, employment generating units and shops (see also Woost, 1994). The entire village is served by a 'centre of excellence' which is the former destroyed residence-turned-holiday home. It hosts ten sectors of activity, ranging from women's entrepreneurial training to artisan production and a healthcare centre in which villagers apply and seek appointments to participate. A memorial to dead members of the village community is installed at the centre with episodes of consternation amongst some villagers (see Simpson and De Alwis, 2008).

The centre does not institute an open-door policy. The gates to it are manned by security and those entering the premises need a reason for doing so. Prior appointments can be made to meet project staff, health sector workers and/or participate at the weekly classes inside the centre; in the words of the founder, the emphasis was on ''leading by example with strict rules and regulations.'' Orderly conduct is a key attribute instilled through participation and any sense of accessing it in a leisurely way, as most villagers would familiar with, is not encouraged. In the case of Sulawesi border-park villagers, Li (2007) notes how ''villagers were to be true to themselves, while also conforming to new requirements'' (2007:132). A similar expectation was instilled through the changes instituted with getting appointments and orderly entrancing to the

7 This was because attracting funding from foreign governments was feasible only with NGO-status.

Centre.[8] Importantly, the language of the founder changed regarding the activities offered by the Centre. In the immediate posttsunami period, the founder spoke of the skills training offered to the villagers by the centres – initially one but by now three dotted around the village or boundary villages. In more recent times, the founder speaks of 'empowerment' of villagers via skills training. Shifting the jargon to suit the development rhetoric of the donor community is clearly vital to his ability to expand to be able to continue to be treated as a serious trustee with commitment to not just local needs, but also global development discourses.

The building of the main centre itself concretizes a spatial and social division: areas designed for village community activities and hosting the philanthropic organization's project office are accessible to villagers by appointment. Meanwhile, the lavish rear of the building, a holiday and residential quarter complete with swimming pool, is reserved for visiting dignitaries, friends, family and similarly socially connected people. This is a space creatively carved out as a distinct area which separates the rural people, permitted entrance only as domestic workers, from the mostly Colombo-based and foreign visitors to the reconstructed village.

Was this a new kind-of rural planning implemented in practice? In F-village when the foreign donor driven project selected its site, there was no prior consultation with recipients, local authorities or other associated bodies aware of local housing matters. Even when the details among different partners were clarified regarding implementing an 'eco-friendly housing model' and a MOU signed in October 2005, the government instituted Tsunami authorities were not involved. Partially the donor group sidelined official authorities because they ranked their linkages with local political officials and partners highly. Formal bodies were a trivial detail. When the decision to implement the project via an international NGO was made, links with official relief structures were mobilized. At this point, the NGO registered the project with TAFREN (Task Force to Rebuilding the Nation)/ RADA (Reconstruction and Development Agency), so that it became an official tsunami housing scheme. In reality, however, the political influence of local political figures and authorities was more crucial in creating a 'model' project as it helped bypass established state policy for sake of punctuality. For instance, the slowness of a local government official to make decisions resulted in a donor calling a political friend to impel quick action in the decision-making process: ''You know, if things are not moving you should let us know; we will use our contacts to pressure the local authorities to work faster. We can not have more delays in the implementation process, we need to show success ...We made promises... we need to fulfil these promises.'' By this time, the matter of showing success

8 Gated entrances to the homes of village elite have been in place over decades in the village; this was merely a reinforcement of class and place in the location (Hollenbach and Ruwanpura, 2011).

and delivering on promises was the driving force – and the political expediency of 'will to improve', rather than compassion, had taken the upper-hand. Post-tsunami housing schemes and their practices were much messier on the ground, embedded as they were in the politics of access and privilege over and above those discrepancies already examined (Brun and Lund, 2009).

Once the NGO signed up with TAFREN/RADA, they strictly followed all rules introduced by local authorities. The size of the house, the minimum space between structures, the size of roads, and all other standards regarding post-tsunami housing policy were taken into consideration. The projected task was to build 90 new houses with an emphasis on individual gardens designed by an architect native to the donor country. The donors demanded building a kindergarten, a library, a medical facility, a playground, shops, a bakery,[9] a village square and a community hall alongside the houses. The structuring was similar to villages of the donor country where the community hall is located at the centre of the village. This was the space where people meet, come together, communicate and create a ''peaceful'' living environment. Representing village communities through an emphasis on ''harmony, equality and tradition'' was a critical device in giving meaning to these schemes (Li, 1996:502). Planning for the perfect community, however, was undergirded by constraints of timing and success: ''...we have to start the project now as we have to show progress to the financial backers in the host country. The identification of beneficiaries is important, I know, but we cannot discuss more details about the project. We have to start construction!'' The ideal village where people were supposed to take responsibility for its sustenance was planned and constructed without considering who this group was. There was thus no issue about sidelining their interests and wishes.

The scales at which both post-tsunami village building schemes have taken place is significant and impressive. Yet the quest to build ideal villages is a story about the ability of a group to instil and promote particular values, revealing the degree to which improving the human condition is always pervaded by modern impulses. More critically, however, there is another shift taking place. No longer are these initiatives solely the purview of the state (Woost, 1993, 1994; Brow, 1988, 1990). The current juncture has also led to private people and groups seeing it as their unquestioning responsibility to implement and instil changes perceived as bettering deserving people. This drive is starkly apparent in the ways in which the village layout resonated with each donor's notion of rural community ordering (Li, 1996). Detailed neighbourhood practices show how planned efforts did not always go as intended. It thus shows that even as the sliding from compassion to the

9 The bakery is reflective of the critical role bread plays in the donor country, where a local bakery is a present in most village settings.

will to improve lead to powerful efforts at village reordering (Li, 1996:504), lived realities of village community life also need documentation.

5. From idyllic villages to everyday living

The restructured L-village with its sub-communes was aflood with road names and sub-village names recently given to signify the renovated and newly built homes' connection to the numerous corporate and donor associations. Within the main village there is a plethora of other sub-villages with distinctive flavours connoting ownership to the donor community, for example Victoria Gardens, AVIVA village and Perth village. Beyond signposts, the layouts resonate with donor images of idyllic communes. Walking through Perth village one comes across small and pretty garden path with street lamps fashioned after old gas lamps, lighting the way into a small and seemingly cosy community of 6–7 houses. Victoria Gardens is designed with a tarred road, which has a children's playground in the midst of 84 two-storied houses, a novelty and rarity in any Sri Lankan village.

The local unit is actively involved in attempting to maintain an idealized vision of a village community. Hence 9 years after the tsunami there is still great effort and commitment to maintain this.

However, both the donor and several villagers conceded that efforts to beautify and keep individual home gardens and paths through a scheme of awarding a monthly prize with dry food rations had been abandoned because of costs involved with giving prizes and monitoring and judging best gardens. The lack of interest on the part of the villagers was also a contributory factor. A villager said ''Mahathaya (the gentleman) thinks that we have the time to be looking after home gardens. He does not realize that we are [too] busy trying to eke a living to have the time to be gardening and beautifying our premises.'' A woman said ''It is not as if we Sri Lankan's are known to be unclean people; we sweep the garden and keep our premises clean. We just don't have the time to take the extra effort to be keeping flower beds and planting new plants.'' Their reactions were grounded in the everyday of their lives with economic pressures and material discomforts being prominent concerns. The inevitability of the ''gap between what is attempted and what is accomplished'' is not merely because ''the will is stubborn'' (Li, 2007:1). It is also because the persistence of material deprivation and class inequality thwarts these efforts, thus making villagers have different sets of priorities from those who are will a distinct improvement.

Villagers also had a different understanding of space. Where architects built bathrooms and toilets into the houses they designed, villagers turned those bathrooms into storerooms or a spare room, prioritizing funds toward building

a new toilet outside, separate from their new homes – constraining even further their rather small rear compounds. The villagers expressed their strongest displeasure with this new feature. One villager simply put it thus: ''Toilets shouldn't be in the house. Everything that goes on in there can be heard – how civilized is that?'' Additionally, laundry lines in front gardens – initially forbidden – and vegetable patches and small cash crop cultivations greeted us on subsequent field visits in place of flowerbeds. Village life lived is chaotic, grounded, and with rough edges.

In F-village the central meeting office is the dominant building in the square and it houses the grama niladari's office, kindergarten, library, etc. According to a donor ''This should be the place where people meet, where life happens... the villagers have to organize a weekly-market and all the people can meet here and exchange''. The space was planned with a large market place and several benches placed around the public space. One donor said ''I imagine in couple of years if all the trees are big and there is enough shadow, then people will sit here talk and meet''. Benches were also placed along the hilly area where several stairs connect the lower with the upper part of the village. Walking down the stairs in 2011, the benches exist but the anticipated view of the surrounding area is obscured by the woods because of neglect. Asking the villagers about this set-up, one woman recently (February 2011) noted, ''You know we are not using these things... now the benches are more a meeting place for the young boys drinking and smoking without us seeing them... You can go there and you always find bottles and cigarettes... we actually do not like to go there with our small children, it is not nice''. Moreover, the publicly situated benches are unused because the trees planted alongside haven't grown fully, hence anyone using it is exposed to the hot sun.

Another characteristic eco-friendly concept was to put up public dustbins to keep public spaces clean and waste free. During several community meetings the concept was explained, and villagers were asked to set up a volunteer group to encourage recycling disposed waste. Today, the dustbins are rare. When villagers were queried, they stressed ''You know the people did throw their waste anywhere and did not put these into the bins. Then young boys started to break them... some are in the Presidents' office, you can see them if you like...some people took them to their house and use them for private waste. Also the waste collection never really started, we still burn all our waste''. While the villagers are aware of expectations placed on them and how they were supposed to be disciplined into, in this instance, a version of environmentally-conscious citizens, they continue to use the village in ways consonant with everyday life as they know it (Scott, 1990). This failure of ''reorganization 'educated' by development discourse and practice'' suggests how ''contradictory sedimentation of knowledge... and contextualized

judgements about practical experience in everyday life'' occur (Woost, 1993:516). At first glance the village is idyllic with lush surroundings that offer a feeling of being apart from city-life. The wild foliage, rubber trees and tea estates dominate the backdrop. Since the public spaces are no longer well maintained, nature creeps into spaces originally planned as playgrounds, meetings areas or community gardens. Village life becomes disorganized not simply because of the everyday lives of villagers, but also because the environment defines it to reflect practices found on the ground.

In both villages, the libraries and community halls were sporadically used. In order to protect books, the persons assigned to keep the libraries secure tended to be stingy and were reluctant to loan or had strict hours of operation. This reflected both the ways that those with some influence acted, entrenching their social position within the village and leading to disquiet amongst others (see also Brow, 1996); or as levers managing accessibility to public facilities, values that varied from village norms were instilled. While the medical facilities are used, in F-village a medical practitioner has a private clinic in operation, in L-village volunteer medical practitioners work only over the weekends. The gradual privatization of healthcare facilities has become slowly instituted through these initiatives. These shifts are worthwhile noting because of the disjuncture between what was attempted and what has transpired; sometimes in keeping with the script and at other times incurring unexpected shifts. The effects of interventions, as Li (2007) reminds us, are always ''contingent and diverse'' (2007:272).

These built communes signal foreign and corporate donor interventions and hence their claim on these villages, rather than necessarily how locals structure their village compounds to reflect their lived social community. Woost (1994) reminds us that often Sri Lankan villages are ''loose conglomerates of homesteads dispersed''; in his case throughout the jungle, in our case diffused on the coastline and in the immediate interior. Indeed it did not seem that the local villagers had any say, save for the colours used to paint their houses, in designing or redesigning the villages. The founder, elite and English-speaking, was the ''local'' mediator deploying donor-friendly language who negotiated funding and reconstruction plans on behalf of the village. The donor village similarly was striking the correct chords in using the lingua franca of environmentalism that reverberated in the two countries. In both instances, at one scale it was his/their village at incipient stages of the process; later, the villagers redefined their space – shaped by their everyday situations and material realities.

6. The slippery slope between compassion and the will to improve

Both initiatives presented here departed from village development terrains where tragic circumstances wrought by the tsunami necessitated compassion and kindness towards the other, whether distant or otherwise. The discourses of compassion, goodness, and kindness were paramount for accentuating the gravity of post-tsunami Sri Lanka, with catastrophic tsunami images not needing too much effort on the part of fund raisers to capture the attention of the munificent (Telford and Cosgrave, 2007). Korf (2006) points out that when the attention shifted to ''our'' generosity, creating narratives around the compassion to help acted as important catalysts creating empathy in the Western world. Using these tropes, however, comes with a price. Aid practices get tailored according to the will of the donor, where their primary interest is in flourishing donations rather than necessarily listening to what the local recipients may most need (2006:246). Yet, enveloping this discourse was also donor recognition that an opportunity was created with a seeming clean slate, and a mandate to 'build back better', as official tsunami housing policy states. This momentum underlined efforts to exemplify innovative rural development, a reoccurring theme in Sri Lanka's development landscape (Woost, 1994; Brow, 1988, 1996), but one which continuously neglects class dynamics and social hierarchies or rural communities (Caron and Da Costa, 2007). The distinction this time was that philanthropists and non-state actors were in full force, while the structural sources of inequality continued to be hidden from view (Li, 2007:275; see also Korf et al., 2010).

Tropes of compassion and kindness were important to mobilize donor and philanthropic funding. Their import also lies in the ways such discourses engage villagers in a culturally familiar language. Thus, as beneficiaries moving into reconstituted villages, villagers found a semblance of coherence and recognition in the moral tropes used given its resonance with the proverbial. By documenting how the deployments of cultural idioms (compassion) cloak moral imperatives, we have shown how individual donors and non-governmental organizations take upon themselves the quest for uplifting villagers. We show the need to trace the discursive strategies of authoritative sources as they hit the ground. Li (1996) notes how competing visions of community offers space for imagining alternatives, whilst reminding us that ''the attempt to catalogue tradition and locate an authoritative source able to represent 'the community'... leads to simplifications inevitably ridden with power, as articulate spokesmen.... overlook ambiguities in ... indigenous terms and practices'' (1996:508). The tsunami offered a space to rejuvenate these authoritative voices – whether they are the voices of local elites committed to socially-motivated betterment, or those of foreign donors with ties to Sri Lanka who envisioned harmonious village life.

Good intentions are not value-free. A veiled script reveals how values of individual responsibility are inculcated and how outsiders attempt to rectify what they perceived tsunami-affected villagers to be lacking. As Cruikshank writes, ''citizens are not born; they are made...[that explains] the political significance of the ways social scientific knowledge is operationalized in techniques, programs, and strategies for governing, shaping, and guiding those who are held to exhibit some specific lack'' (1999: 3). Bettering post-tsunami village life carries with it the connotation that the deficits of village life needed correcting. The assumption was that intervening outsiders would decide how to improve it for them without considering the need for redistributive social justice. Li (2007) reminds us that ''the objective of trusteeship is not to dominate others-it is to enhance their capacity for action, and to direct it. ... Their intentions are benevolent, even utopian. They desire to make the world better than it is. Their methods are subtle... They structure a field of possible actions. They entice and induce'' (2007:5). Similarly, in post-tsunami Sri Lanka the rejuvenation was not merely limited to re/building new homes. It also consists of self-contained and prototype village layouts, with access to various skill training programmes.[10] This phase of restitution had a natural event as a catalyst and hence was distinct from preceding periods of village awakening schemes in which the state forced action (Woost, 1994, 1993; Brow, 1990, 1988). Consequently, it ''blend[s] seamlessly into common sense'' (Li, 2007:5) with a historical trajectory already in existence in Sri Lanka, made more urgent by a ''natural'' disaster. Yet it is a backdrop no less worthy of scrutiny. The development state is dissected for its entanglements, retreat, interference, visibility, or violence (Hyndman, 2011; Jeffrey, 2007; Brow, 1996). Yet the growing presence of local and foreign philanthropists in new realms have escaped critical gaze in post-tsunami scholarship. Our intervention modestly attempts to fill this gap. As new agents of development, philanthropists and non-state donors are engaged in a politics of representation that does not simply defy quotidian conditions on the ground, but also reifies a particular version of political economy (see also Hyndman, 2011; Brow, 1996). The villagers themselves did go about their lives as they found fit.[11] Our foci, however, calls for reengaging moral tropes that are utilized by non-state agents to sustain a script pervaded by individualist undertones.

10 With limited rural employment opportunities, the value of these training schemes beggars belief.
11 In this regard, the ways in which new governance regimes attempts and failures at disciplining local communities into a better world in post-tsunami Sri Lanka needs further research.

7. Conclusion

Logics of compassion were critical for generating aid in posttsunami Sri Lanka. Tracking the moralities of the compassionate discourses of independent donors has highlighted that village planning continues to be governed by principles of modernization (Li, 2007). Crucially, we have traced how privileged philanthropists perpetuated hegemonic and nationalist visions of model villages, whereby individual responsibility was also encouraged. Non-state agencies are increasingly the preferred development partners, where they deftly deploy culturally sensitive tropes in a neo-liberal landscape (Hyndman, 2011). Yet our paper calls for examining the manner in which their actions are also about subtly shifting social relations favourable to neo-liberal incursions into village life, which we also contend bears upon nationalist politics. While we see the state (Jeffrey, 2007), we also need to see the non-state and its increasing role in development interventions to more fully appreciate its entanglements, intercession, gentle violence and culpability in social life. More specifically, we have shown how individual donors used their personal connections with politicians and high-profile bureaucrats to outwit state/non-state procedures so as to achieve their vision. Excavating the everyday violence perpetrated suggests how we need to pay careful attention to the emerging role of philanthropists and their increasing role in development interventions.

Improving village communities and rural development schemes of all sorts was the purview of colonial administrators, the state and multi-lateral organizations – whether in Sri Lanka or other regions in the Global South (Li, 2007; Woost, 1994; Brow, 1990, 1988). What we have illustrated is how this trusteeship is changing hands to philanthropists and non-state actors in post-tsunami Sri Lanka, albeit without the same level of analysis it deserves. The emergence of this new assembly of trustees equally needs unpacking since intervention schemes are ''fragments of reality....(which) signal new ways in which social forces can be bounded and dissected'' (Li, 2007:277; see also Hyndman, 2011). The absence of the state in these instances may not necessarily lead to ''anarchy, poverty and despair'' (ibid 280), but rather results in non-state agencies stepping up its role without much scrutiny. Our concern then is that social hierarchies are reinforced despite the mobilization of localism, culture, responsibility and sustainability with a seeming concern for social justice. Such rhetoric deflects attention from grounded political-economic relations, where producing responsible villagers depoliticizes their existing subjectivities and neglects prevailing social relations at the village scale.

For post-tsunami Sri Lanka we have revealed how political economic relations are simultaneously implicated and yet elided in the shift from the discursive tropes of compassion in the advent of disaster to the will to improve. Villagers are not necessarily trapped in their new settings or unafraid to draw attention to the materially frenzied nature of their lives. Yet it is also the case that constellations of power at certain junctures need not necessarily lead to imaginative alternatives. The interpellation of religious and moral mores during disasters to assist affected others are compassionate gesticulations, but when taken to the scale of willing communities to improve, such schemes expose an underbelly where the political economy matters. The moral of the story remains thus: Compassion ultimately does not rid social relations of material inequality and class discrepancies. These can only be addressed through redistributive social justice.

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Part 3
Annex

Annex 1

Table 1: Tsunami affected Provinces by District, DS and GN Division

Province	District	DS Division Total Number	DS Division affected (% of total)
Eastern	Apmara	20	10 (50%)
	Batticaloa	14	8 (57%)
	Trincomalee	11	6 (54%)
Northern	Jaffna	16	2 (13%)
	Kilinochchi	4	3 (75 %)
	Mullaitivu	5	1 (20%)
Southern	Galle	18	6 (33%)
	Hambantota	11	4 (36%)
	Matara	16	3 (19%)
Western	Colombo	13	5 (38%)
	Gampaha	13	2 (15%)
	Kalutara	14	3 (21%)
North-Western	Putalam	16	1 (6%)
Overall total			**35**

GN Division Total Number	GN Division affected (% of total)
507	124 (24%)
348	68 (20%)
230	55 (24%)
435	31 (7%)
95	9 (9%)
127	18 (14%)
895	132 (15%)
576	33 (8%)
650	71 (11%)
557	30 (5%)
1177	13 (1%)
762	54 (7%)
548	1 (0,2%)
	639

Source: Department of Census and Statistics, 2005

Annex 1

Table 2: Number of Tsunami affected population by Province and District

Province	District	Dead	Injured	Displaced
Eastern	Apmara	10.436	5.762	75.172
	Batticaloa	2.840	1.925	61.912
	Trincomalee	1.078	1.426	81.643
In Total		**14. 354**	**9.113**	**218.727**
Northern	Jaffna	2.640	1.775	39.907
	Kilinochchi	590	3	1.603
	Mullaitivu	3.000	3.904	22.557
In Total		6.230	**5.682**	**64.067**
Southern	Galle	4.214	3.564	128.077
	Hambantota	4.500	1.236	17.723
	Matara	1.342	3.654	13.305
In Total		**10.056**	**8.454**	**159.105**
Western	Colombo	79	452	31.239
	Gampaha	6	109	1.449
	Kalutara	256	711	27.713
In Total		**341**	**1.272**	**60.401**
North-Western	Putalam	4	-	66
In Total		**4**	-	**66**
Overall total		**30.985**	**16.067**	**502.366**

Source: Department of Census and Statistics, 2005

Table 3: Number of Tsunami damaged Housing Units by Province and District

Province	District	Completely Damaged	Partially Damaged (unusable)	Partially Damaged (usable)	Total
Eastern	Apmara	9.573	2.792	8.836	21.201
	Batticaloa	5.487	1.955	6.429	13.871
	Trincomalee	4.691	1.037	3.646	9.374
In Total		**19.751**	**5.784**	**18.911**	**44.446**
Southern	Galle	4.885	1.115	6.645	12.645
	Matara	1.804	708	4.042	6.554
	Hambantota	1.218	304	1.019	2.541
In Total		**7.907**	**2.127**	**11.706**	**21.740**
Nothern	Mullaitivu	4.564	627	509	5.700
	Jaffna	3.819	291	2.099	6.209
	Kilinochchi	294	-	-	294
In Total		**8.677**	**918**	**2.608**	**12.203**
Western	Colombo	3.313	646	3.039	6.998
	Kalutara	2.386	512	3.799	6.697
	Gampaha	290	87	629	1.006
In Total		**5.989**	**1.245**	**7.467**	**14.701**
North-Western	Putalam	12	15.	31	58
In Total		**12**	**15**	**31**	**58**
Overall total		**42.336**	**10.089**	**40.723**	**93.148**

Source: Department of Census and Statistics, 2005

Annex 2

Government Leaflet – Official Tsunami Housing Policy



For those whose houses were affected by the Tsunami

500 sq.ft. house free of charge.
Grant of Rs. 100,000 to 250,000.
Loan up to Rs. 500,000.

Sri Lanka, the Pearl of the Indian Ocean, blessed with abundant natural resources, faced one of the worst natural disasters in the recent recorded history. Having consulted various stakeholders affected by this devastation the Government of Sri Lanka has decided to declare a Coastal Conservation (Buffer) Zone (CCZ). The Coastal Conservation (Buffer) Zone is introduced to better safeguard the lives of the coastal population and to protect the coastal environment from any future natural disasters. To minimize the difficulties that people living in these areas have to endure, the Government has taken the following key initiatives which will assist those affected by the Tsunami and rebuild Sri Lanka into a formidable Nation.

The Government will implement the following assistance schemes to owners of houses damaged by the Tsunami:

Houses within the Coastal Conservation (Buffer) Zone

- Reconstruction of damaged houses will not be permitted within the CCZ. Instead, the GOSL will provide **a house that is a minimum of 500 sq.ft. free of charge,** in close proximity to the original location.
- The proposed houses will be located in urban and rural settlements which will be provided with infrastructure such as electricity, water, sanitation, recreation facilities and road systems etc.

Houses outside the Coastal Conservation (Buffer) Zone

All affected house owners of Tsunami damaged properties will be entitled to a **Grant by the State.**

EXTENT OF DAMAGE	Fully damaged	Partially damaged
DEFINITION	Repair cost is **MORE** than 40% of replacement cost of the house	Repair cost is **LESS** than 40% of replacement cost of the house
VALUE OF GRANT	**Rs. 250,000/- disbursed in 4 stages**	**Rs. 100,000/- disbursed in 2 stages**

- House owners who have successfully utilized the above grant will be eligible to apply for a **concessionary loan of up to Rs. 500,000.00 from the state banks.**
- Please contact your nearest Branch of the Bank of Ceylon & People's Bank for details of the Grant and Loan.

The Coastal Conservation (Buffer) Zone (CCZ)

Zone 1	Zone 2
Coastal belt within the Kilinochchi, Mannar, Puttlam, Gampaha, Colombo, Kalutara, Galle, Matara, Hambantota districts	Coastal belt within the Jaffna, Mullaitivu, Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Ampara districts
100m landwards from the mean high water line	200m landwards from the mean high water line

The GOSL has decided that there will be no development activity within the Coastal Conservation Zone (Buffer) other than the exceptions listed below:

1. Coastal conservation structures and vegetation
2. Activities in connection with the fisheries industry such as harbours, piers, anchorages, warehouses and ancillary facilities
3. Agricultural activities approved by the Coast Conservation Department
4. Historical monuments and archeological sites
5. Essential infrastructure facilities

Further details could be obtained from the Tsunami Housing Reconstruction Unit (THRU) at the UDA
Tel: 2864150, 2875919

Ministry of Finance & Planning
Ministry of Urban Development & Water Supply

TAFREN

A Nation United

Government Leaflet – To rebuild our Tourism Industry

To rebuild our Tourism Industry

affected by the Tsunami

Special Tourism Zones.

Alternate land with better facilities free of charge.

Focused development plan for the Hospitality Industry.

Unencumbered access to beaches.

Sri Lanka, the Pearl of the Indian Ocean, blessed with abundant natural resources, faced one of the worst natural disasters in the recent recorded history. Having consulted various stakeholders affected by this devastation the Government of Sri Lanka has decided to declare a Coastal Conservation (Buffer) Zone (CCZ). The Coastal Conservation (Buffer) Zone is introduced to better safeguard the lives of the coastal population and to protect the coastal environment from any future natural disasters. The Government will set up special Tourism Zones covering all the tourist areas in the coastal belt. These zones will have modern infrastructure with an unencumbered view and access to the coast. There will be special incentives provided to promote sustainable and value added tourism.

The Coastal Conservation (Buffer) Zone (CCZ)

Zone 1	Zone 2
Coastal belt within the Kilinochchi, Mannar, Puttlam, Gampaha, Colombo, Kalutara, Galle, Matara, Hambantota districts	Coastal belt within the Jaffna, Mullaitivu, Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Ampara districts
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3. Agricultural activities approved by the Coast Conservation Department
4. Historical monuments and archeological sites
5. Essential infrastructure facilities

In recognition of the importance of the Tourism Industry in Sri Lanka, the below mentioned additional exceptions will apply to businesses in the Hospitality Industry approved by the Sri Lanka Tourist Board which have obtained all necessary regulatory approvals before 26th Dec. 2004.

Following are the guidelines for post Tsunami reconstruction of buildings used in the Hospitality Industry in the Tsunami affected districts:

Hospitality Business Premises not damaged by the Tsunami

- Such buildings will be allowed to remain within the Coastal Conservation (Buffer) Zone provided they had approval from all relevant regulatory authorities including the Sri Lanka Tourist Board prior to 26th Dec. 2004.

Hospitality Business Premises partially damaged by the Tsunami

- A building is deemed to be partially damaged if the cost of repair is below 40% of the replacement value of the building.
- Such buildings will be allowed to be re-constructed within the Coastal Conservation (Buffer) Zone provided they had approval from all relevant regulatory authorities including the Sri Lanka Tourist Board prior to 26th Dec. 2004.

Hospitality Business Premises completely destroyed by the Tsunami

- A building is deemed to be completely destroyed if the cost of repair exceeds 40% of the replacement value of the building.
- Such buildings will not be permitted to be reconstructed within the Coastal Conservation (Buffer) Zone. The Govt. together with the Tourist Board will establish special Tourism Zones by 31st March 2005. Businesses that are prevented from rebuilding within the CCZ will be given preference in allotment of land with similar or better facilities within the Tourism Zones to rebuild their businesses. The land will be provided **free of charge.**

Hospitality Business Premises under construction as at 25th December 2004

- Buildings under construction that were not damaged by the Tsunami will be allowed to be completed provided they had approval from all relevant regulatory authorities including the Sri Lanka Tourist Board prior to 26th Dec. 2004.
- Buildings under construction (with all relevant approvals) that were damaged by the Tsunami will be allowed to be completed provided the cost of completing the buildings does not exceed 60% of the value of the building when completed.
- Establishments that are not entitled to complete the buildings, will be entitled to land in the Tourism Zones described above.
- The same privilege (land in Tourism Zones etc.) will be afforded to those who have already obtained Government approvals to construct new buildings but had not commenced construction before 26th Dec. 2004.

Contact - The Chairman, Sri Lanka Tourist Board, 80 Galle Road, Colombo 3. Fax: 2437953 E-mail: ch@sri.lanka.net

Ministry of Tourism

TAFREN

Ceylon Tourist Board

A Nation United

Annex 3

Overview conducted interviews (Field visits: 11/2009-03/2010, 02-03/2011)

Sri Lanka	
Category	Description
Households	
German Haritha Gama	Permanent Tsunami settlers
German Harita Gama	Permanent Non-Tsunami settlers
Galle Fourt Gravets	Housing owners GHG non permanent settlers
Mahamodara	Housing owners GHG non permanent settlers
Gintota/Gintota East	Housing owners GHG non permanent settlers
Kaluwella	Housing owners GHG non permanent settlers
German Haritha Gama Focus Group Discussion	Permanent Tsunami settlers
Walahanduwa Watta (Private Donor Tsunami Relocation Project)	Permanent settlers neighbouring village
Walahanduwa Watta (Local Donor Tsunami Relocation Project)	Permanent settlers neighbouring village
Walahanduwa Watta (Donor Driven Tsunami Relocation Project) Walahanduwa Watta	Permanent settlers neighbouring village Non-Tsunami Village
Overall total households	

Amount
35
8
3
6
4
6
9
9
8
6
4
98

The tables show the number of households and persons who were interviewed but does not specify the number of sessions (several households/people were revisited and re-interviewed during the PhD research process).

Number of Interview Partners in Sri Lanka
Tbc on following sides.

Sri Lanka	
Category	Description
Government Officials	
Tsunami Housing Officer	DS Galle
Additional DS for Tsunami (former)	DS Galle
Social Service Officer	DS Galle
NGO coordinator	DS Galle
Director District Recovery and Development Unit	DS Galle
District Secretary	DS Galle
Government Agent	Galle
Urban Development Authority	Galle
Urban Development Authority	Colombo
Mayor	Galle City
Pradesh Sabah	Akmeemana
District Secretary	DS Akmeemana
Planning Officer	DS Akmeemana
Grama Niladhari	Pilana
Grama Niladhari	Gintota
Grama Niladhari	Mahamodara
Grama Niladhari	Kaluwella
Former Minister of Ministry of Public Administration and Home Affairs	Sri Lanka
Former Minister of Ministry of Water Supply and Development	Sri Lanka
National Housing Development Authority	Colombo
RADA Committee Member	Colombo
Overall total Government Officials	

Amount
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
3
1
25

Number of Interview Partners in Sri Lanka
Tbc on following sides.

Sri Lanka	
Category	Description
Aid Organisation Officials	Local Representative Galle GHG (current/former)
	Deputy Team Leader Palm Foundation
	Community Developer Palm Foundation
	Project Officer Practical Action
	Technical Advisor Sustainable Environment Technology Practical Action
	Former Project Staff DKH Office Sri Lanka
Overall total Aid Organisation Officials	
Key Informants	Local Lawyer legal Consultant to German donators
	CEO Porsche Sri Lanka (business friend of German donator)
	Former Legal Advisor Minister of Water Supply and Development (responsable project implementation GHG)
	Former Director National Housing Development Authority
	Local Academics (Colombo University)
Overall total Key Informants	
Overall total Interwiew Partners Sri Lanka	

Amount
2
1
1
1
1
3
9
1
1
1
1
3
8
131

Number of Interview Partners in Sri Lanka

Germany	
Category	Description
Private Donators	Project Initiators GHG
Government Officials	Former Administrative Officer Ministry of the Environment Ba-Wü
Aid Organisation Officials	Project Coordinator Asia DKH – Headquarters
	Former Director DKH
	Current Director DKH
	Former Technical Consultant to DKH
Overall total Interwiew Partners Gemany	

Amount
3
1
2
1
1
1
9

Number of Interview Partners in Germany

Annex 4

The table does specify which internal documents were accessed in order to gain more insights into the private donator driven housing project

Category	Description	Amount
Monthly Reports Local Office Sri Lanka	2005-2007	15
GHG three monthly Reports	March 2006, June 2006, September 2006, March 2007, June 2007	5
Final Project Report	August 2008	1
Minutes of Donator Meetings in Baden Württemberg	2005-2007	12
Communication Donators, Ministry of the Environment, Local Office DKH Sri Lanka/Germany	Letters, Emails, conversation notes	42
GHG Village Community	Letter of Complains to AID and Donators	2
Village Management	Village Constitution	1
Total Number of used internal documents		**79**